Another Dutch CA Hacked
An anonymous reader writes "After the fiasco involving DigiNotar, another Dutch CA (Gemnet, a daughter of KPN-Telecom) has been hacked and databases were accessed, webwereld.nl reports (Dutch original). The hack was possible because the website was managed using PHP-MyAdmin, and this application allowed database access without a password. The site has been shut down and security checks were ordered."
So a CA, holder of the keys for SSL certs, had an externally facing db admin module with no password... Just wow...
At what point does this become "criminal negligence"?
And you'd expect there would be some sort of periodic audit process in place for anyone that manages a root certificate? hippa-style something or other? Or will they just set up any idiots with a CA that have good credit?
I work for the Department of Redundancy Department.
this application allowed database access without a password
Nope, it doesn't.. not unless configured by a really clueless person, or (this being Holland) by someone who really couldn't give a f**k while being mis-managed by someone determined to spend as little as possible, or hopefully less.
(disclaimer; I'm a sysadmin who runs, amongst many other things, a MySQL server + PHPmyadmin for my company in the Netherlands, I do it properly but that's only because I care, nobody has ever checked..)
"Oops, I always forget the purpose of competition is to divide people into winners and losers." - Hobbes
The hack was possible because the website was managed using PHP-MyAdmin, and this application allowed database access without a password.
That's a bit misleading. From what I gather the hack was possible because the database was configured to allow access without a password. Considering that, whether or not PHPMyAdmin is appropriate is a tiny matter by comparison. The summary makes it sound like PHPMyAdmin is to blame.
Personally, I now have more faith in the CA system than before.
When a rogue CA was spotted, within days it had was revoked AND ALL ITS CERTIFICATES FAILED, including ones running in government departments, in every major web browser (totally independently).
That's a pretty damn good response, and caused the collapse of the company and a government investigation - because browsers that have NOTHING to do with the CA's or the government unilaterally revoked a CA certificate in their browsers.
The point of the CA system is trust. At some point you have to trust someone. Web of trust is just trusting the majority of public opinion, statistics or some other automated metric. The CA system is trusting particular institutions and browser makers (who, if you don't trust anyway, you wouldn't be doing business with or using their product).
One CA abused that trust and they disappeared from the web overnight. But I still trust my CA. It's like saying that because one hosting company had a website vandal, everyone should just stop using website hosts.
And now it's in the news, every tiny little breach is going to come to light whereas before, unless you followed the OSCP revocations religiously, you'd never have known.
The CA system did exactly what it was designed to do and it worked much better than I would have ever expected. I don't see the Dutch CA failing as a failure of the system - the system worked and continues to work. It's like the Internet - it just routes around damage and carries on (by revoking the trust - which you can do yourself in any browser - in those who are untrustworthy).
So the first question I expected t.f.a. to answer:
What is the subject name of this Ca so I can remove it from my list of "trusted" Cas?