Rogue SSL Certs Issued For CIA, MI6, Mossad
Orome1 writes with this excerpt from Help Net Security: "The number of rogue SSL certificates issued by Dutch CA DigiNotar has ballooned from one to a couple dozen to over 250 to 531 in just a few days. As Jacob Appelbaum of the Tor project shared the full list of the rogue certificates, it became clear that fraudulent certificates for domains of a number of intelligence agencies from around the world were also issued during the CA's compromise — including the CIA, MI6 and Mossad. Additional targeted domains include Facebook, Yahoo!, Microsoft, Skype, Twitter, Tor, Wordpress and many others."
We've now had proof positive that no centralized trust system is workable against a sustained attack. Can we start to get some distributed trust systems in place, instead? The idea of a single proof of identity has failed. It's time to move on to a system that allows multiple checks and balances.
Monocultures are great for creating massive failures, which is why nature wipes them out over time.
It may not be complete, but, F-secure has a list of the ones created, including *.*.com, *.*.org, www.cia.gov, addons.mozilla.org, *.torproject.org, etc...
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That may very well work for you or your organization. Not so much for third parties or the internet, which is the case here. I mean... would you trust a bank's homepage if it's self-signed?
I rarely respond to comments. Also, don't ask for clarifications: a brain and Google are faster, believe me!
Related: Forget Rogue, Microsoft handed ability to intercept SSL on windows (Another Wikileaks revelation, translated) to Tunisian dictator Ben Ali, apparently in return for contracts, stifling open source competition etc etc in Tunisia and allowing them to intercept Facebook, Google,... before the Arab spring revolution took place.