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Scammers Work Around Two-Factor Authentication With Social Engineering
mask.of.sanity writes "Thieves have made off with $45k after they intercepted a victim's two factor online banking codes used to verify large transactions. The scammers got the Australian executive's mobile number from his daughter, and work place details from his willing secretary. Armed with this data, they bluffed Vodafone which ported his phone number, meaning the criminals could verify the bank's two factor verification codes generated during their spending spree and the victim never knew a thing."
It wouldn't make a significant difference even if they did.
There are thousands of examples of carriers being tricked into forwarding numbers by 3rd parties. I do it all the time for customers that port into us if something goes wrong with the porting process.
Often all I do is:
1. Identify myself as $MYNAME from $MYCOMPANY. (NOT $THEIRCLIENT)
2. State that I'm calling on behalf of $THEIRCLIENT.
3. Tell them that $THEIRCLIENT is in the process of moving to our services and need to forward the number temporarily.
4. Carrier asks for the forwarding number and it's generally done in 1-2 hours.
The only shred of validation that might happen is them checking my caller id. I've never needed an account number, billing contact name, authorization code, or anything. Just the phone number.
I've even offered to pay for the forward but been declined because I'm not $THEIRCLIENT. They were happy enough to charge the $THEIRCLIENT on my behalf.
Phones/SMS/etc will never be a reliable way to verify an account holder because it really can be anyone on the other end.
The point is that if you trust your cell phone to be a 2nd authentication factor for your banking, you've contracted out your security to [the dumbest customer service rep at] your mobile carrier.
Also, being broke is probably a pretty good strategy for avoiding these kinds of problems.
My God, it's Full of Source!
OUTSIDE_IP=$(dig +short my.ip @outsideip.net)
no form of security is absolutely 100% perfect in every way..
Right; but that's not something new. No bank vault has ever been 100% safe either. The difference is that the bank takes responsibility for that so they ensure that it's "good enough", whatever that means. If money gets stolen from the bank vault they don't say "oh that was money from your account; sorry". With electronic security, there's often a level where they blame the failure of their own security measures on "identity theft" and make it the customer's responsibility. Two factor authentication of this kind is fine for a transaction of a few thousand dollars; It's not enough for transactions of hundreds of thousands of dollars. For 45k AUD that's a judgement call. `
This case is not like most American and some European banks though; Commonwealth Bank discovered the problem its self, is paying off the cost of the transaction and, even so, warned their customer. When they take the responsibility for the losses then what systems to use or not use become their commercial judgement. They looked at an MNP security system and decided there was something wrong with it. Maybe they now change their mind, maybe not. That's exactly the right thing. Hopefully they can persuade Vodafone to at least send a text message warning customers that their number is being ported before they actually do it in future.
=~ s,(.*),<sarcasm>$1</sarcasm>,g if any_point_you_wish();