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Kernel.org Compromised
First time accepted submitter JoeF writes "There is a note posted on the main kernel.org page indicating that kernel.org was compromised earlier this month: 'Earlier this month, a number of servers in the kernel.org infrastructure were compromised. We discovered this August 28th. While we currently believe that the source code repositories were unaffected, we are in the process of verifying this and taking steps to enhance security across the kernel.org infrastructure.' The note goes on to say that it is unlikely to have affected the source code repositories, due to the nature of git."
And seriously, why else would you hack kernel.org?
If the same thing happened to Microsoft, Microsoft wouldn't let anybody know.
If the attackers were worth their salt, after gaining access they would drop in their own custom replacements for patch, make and gcc.
Since patch, make, and gcc are all GNU tools and not part of the Linux kernel, the only harm would be to the single copy on the kernel.org machine. If that machine isn't part of the build process (i.e., if it was merely a file repository), then nothing would be compromised.
It would also be pretty easy to see because builds from other machines wouldn't match.
H.P.A. has commit privs and his work laptop was trojanned. That's how. Am I the only one who reads and understands the original e-mails from the admin?
C|N>K
Ok... I'll bite.... I will concede that Windows is a lot more secure than some folks will have you believe, but there is still one glaringly huge security flaw in Windows that would be ridiculously easy for Microsoft to fix: the accounts created during install time are all administrative accounts.
To its credit, Windows will allow you to change those accounts to non-administrative, and it will give you the option of creating non-administrative accounts when you later go in to the user cp, but by default, it still makes everybody an administrator unless explicitly told not to.
Now... the fundamentals of securing a Windows system are exactly the same as the fundamentals of securing a Linux system: don't run any unnecessary daemons, particularly daemons that listen to outside connections, and be careful what you allow to run on your computer. When possible, run anything that executes arbitrary code (like, say, Flash or Silverlight) sandboxed, or not at all. And above all, apply all security updates as soon as they're available. (well, assuming your source of security patches didn't get compromised....)
It's not hard to lock down a Windows system, and all of the above has been doable since NT3.1 in 1993. But as long as its default setting is for users to have administrative access, and it doesn't require any kind of secondary authentication to run programs with elevated permissions (and don't get me started on the debacle that is UAC), then Windows is *not* as secure as most Linux distros. The average user is simply not going to go out of their way to lock down a system once they have gone through the initial setup, and with that in mind, Windows is defective by design. It's in the name of usability, which is certainly understandable, but don't paint it with rose coloured glasses: you can achieve the same level of security under Windows, but you have to do more to reach it.
Yeah, like I need to be reminded what year it is on a daily basis.
Actually YMD is useful because it sorts.