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Sykipot Trojan Variant Stealing DoD Smartcard Credentials

Trailrunner7 writes "A new research report says variants of the Sykipot Trojan have been found that can steal Dept. of Defense smartcard credentials. The research, published in a blog post Thursday, is the latest by Alien Vault to look at Sykipot, a Trojan horse program known to be used in targeted attacks against the defense industry. The new variants, which Alien Vault believes have been circulating since March, 2011, have been used in 'dozens of attacks' and contain features that would allow remote attackers to steal smart card credentials and access sensitive information."

25 of 44 comments (clear)

  1. Ouch! by jd · · Score: 4, Interesting

    Those cards are heavily used. It's not like this would only impact e-mail, the cards are pretty much used for everything.

    --
    It's a small world and it smells funny; I'd buy another if it wasn't for the money; Take back what I paid (SoM)
    1. Re:Ouch! by HBI · · Score: 3, Informative

      They are frequently reissued and new certs generated. This causes its own issues, though. The reissued cards cost money and time, and they cause an issue when trying to decrypt old mail, for instance. Specifically, you can't.

      The whole PKI infrastructure thing has not been a glowing success in its largest known implementation.

      --
      HBI's Law: Frequency of calling others Nazis is directly correlated with the likelihood of the accuser being Communist.
    2. Re:Ouch! by imamac · · Score: 2

      I believe you're referring to my post. I didn't say it would be "totally OK". I said it's better than basic longing/password security. I have seen L/P security breached thousands of times. This is the first I have head of a security issue with DoD CACs.

    3. Re:Ouch! by jank1887 · · Score: 3, Informative

      smart cards are not used without passwords. there's still a 'something you know' aspect to go along with something you have. it's just not the traditional login/password.

    4. Re:Ouch! by binary_state · · Score: 1

      Incorrect, the old certs are recoverable pretty easily, you vist a website, present your CAC, and have access to all your old Certs.

    5. Re:Ouch! by HBI · · Score: 1

      Contractor CACs (the vast majority) expire with the contract year, usually. The interpretation of the rules by local staff is the arbiter of how it is done. Basically, they shouldn't be issuing the CAC for option years that have not been paid for.

      --
      HBI's Law: Frequency of calling others Nazis is directly correlated with the likelihood of the accuser being Communist.
  2. That's what they want you to think by dak664 · · Score: 4, Funny

    There is a trojan within the trojan to guide the black helicopters to your home. In fact I risk the BSOD just posting this.

  3. vulnerability in the Adobe Reader by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Informative

    Per the Article:

    >> The Trojan is delivered to target systems in a corrupted PDF attached to spear-phishing e-mail messages. The PDFs exploited a previously unknown software vulnerability in the Adobe Reader program, the company said.

    1. Re:vulnerability in the Adobe Reader by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Insightful

      Per the Article:

      >> The Trojan is delivered to target systems in a corrupted PDF attached to spear-phishing e-mail messages. The PDFs exploited a previously unknown software vulnerability in the Adobe Reader program, the company said.

      Is it just me, or is a program whose purpose (for the vast majority of users) is just to open a document to print turned into a gigantic bloated mess that was far better 10 years ago?

    2. Re:vulnerability in the Adobe Reader by Walter+White · · Score: 1

      Is it just me, or is a program whose purpose (for the vast majority of users) is just to open a document to print turned into a gigantic bloated mess that was far better 10 years ago?

      I disagree. It was a bloated POS ten years ago. I had a great dislike for PDF documents not because there was anything inherently wrong with the format but rather because the Adobe reader was so clunky and slow.

      I will grant that it has probably gotten worse in ten years.

  4. Authentication 101 by cffrost · · Score: 2

    Authentication 101: Something you have and something you know. I've only read the summary, but if these copied credentials ("something you had") can be used to access sensitive resources remotely, then it would seem that "something you know" is something DoD didn't know.

    --
    Thank you, Edward Snowden.

    "Arguments from authority are worthless." —Carl Sagan
    1. Re:Authentication 101 by Jumperalex · · Score: 4, Informative

      If the Trojan can pull pki credentials it can keylog pins.

      --
      If you can't be good, be good at it!
    2. Re:Authentication 101 by timeOday · · Score: 1

      Maybe I'm confused about what's happening here. If you're using something like a SecureID card, it shouldn't matter that much if somebody gets your PIN, unless they also get your card (and you don't notice and get it deactivated).

    3. Re:Authentication 101 by gruntled · · Score: 2

      The exploit isn't pulling PKI credentials; the exploit is only effective if the card is in the card reader, according to one of the articles. At which point it can play back the PIN; *that's* the exploit.

      An exploit that can misappropriate identity within your hard-token based authentication system but only so long as the token is plugged into the system isn't much of an exploit since the only reasonable protection offered by hard tokens is...you can't authenticate if the token ain't there. Show me an exploit that allows authentication *without* the token and you'll get my attention.

    4. Re:Authentication 101 by gruntled · · Score: 1

      I concur. The concept they're selling is that if you're logged into your system with your card and use your pin, they can then use those credentials to gain access to sensitive databases only you are supposed to have access to. I would argue that if your system is so porous that folks are hanging out waiting for you to log in to the network, you're already done.

    5. Re:Authentication 101 by Jumperalex · · Score: 1

      well then i can tell you that the card is always in the reader while the machine is logged in and unlocked. pull the card and the machine immediately locks. perhaps that needs to change?

      Or is that mitigated by the fact that when a website or other resource (outlook msg signing) require reauthorization they force a reread of the card and asks for your pin? Policy wise for email that ensures non-repudiation, and for online resources I know it enforces authentication in case someone fails to lock their computer when they walk away. But does that also help prevent token discovery?

      --
      If you can't be good, be good at it!
    6. Re:Authentication 101 by Jumperalex · · Score: 2

      perhaps, but not in the DoD. DoD locks the machine as soon as you remove the card.

      --
      If you can't be good, be good at it!
  5. Smartcards suck by WaffleMonster · · Score: 1

    Does it really matter the smart card was attacked? If the machine is compromised to begin with anything you or your computer does with your credentials is compromised anyway.

    According to TFA attacker still can only do anything while card is in compromised computers reader. What has failed?

  6. Well, only sort of... by Thad+Zurich · · Score: 5, Insightful

    The trojan steals "use" of the inserted card, and probably the PIN. The private key remains safely in the card, and the trojan can't use it once the card is removed. The defenses are (1) don't use smart card on untrusted computer, or (2) if no other choice, use smart card only long enough to accomplish a specific task. The smart card PIN can be changed by the user, so it may not even be necessary to revoke the credential after an exposure. However, the trojan also gains temporary use of the card holder's digital signature -- meaning that authentic digitally-signed spear phishing emails could be sent under the card-holder's email account. If the card is inserted but the PIN is never entered, then a trojan might maliciously enter several random PINs and block the card as a DoS attack...

    1. Re:Well, only sort of... by Thad+Zurich · · Score: 1

      That's not how (these types of) smart cards work. The card is smart, and performs private key operations on board the card. All the host gets are session keys, hashes, etc. By design, the private key memory of the card can only be written, at a specially configured programming station. That doesn't mean there aren't user-readable or re-writable areas on the card, but the credential private keys aren't among them. The hardware literally doesn't support reading back private keys, only overwriting them. Any key escrow is accomplished by the programming station, when the card is first written.

    2. Re:Well, only sort of... by couchslug · · Score: 1

      DoD has a live distro for telecommuting. They should make its use mandatory for that, and get rid of their Windows desktops. That's as easy as giving the order, just like when we transitioned TO Windows in ancient times.

      It's free to download, grab a copy:

      http://www.spi.dod.mil/lipose.htm

      --
      "This post is an artistic work of fiction and falsehood. Only a fool would take anything posted here as fact."
  7. Adobe Reader - bloatware by Firethorn · · Score: 1

    It's not just you. I've noticed it as well. Fillable PDFs are of the good, but why do I need 'adobe echosign' when my work already issues digital certificates, a 'convert to PDF' when it's already a PDF, etc..?

    --
    I don't read AC A human right
    1. Re:Adobe Reader - bloatware by Derek+Pomery · · Score: 1
      --
      -- perl -e'print pack"H*","6e656d6f406d38792e6f7267"' /. ate my old sig. Bastards.
  8. USAF distro solves this for remote users. by couchslug · · Score: 1

    http://www.spi.dod.mil/lipose.htm

    Your taxes paid for it and it's a free download. Grab a copy and check it out. Saves buckets of money in license fees compared to a PE-ish live CD, and won't run Windows malware.

    --
    "This post is an artistic work of fiction and falsehood. Only a fool would take anything posted here as fact."
  9. Smartcard attack only works on Windows by microphage · · Score: 1

    Here is more detail on the attack:

    Smartcard access

    The rst one is that it creates a new thread with a keylogger routine. The code is very basic, it stores the window name and the keys pressed under a le named MSF5F0.dat on an unencrypted format, example:

    Title:Internet Explorer
    www.google.es
    Title:My Computer

    It uses the WIN32 APIs functions [GetKeyState, GetAsyncKeyState, GetForegroundWindow, GetWindowTextA].