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Certificate Blunders May Mean the End For DigiNotar
Certificate Authority DigiNotar is having a rough time of it. dinscott writes with these words from Help Net Security: "After having its SSL and EVSSL certificates deemed untrustworthy by the most popular browsers, around 4200 qualified certificates — i.e. certificates used to create digital signatures — issued by the CA are currently in the process of being revoked and their holders notified of the fact by the Dutch independent post and telecommunication authority (OPTA). Starting from yesterday, OPTA has terminated the accreditation of DigiNotar as a certificate provider for 'qualified' certificates. The revocation of this accreditation also makes DigiNotar unqualified to issue certificates under the PKIoverheid CA."
It's not like we have reason to think that other CAs have not had unreported blunders. In fact, we have every reason to think that the whole CA system is broken, and is just hanging on because nobody is willing to put in the effort needed to replace it.
Palm trees and 8
Hopefully this will get the others CAs worried and motivate them to get better security.
If getting compromised and issuing bad certificates *didn't* cost you your position of trust, then what credibility would the certification process have anyway?
If you won't properly separate your security-critical systems from your Internet-facing systems, or cannot even keep them from being rooted multiple times, you have no business being a CA.
Honestly, it's understandable DigiNotar didn't want this information out: bankrupcy is inevitable now, and that's bad for shareholder value.
Error: password can't contain reverse spelling of ancient Chinese emperor
What.. you reckon? They were tasked to do ONE THING and ended up in an epic case of fail and pwnage.
Never email donotemail@WeAreSpammers.com
Firstly, Microsoft has invalidated the cert (at least to my knowledge).
Your knowledge is incorrect. At the request of the Dutch government, Microsoft deliberately did NOT patch its systems from that country... until several weeks later when the government's request was made public and they retracted their request.
But Microsoft HAS pulled the cert, whereas your comment was written as if they have not yet done so. And my knowledge of this is not incorrect unless you are still implying that Microsoft has yet to invalidate those certs.
Secondly, it is not at all clear how moving to ipv6 tells the corporations to eat a bag of dicks
Perhaps not to you, but to the rest of us who have read the standard... end to end encryption means no man in the middle attacks, no certificate authorities, etc. Every organization has access to its own key in DNS, and if someone tries to replace it, anyone who has connected to it previously would know.
It does not mean no man in the middle attacks. Even with IPSec you still have to trust, whether you are trusting a CA or the DNS, you are still trusting. If your ISP is your DNS provider, and they are also the best positioned to implement MITM attacks, then unless you have a shared secret, using a CA in a country like Iran may actually be more secure.
This is just going through the motions. DigiNotar has been dead since August 30, when Google, Mozilla, and Microsoft all revoked trust in their certificates. Anyone with at least two brain cells (which seems to exclude a large number of managers, unfortunately) could see the writing on the wall. No one would ever buy a new DigiNotar certificate, since it would always pop up a scary warning to the user in a web browser. Why bother with buying a certificate from DigiNotar and dealing with the resulting end-user support issues, when you can buy from someone else and not have to deal with the problem?
More interesting to me is what will happen to DigiNotar's corporate parent, Vasco Data Security? The purchase of DigiNotar is relatively recent (January 10, 2011), so it's not clear how much influence Vasco's management had over DigiNotar's operations. At the very least, Vasco is going to need to pay for an audit of its own systems to reassure its direct customers.
--Paul
IPv6 security options can give you end-to-end encryption similar to what IPSEC gives you, if you always turn it on.
End to end encryption means that nobody can eavesdrop on connections that you've set up to the party on the far end. If that party is actually the party you think they are, and they're somebody you should trust, that's a Good Thing - if they're a Man In The Middle, you lose (though it reduces the number of ankle-biters who might be trying to eavesdrop on you, and it's kind of comforting to know that your credit card is only being stolen by the Russian Mafia and not by the other people in the coffee shop with you.)
End to End Encryption doesn't give you a way to authenticate connections to people you don't already know. That's a job for certification authorities, or somebody doing a similar job. If you do already know the party at the other end, and have an authenticated connection of some kind (like a pre-shared key or a SecureID token or a courier with a briefcase handcuffed to his arm or a yellow sticky note or a PGP key on a business card that somebody who wasn't an impostor handed you ), end-to-end encryption systems can do things like Diffie-Hellman key exchange to bootstrap that into a full connection.
"Every organization has access to its own key in DNS" is an assertion about the DNS system, not the network or transport protocols. It sounds like you're thinking about DNSSEC, which _should_ have been deployed decades ago (but among other problems, they were blocked by the US ITAR anti-crypto mafiosi.) If DNSSEC had been deployed properly along with the DNS system, you could be sure that if you had the correct IP address for microsoft.com, you'd also have the correct public key for setting up connections to microsoft.com's web site, and if you have the correct IP address for m1cr0s0tf.com, you'd also have the correct public key for setting up connections to m1cr0s0tf.com, which might or might not be somebody you want to talk to.
Bill Stewart
New Fast-Compression-only CPR http://preview.tinyurl.com/dy575ks
The current system is that your browser ships with a bunch of CA's listed in it, many of which are currently in business, and some of which are trustable, and some of which are random corporate leftovers run by shadowy anonymous figures, and if you're like most people you haven't bothered listing them (or if you did, it was years ago.) So from a technical standpoint, perhaps you're in deep trouble, but it's your own fault because you didn't look. See figure 1.
From a business/financial standpoint, it's different. Many of those CAs are run by reputable firms, whose business models are that they'll give a certificate to anybody who pays them $100 (or whatever the going rate is this year), and they'll certify that the payer's credit card was good, and maybe, just maybe, they'll only deliver the SSL certificate to an email address or web site that matches the keys they just certified, or do some similarly minimal level of validation. Some of the CAs, of course, require more documentation, charge more money, and provide methods for a user to validate one of their certificates other than using it and seeing if their browser flagged it. But not everybody uses those CAs - Microsoft.com probably does, and Microsfot.cm probably doesn't. So from a business/financial standpoint, you're in sort of the same condition you were in in the previous paragraph, except that you can rely on the financial guarantees that the CA gave you, the user of a browser that trusted their certificate, unless you didn't pay them anything, in which case you should also see figure 1.
Back to technology, there's the problem of whether a certificate is still good. That's backed by three things, expiration dates on the certificates, ability to validate a certificate chain, and revocation lists that the CAs provide to deal with the problem of certificates that were compromised before they expired. Expiration dates on most certificates tend to either be the remaining fraction of one year (because the CA is charging for them on an annual bases) or "already expired". And that certificate chain's useful, if the CAs on it are still in business and their certificates haven't already expired, unless their certification system has been compromised without being detected, in which case see figure 1.
And then there's the user interface issue - if you're directly using a browser, and everything's good, it'll probably turn a little lock icon green, which you won't notice. Otherwise, it'll give you a dialog box, "Security problem - See figure 1 [Click OK]", and you'll click OK, and you'll either feel fine, or you'll have this little nagging feeling that something was wrong, but you're not sure what.
And then there's the financial layer again. If the certificate was protecting your credit card number, and you're in the US, you're liable for at most $50 if it got stolen, and otherwise it was probably just protecting your Facebook account, in which case the worst that'll happen is somebody posting rude notes to your friends, or overwatering the shrubbery in your farm. So fundamentally, you don't care that the CA system is broken.
One of the advantages of having been one of the early cypherpunks is that I got to watch a lot of this stuff develop, see many of the things that were done right or wrong, and know a lot of people who are either much smarter than I am (too many of them to list here) or who went out and Did The Right Thing at the Right Time (special shout-out to the Netscape folks, who went and shipped encryption for free even though the legality was dubious, which not only catalyzed the internet commerce business but broke the government's anti-crypto stronghold.) Lots of the solutions that shipped weren't perfect, and lots of the solutions that were Perfect never shipped, and lots of the solutions people spent time on didn't have problems associated with them, but it did still transform the world.
Bill Stewart
New Fast-Compression-only CPR http://preview.tinyurl.com/dy575ks