Airline Pilots Allowed To Dodge Security Screening

OverTheGeicoE writes "Wired has a story about TSA's known crewmember program, which allows airline pilots to bypass traditional airport security on their way to the cockpit. Pilots will be verified using a system known as CrewPASS that relies on uniforms, identity cards, fingerprints, and possibly other biometrics to authenticate flight deck crews. Once they are authenticated, they can enter secure areas in airports without any further screening. Participation at present is voluntary, and applies at Baltimore/Washington (BWI), Pittsburg (PIT), Columbia (CAE) and now Chicago O'Hare (ORD) airports. TSA is hoping to expand the program nationally. Bruce Schneier thinks this program is 'a really bad idea.' Pilots are already avoiding scanners and patdowns at security checkpoints (video). Is the new program just a way for TSA to hide this fact from the flying public?"

Comments

How is this a problem?

[FunkSoulBrother]

Couldn't a pilot who's convinced to pull off a terrorist attack just, well -- do it? They are at the controls and all...

Re:How is this a problem?

[danceswithtrees]

Can't they carry guns in the cockpit?
http://www.tsa.gov/lawenforcement/programs/ffdo.shtm

The guns are meant to be used against "bad guys" but they work just as well on pilots, co-pilots, etc. Once the rest of the crew is dead, and the door is already secured, fly the plane into whatever you want. No need for box cutters. Profit (just kidding).

Re:How is this a problem?

[Ieshan]

The problem is not really preventing pilots from carrying guns on planes. It's preventing people who look like pilots from being given special security breaks and dealing with the costs associated with preventing that while reaping only minimal gains from not scanning pilots.

This essay: https://www.schneier.com/essay-130.html by Schneier does a fantastic job at explaining the problem. The basic synopsis is:
1) Security is a system, and for all the easy changes you make ("Let's not screen pilots, that makes no sense!"), you actually need to build tons of other systems (Databases to validate pilot IDs, training for security personnel to access those databases, hard to forge ID cards to identify pilots, etc).
2) Because of those things you didn't think of in (1), and because security is a zero-sum game, all the dollars you spend building security systems to deal with pilots and all the minutes that you save not screening them could have been spent doing more impactful things that make everyone safer and reduce time at the security checkpoint for less money.

Basically, with limited resources and the hidden costs of not scanning pilots, is it worth it to not scan pilots? Probably not.

Something more useful

[__aaxtnf2500]

Send them through a breathalyzer-only checkpoint and you will have satisfied me.

That's not the issue.

[khasim]

The issue is whether a terrorist can impersonate a pilot long enough to bypass the screening process.

Once you introduce multiple avenues for clearance, you introduce vulnerabilities.

Re:Great for smuggling, especially narcotics

[YrWrstNtmr]

Is there really any significant advantage to not screening crew?

Sure, for the crew. If you, the crew, have to go through the same tired, intrusive screening 3, 4, 5 times a day...you'd get pretty damn tired of it.

Re:how about not screening *anybody*?

[sjames]

Actually, we can to a high degree of certainty. It is as much in the nature of a disliked government agency to crow from the rooftops any small success it might have as it is for water to flow down hill.

They haven't crowed.

We do know that two terrorists slipped right through the TSA since 9/11. Both were stopped by the passengers.

In baseball, that's called an Ofer

Re:Really?

[aix tom]

Hey, now I have figured it all out. The terrorist have just changed tactics:

They started impersonating TSA agents a few years back without anybody noticing. After all, those are the ones terrorizing people these days.