Ask Slashdot: Does SSL Validation Matter?
An anonymous reader writes "Right now, in an email list excluded from the public eye, some bright people are discussing the future of SSL. Under debate is (a) do they allow DV (domain only validation) certificates to continue to exist (exist for e-commerce use? only encryption use?) or do they require a higher degree of certificate validation? (b) Do they allow certificates to be issued with non-unique common names (certificates used on internal networks, think your exchange server) or do they ban the practice? If this were 'hypothetically' a heated debate going on right now and you could chime in, what would you say?"
Domain Validation (DV) certs are not the same as OV, Organizational Validation, or EV, Extended Validation, certs. Web SSL certs are OV or EV. DV certs are intended to validate that the FQDN is valid (i.e. correctly owned by the domain). This is the job that DNSsec is meant to address in many ways. There's already been public discussion on some of the crypto forums such as mozilla-crypto (ok, for some value of "public" - but it's not a closed list). The DNSsec crowd have asked about putting certificate signatures in DNSsec and the entrenched CA crowd got all up and in arms and huffy about it. But DV certs would just tie the certs to the domain owners, and that's all, which is exactly what can be done in DNSsec. And, yes, we all know, the domain could be faked but that's not the point. The point is to tie a certificate back to the domain owner or not. The OV/EV certs are what validate the organization claiming to own the domain/FQDN. The CA crowd doesn't like the fact that DNSsec can do for free what they can charge money for. DNSsec puts the power totally in the hands of the domain owners (where it bloody well belongs). Now if we could just get certain bloody registrars, like Network Solutions, to let us register our key signing keys, we could get on with things. The root zone (.) is signed. The .org, .net, .com, .edu, and .gov zones are all signed and numerous other ccTLDs are signed. Godaddy and others are reported to be accepting DNSsec registrations. Where is Network Solutions? A sleep at the switch last I looked. And OpenDNS continues to pout, whining "I donwanna... Use DNS Curve or I'm gonna cry." DV certs are a solution in search of a problem and DNSsec is a better solution.
1) Stop selling the idea that certificates "verify" who you're talking to. They don't. They never did. As soon as I compromise your server -- easily done, as history shows -- I have your certificate. If it is remote across your network, a little more work, but still, soon I'll have it. Now you have still encryption of the intermediate channel, but the wrong person is catching the data.
2) Tell the truth for once, and let people know that certificates provide encryption of the intermediate channel, hardening ONLY that channel against interception (but NOT proofing it.) ID is NOT provided, only an invalid assumption of ID built out of the lies of Verisign and its co-scammers.
3) Stop "allowing" certificates at all. We can easily make them at zero cost, and we should. The whole "Verisign" thing is a complete and utter scam, and always has been, one with the collusion of the browser makers with the fake warnings and "scare the user" policies. Giving ownership of the encrypted data channel to profit making operations was a stupid, stupid move, and has served only to cripple e-commerce from the day it began -- it's one more useless and endless cost for the small entrepreneur to have to absorb, and therefore in the end, the consumer. Further, it has evolved into a higher stakes / cost game of buying that little green verification bar in some browsers. Scams upon scams.
Doesn't matter how "smart" the people are working on this. They'll go with the money.
I've fallen off your lawn, and I can't get up.