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Researchers Build TCP-Based Spam Detection

itwbennett writes "In a presentation at the Usenix LISA conference in Boston, researchers from the Naval Academy showed that signal analysis of factors such as timing, packet reordering, congestion and flow control can reveal the work of a spam-spewing botnet. The work 'advanced both the science of spam fighting and ... worked through all the engineering challenges of getting these techniques built into the most popular open-source spam filter,' said MIT computer science research affiliate Steve Bauer, who was not involved with the work. 'So this is both a clever bit of research and genuinely practical contribution to the persistent problem of fighting spam.'"

5 of 81 comments (clear)

  1. Why do we keep doing this? by damn_registrars · · Score: 5, Insightful

    People are looking at the wrong end of the problem with much of their efforts - and this is just another example of that. You cannot solve spam with filtering, detection, or legislative actions. We've seen time and time again that those are just time and money-sucking stopgap measures that ignore the reality of the situation.

    We won't see a real solution to the spam epidemic until people acknowledge the simple truth that spam is an economic problem. There is still a lot of money to be made by sending out spam, with very little expense for the spammer. The profit margin is high enough that it is well worth their while to find various ways around filters and any other silly mechanisms we throw at them.

    If you want to make an actual difference in the fight against spam, you need to approach the economic motivations behind it. If you stop of the flow of money to the spammers, you will stop the spam as well. Because no matter how much some people may want to believe otherwise, spam isn't sent just to piss you off and ruin your day. Spam is sent out because spammers are paid to do so. If they don't get paid, they won't send spam, it is as simple as that. Any other kind of countermeasure only prolongs the fight and throws more money in the wrong direction.

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    Damn_registrars has no butt-hole. Damn_registrars has no use for a butt-hole.
    1. Re:Why do we keep doing this? by Tom · · Score: 5, Insightful

      The economic side has been tackled as well, and it turns out that it is not easier than the technological side. More importantly: It involves politics, and politics move slowly on all problems of the commons (i.e. low impact on many people).

      --
      Assorted stuff I do sometimes: Lemuria.org
    2. Re:Why do we keep doing this? by Halo1 · · Score: 5, Insightful

      The same can be said about pickpocketing, burglary and almost any other kind of crime. As long as technical measures can help with partially or temporarily alleviating the problems without causing disproportional side effects or requiring disproportionately large investments (i.e., not TSA nonsense vs terrorism, but more like door locks vs breaking and entering), I don't see what the problem is with developing and deploying them.

      --
      Donate free food here
  2. Skip the ITWorld article by wkcole · · Score: 4, Informative

    I'm sure 'itwbennett' would rather everyone go to his employer's website to read that article, but it is clearly not written (or edited) by anyone who has any basic clues about spam-fighting. Just reading the subtitle makes me cringe for the unfortunate "journalists" lassoed into writing it, as it was clearly done by spam neophytes in a desperate scramble for click-scrounging content. The article is vaguely about a paper presented almost a year ago at LISA '11. There are links to an abstract and the original paper at the LISA '11 site: http://www.usenix.org/events/lisa11/tech/

    The general space of sniffing out spam by looking at TCP characteristics has been mined for years usefully with Symantec and MailChannels both offering proprietary tools that use such techniques and some open DNSBL's using TCP sniffing to identify sources, but it would be incorrect to believe that any one methodology will ever be a magical silver bullet against spam.

  3. Re:Please stop by DamonHD · · Score: 3, Interesting

    This rather assumes that every MTA will have the same threshold. It is not necessary (or helpful) to have a security monoculture.

    A very simple first defence against such rate tuning is to randomly vary thresholds substantially between systems and from time to time.

    Rgds

    Damon

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    http://m.earth.org.uk/