Fukushima and Chernobyl Side-by-Side

gbrumfiel writes "It's now been six months since an earthquake and tsunami sparked a triple meltdown at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant. New data from the Japanese government is now allowing a closer comparison of the fallout from the disaster with the Chernobyl. In terms of Cs-137, the contaminant of greatest concern, Fukushima appears to be about a fifth as bad as Chernobyl. Nature News has a Google Earth mash-up that lets you see the two accidents together. Nature also reports that chaos and bureaucracy are slowing efforts to research the crisis." (Note: There's plenty left for Linux users in the accompanying text, but the Google Earth plug-in is for Windows and Mac OS X only.)

Comments

Should have been much less

[tp1024]

The problem I have with Fukushima is that the only criticisms of the safety mechanisms of the plant referred to two things: namely the lack of tsunami protection and the how people dealt with the aftermath. Otherwise it was stressed that Japan is a modern country with state-of-the-art technology. But those were literally the least of the problems. The whole Japanese coast in the area had tsunami protection after the devastating tsunamis of 1933 and 1896 ... which was overwhelmed, wiping a dozen towns off the coast. Either you criticize all of Japan in that regard, or none of it. And the way people are dealing with the aftermath is of much less concern than they dealt with safety before the accident.

In fact, Fukushima Daiichi could be found on the third last position in a world wide safety ranking of nuclear power plants in 2010. (Mostly concerned with on-site radioactivity that was pretty high due to leaks.) It lacked emergency generators (13 generators for 6 reactors - I've seen 12 generators in place for one reactor. At least 4 per reactor is common). It lacked redundancy in those generators. They were all the same kind of sea-water cooled diesel generators. And because of the latter, they lacked protection against common cause failure, which demands that you distribute emergency equipment over as wide an area as possible ... which is obviously very limited if you have fixed installations dependent on sea water.

It also lacked filtered containment vents. Those filters can filter out at least 99% of the Caesium and Iodine (I remember a figure of 99.99% but don't know if it was Cs-137 or I-131). It's somewhat expensive (although just a fraction of the cost of the whole plant), but was adopted in Europe in the 1980ies. Further, safety protocols didn't take account of the finding that the Mark I containment didn't properly seal in a test at a prototype plant at a pressure of about 70 bar. (In emergencies it is supposed to be tight up to 72 bar, but regular testing is only done up to 62 bar.) Which was what allowed the massive quantities of hydrogen to get into the buildings in the first place.

Finally, because hydrogen getting into the buildings couldn't be ruled out in 100% of the cases during simulations, at least European plants were equipped with passive autocatalytic recombiners in all closed rooms of the reactor building. Those are catalytic converters that burn hydrogen with oxygen in the air before it can reach concentrations in the buildings, where it can ignite and either burn or (as we've seen) explode. Those are pretty cheap (about $5 mio per reactor bulding) and were installed in the 1990ies.

None of what happened was a surprise to anyone who dug out the freely available descriptions and research on the safety of the Mark I containment after the earthquake. But of course, that is something that the media couldn't be bothered with. Because they are "reporters" and as such doing research or actually understanding what they are reporting is clearly beneath them. All that reporters are there for, is to "report" (that is: parrot) the statements of politicians and whatever "experts" they feel will give them the answers they want.

Overall, the containments used in Fukushima are a great demonstration of what engineers of the 1960ies could do. They did a remarkable job in preventing a major disaster like Chernobyl. But it also shows what happens when you ignore all further developments. There were flaws in the models of what happens during a meltdown that became obvious only years or decades after the development of those containments. In engineering on the one hand and in radiology on the other - namely, that the dangers of I-131 were under-appreciated until about that time. (Exposure limits were cut down to about one thousands of the previous limits some time in the late 1960ies.)

But given the way reporting was and is being done, nothing of that will ever be known to a wide audience - because it doesn't square with the scare

Mod parent up!

[Idou]

I was there when it happened and left for this very reason (at significant cost to my finances and career). It took 3 months for them to confirm rumors that the reactors had melted down, and the rumors these days are that steam is coming from cracks in the ground.

I think, in the end, the USSR did not feel like it needed to play PR games with the public. The government already had complete control, so they had no reason to lie at a certain point. However, PR is everything for the nuclear lobby in Japan, which may be the most powerful group in the country (remember, Japan is not just the #1 exporter of nuclear reactors, they are the ONLY exporter). Any little fact that gets denied, delayed, or manipulated results in either additional profit made or saved. Accordingly, I do not consider the reports coming out of Japan as facts, just measuring points for where the tip of the iceberg is.