Slashdot Mirror
USPTO Declares Invalid Third of Three Critical Rambus Patents
slew writes "This is a followup to this earlier story about 2 of 3 of Rambus's 'critical' patents being invalidated. Apparently now it's a hat-trick."
There's something that seems unsavory and wasteful about a business environment in which a company's stock value "fluctuates sharply on its successes and failures in patent litigation and licensing." The linked article offers a brief but decent summary of the way Rambus has profited over the years from these now-invalidated patents.
Up with this we will not put!
So do Nvidia, Hewlett-Packard , et al have any chance of recovering any money they paid to Rambus, or are they simply out the entire amount, or has no actual money traded hands yet?
Sig Battery depleted. Reverting to safe mode.
There's something that seems unsavory and wasteful about a business environment in which a company's stock value "fluctuates sharply on its successes and failures in patent litigation and licensing."
If ARM holdings licensing came into question it would probably destroy the company's stock. I am loving the way the ARM architecture is handled, a lot more competition than x86, and it seems to be advancing quickly now that it has becoming popular.
I was trying to imagine today if ARM holdings could survive in a world without IP laws. I think yes it could. It seems that getting a hold of ARM holdings processor plans, from something like bittorrent, would not be super useful even to Texas Instruments, Samsung, or Nvidia engineers. ARM works with them to implement the design, so the payment agreement would probably just be altered slightly and ARM would have to protect its disclosure of ARM architecture details a little more closely. Perhaps ARM would morph more into a standards body and not be as profitable though? I am curious what someone with more info on the topic can share please!
It's not that a company's price fluctuates with the state of its patent portfolio. The problem is that 3 patents, which should have never been issued in the first place, terrorized inventors and suppressed innovation for multiple years. This is squarely an indictment of the USPTO and of the Congress.
Must we continually remind you that Rambus technology was never Rambus technology, but rather stolen technology?
Sig Battery depleted. Reverting to safe mode.
Perhaps there should be greater incentivization for companies that are directly involved in making products based on patents, or at least on companies that have a reasonably large interest in companies that do produce products based on patents. Since we've all decided that Intellectual Property is Real Property, we've essentially allowed companies to use patents like they would apartment buildings, if we're not going to redefine what constitutes property, then at least there should, say, tax incentives for companies that patent and then produce products, are take ownership stakes in companies that do produce products based on patents. Or, we could just simply set the tax rate extremely high on licensing income, and then if you can demonstrate that you are in any substantial way responsible for making products based on patents you hold, then you get a break on those taxes. So let's say a company that makes its money purely from acquiring and licensing patents has to pay 95% of said income in taxes, but where they actually are involved in production that uses said patents they get an increasingly greater cut up to what we would currently consider normal corporate rates, so that companies like Apple (though I have my own issues with their using patents to bludgeon, but at least they do actually manufacture products based on their portfolios) are not penalized. I think you could make it very fine-grained, based upon each patent, so that there is no incentive to patent lots of things and then strategically use patents that one has no intention of making products from to attack competitors.
It wouldn't be a perfect solution, and still leaves open questionable patent suits like Apples', but perhaps we might also look at rules to require that licensing fees plus some level of interest be returned to the licensees, thus making it far riskier for a company to use dubious patents slipped past overworked examiners to bludgeon or force licensing fees from competitors. How willing would Microsoft be to go after Android manufacturers if there was a law on the books that would require them to return those fees plus interest if the patents got overturned?
The world's burning. Moped Jesus spotted on I50. Details at 11.
USPTO: "Yeah, we approved these totally bogus patents that resulted in billions of dollars of litigation and now we're affirming our own malfeasance. What's your problem?" The USPTO needs to be sued into the stone age for this fraud.
1 and 2 were already invalidated.
The third of 3, i.e. the last one, has now also been invalidated.
You're welcome.
The way Rambus has profited over the years from these now-invalidated patents ...
In other words, Rambus is nothing but a scam
And the amazing part is that the America knowingly allows such a scam to exist for such a looooooooooonnng time !!
Muchas Gracias, Señor Edward Snowden !
Not to mention when they weren't patent trolls they were frankly shitty at business. RDRAM sucked, it cost too much to manufacture, needed dummy chips to fill empty slots, didn't scale well, it just wasn't a great design. Frankly after even Intel gave up on RDRAM patent trolling was pretty much all they had left. Good riddance Rambus, all of us will be glad when you are gone.
ACs don't waste your time replying, your posts are never seen by me.
First off, patents don't protect "products" per se. They protect inventive concepts, of which a given product is but one embodiment (usually). In any case, a patent can comfortably take 5 years from filing to grant, and if you want to decrease that you're going to have to accept a lower standard of examination. Secondly, most jurisdictions have a mechanism wherein the renewal fees on patents (because you have to keep paying every year to keep it in place) rise quite sharply for the latter half of the term of protection. The effect of this is that the average length of patent terms for the majority of cases is actually quite a bit less than the 20 years maximum possible term, because it becomes uneconomical for the proprietor to keep up the renewal fees when the patent's subject matter has ceased to be profitable for them. Also, 5 years might be plenty for technology products, but consider other fields; pharmaceutical products - for whom the "incentive to invent" justification for patents is perhaps strongest - will still be undergoing the regulatory approval process by the end of 5 years.
The "obvious" test isn't really there because of competitors, it's to stop trivial inventions being patentable. Your solution would remove that barrier, and also ignores the fact that there are many possible reasons why a good, solid patent idea may not yet have been filed. With your system, you could end up with trivial patents being granted due to no-one else wanting to work in that field, or extremely solid patents being refused simply because there were multiple people pouring huge amounts of effort and inventiveness into the same field.
Finally, your final criterion already exists. It's called "sufficiency of disclosure", and in most jurisdictions (patents being national rights and hence requirements varying from place to place), if the ordinary skilled person cannot work the invention described to the full extent of protection sought by the claims, then that is grounds for refusal or revocation of the patent.