Dreamhost FTP/Shell Password Database Breached
New submitter Ccmods writes "Below is a snippet from an email Dreamhost sent to subscribers early Saturday morning, describing an intrusion into the database storing FTP and SSH usernames and passwords: 'We are writing to let you know that there may have been illegal and unauthorized access to some of your passwords at DreamHost today. Our security systems detected the potential breach this morning and we immediately took the defensive precaution of expiring and resetting all FTP/shell access passwords for all DreamHost customers and their users. ... Only the FTP/shell access passwords appear to have been compromised by the illegal access. Web panel passwords, email passwords and billing information for DreamHost customers were not affected or accessed.'"
As a Dreamhost customer, I watched this unfold in real time. Apparently the passwords were hashed, and there's no indication that they were compromised, other than the fact that it was technically possible. So they changed the passwords because it's cheaper, PR-wise, than being wrong.
There's a big warning up on the panel, which has a password stored in a different, non-compromised DB. Between the panel and the email, I doubt anybody's confused as to what's going on.
In other words, it's really not that big of a deal. The database shouldn't have been compromised, and I'll expect a full postmortem of how they screwed that up, but in terms of damage (or even inconvenience), there really isn't any to speak of.
I have developed a truly marvelous proof of this comment, which this signature is too narrow to contain.
If the passwords are used for FTP they should be considered comprimised anyway.
http://michaelsmith.id.au
It got so bad at one point that I recommended that readers of my blog .
Never email donotemail@WeAreSpammers.com
I disagree that the process is entirely painless. As a developer and reseller, my account has several dozen different sFTP users set up. Each of them required a password change. Easy? Absolutely. Frustrating? A little, but I'm really glad DreamHost chose to play it safe. Painless? Not really, since the process took over an hour and involved me emailing my users to let them know why they couldn't log in with their old user/pass combinations. In all, I prefer having to spend an hour or two changing passwords and contacting people to discovering that my site (or that of one of my clients) has been hacked.
A copy of the script shown at http://www.nk.ca/blog/index.php?/archives/1275-Phishing-spam-mail-script-intercepted.html was sitting at the root of my domain. Pretty sure it's a remailer.
Why save your soul when you can sell it for a profit?
I'll see your SFTP and raise you disabling password authentication entirely, and using SSH public key authentication only.
If your SSH server is visible over the Internet, you should use public key authentication instead of passwords if at all possible. If you don't think it's important, try logging all of the malicious login attempts you get for the next week.
-- https://help.ubuntu.com/community/SSH/OpenSSH/Keys
Those passwords aren't stored in a database, but in the shadow file.
Not necessarily. SSH can validate the passwords using PAM, and PAM can use a database (e.g. Postgres or LDAP) as backend.
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Here's an example of somebody getting it badly wrong but little press about it.
A few weeks ago Telstra Bigpond, one of Australia's largest ISPs, was caught out with the utterly stupid situation of having their customer list of username, plain text password, email address and mailing address out there naked on the internet. Outsourced workers in call centres needed the information but some idiot decided instead of them having to log in somewhere to get access that they should simply be able to use a URL with the customers username on the end of it. The site with the passwords was still up ten hours after it hit the mainstream news.
Now that's the sort of thing I expect when I see something like the article summary above, but instead it's the opposite - full disclosure early instead of being caught out by the press and not plain text passwords.