Water Pump Destruction Not Due To SCADA Hack
knifeyspooney writes "According to the Springfield State Journal-Register, the city's recent public water system failure was not caused by malicious activity. One water district trustee spoke this gem: 'First, they tell us that it's the first instance of cyber hacking in the entire world, and everyone goes nuts. Now, all of a sudden, they tell us it's not.'"
say what? first instance of cyber hacking? are you suuuuuuuure about that?
simple. you tell that it is due to cyberhack. everyone goes nuts, endless number of articles spread throughout internet. then you admit that it wasnt. at this point it is now impossible to change misinformation. the misinformation spreads, public opinion is shaped. you can pass your $OPA act.
http://www.abc.net.au/science/articles/2011/07/11/3265013.htm
http://idle.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=10/07/14/1235220
Read radical news here
No. It was a revised statement based on new information. That's still allowed, right?
Watch the attempted connections to any machine on a public IP. Probably takes about 20 minutes to get an IP from every country in the world.
Yes, but we would prefer if government agencies didn't jump to outrageous conclusions before all the information is gathered.
As an actual control systems engineer who uses the Siemens Simatic range of PLC/HMI/Servo drives, it doesnt take a two year old who knows how torrents works to download the WinCC flex HMI programming software, throw together a few screens with some built in clipart of pumps and generators and claim he has hacked a city's water supply... or uranium plant, or Area 51 air con system..
Well stuxnet affected Programmable logic controllers that affected centrifuges refining nuclear material. I was at a conference recently and half the talks were about stuxnet, duqu and PLCs, the show was not energy or utility industry related, but basically anything with a PLC is vulnerable to this sort of attack.
There were a lot of folks in industry talking about how uncertain they were about how tight their air-gaps were. Stuxnet got past air-gaps anyway, but at least a lot of the industrial controls folks are talking about it now. It would have been nice if someone listened when US-CERT reported researchers were able to remotely burn out an electrical generator in 2005.