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Researchers, Biosecurity Board Debate How Open Virus Research Should Be

New submitter rackeer writes "Exchanging research results is at the heart of the scientific method. However, there are concerns about whether investigations of pandemics, which possibly constitute a threat to the whole population of earth, should be shared. The debate about research on the avian flu was discussed on Slashdot before. Now the main parties have their own two cents to say. On-line at the journal Science are commentaries both by authors of the paper in question, who went ahead with the publication, and by the national advisory board for biosecurity, which advised against publishing."

19 of 66 comments (clear)

  1. The Ferret is out of the bag by ColdWetDog · · Score: 3, Funny

    From the Biohazards committee:

    Recently, several scientific research teams have achieved some success in isolating influenza A/H5N1 viruses that are transmitted efficiently between mammals, in one instance with maintenance of high pathogenicity. This information is very important because, before these experiments were done, it was uncertain whether avian influenza A/H5N1 could ever acquire the capacity for mammal-to-mammal transmission. Now that this information is known, society can take steps globally to prepare for when nature might generate such a virus spontaneously.

    The method they used (serial passage) isn't complex. The identification of the hemoglutinin protein as the determinant for increased infectivity is interesting, but not particularly relevant to someone interested in a "12 Monkeys" scenario.

    Too Late.

    We're doomed.

    --
    Faster! Faster! Faster would be better!
    1. Re:The Ferret is out of the bag by MightyMartian · · Score: 2

      From what I've heard, the methods used have been around since Pasteur's day. This particular cat was let out of the bag a loooong time ago.

      --
      The world's burning. Moped Jesus spotted on I50. Details at 11.
    2. Re:The Ferret is out of the bag by ColdWetDog · · Score: 5, Insightful

      Another interesting quote:

      The life sciences have reached a crossroads. The direction we choose and the process by which we arrive at this decision must be undertaken as a community and not relegated to small segments of government, the scientific community, or society. Physicists faced a similar situation in the 1940s with nuclear weapons research, and it is inevitable that other scientific disciplines will also do so.

      Sure worked for limiting nuclear weapons proliferation. Actually, it didn't, of course. The big difference between nuclear physics and biology is that the latter is thought to require less infrastructure than the former. This would make it more likely that a non state actor / random psychopath millionaire could obtain the needed equipment and skill set and go off to terrorize the world.

      While likely true - a couple of million dollars could by you a nice lab and the post doctoral level talent to run it - it's not clear that you could appreciably slow down research by simply not posting experimental details. Once you post the results, the details can be left as an exercise for the student. If you decide to limit research entirely you risk being blind sided by someone who hasn't been so constrained.

      --
      Faster! Faster! Faster would be better!
    3. Re:The Ferret is out of the bag by msheekhah · · Score: 2

      The White Plague, Frank Herbert?

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      Mark Anthony Collins
    4. Re:The Ferret is out of the bag by outsider007 · · Score: 3, Funny

      That's a lot of o's. Do you find this that funny?

      --
      If you mod me down the terrorists will have won
  2. were doomed by FudRucker · · Score: 2, Interesting

    sooner or later some scientist is going to kill most the planet by a malicious release or careless negligence, it is not "if" but "when".

    --
    Politics is Treachery, Religion is Brainwashing
    1. Re:were doomed by Daniel+Dvorkin · · Score: 2

      Do you have any support for your assertion, other than Luddite paranoia?

      --
      The correlation between ignorance of statistics and using "correlation is not causation" as an argument is close to 1.
    2. Re:were doomed by ChatHuant · · Score: 2

      sooner or later some scientist is going to kill most the planet by a malicious release or careless negligence, it is not "if" but "when".

      Do you have any support for your assertion, other than Luddite paranoia?

      Well, I think his assertion can be reasonably argued for, and the arguments should be looked at before dismissing the whole thing as Luddite paranoia. Let's compare the nuclear industry and the biological technologies currently being developed - I'll even ignore the intentional release of biological agents, and just consider the risk of accidents.

      The first factor is the number of potential accident sites. Look at the difference in accessibility: nuclear technology requires expensive materials, and highly specialized tools and equipment. That makes nuclear development very controllable, and difficult to hide. In comparison, the tools and technologies required for creating new virus and bacteria strains are very cheap and growing even cheaper - see for example how the cost of DNA sequencing has gone down over the last few years. Moreover, most of the equipment necessary for biology manipulation is easily obtained with a trip to the local mall. It's a reasonable conclusion that more and more people will use those technologies, for research, development, or even hobbies, so there'll be many more potential sites for biological accidents

      The second factor is the risk of an accident for a site. Nuclear industry is very safety conscious: very smart people have worked hard to create safe designs, lots of money has been spent in building the necessary infrastructure, and there are only a few hundreds of nuclear reactors in the whole world. Despite all that, accidents still happen. While some of the people working on biological development will be safety conscious AND will be able to afford the safety infrastructure necessary, many of them won't (if you spent a few thousand bucks for a biological reactor and a couple of thermometers, you probably can't afford another hundred thousand or so to build a negative sterile pressure room with proper sealing). In conclusion, the chances of an accident happening at a biological site can be considered much higher on average.

      The third factor to consider is the potential impact of an accident: with radioactive materials, you need a certain amount of spill to cause serious effects; otherwise the consequences will be mostly local. Even major accidents still have only relatively local effects (see how even Chernobyl and Fukushima have mostly affected the surrounding areas, and had reduced impact further away). With a self-replicating biological agent, even a very small spill can have serious consequences. No nuclear accident can even theoretically kill us all. A biological accident can.

      In conclusion, from all points of view the biological risk is much higher than nuclear. We're looking at a lot of potential sources of spill, difficult or impossible to track, supervised by people of varying qualifications, with varying (but on average not great) safety procedures, and with a chance to cause hugely destructive consequences. I'd say the GP's conclusion shouldn't be dismissed out of hand.

  3. Something to think about by meerling · · Score: 5, Insightful

    Science is progressing at a reasonable pace BECAUSE scientists share data, results, ideas, etc. If you limit or remove that capability, you will be wiping out a large portion of the creative and lateral thinking that often leads to new methods, as well as create much more waste of resources due to duplication of effort. And when you are dealing with something that involves infection rates, you really want MORE research on it, how else can you gain the knowledge to apply to real situations.

    Can something like this be used in a combat or terrorist situation? Yes, but it can also be used to develop countermeasures as well. Besides, there isn't any invention of mankinds that wasn't used to further the ways and means of violence. Medicine, to keep your troops healthy and useful. Food Preservation, to conquer foreign lands. (In fact, that's why Napoleon paid people to develop it.), Vehicles and other means of transportation, you have to get your troops their. HIghways and roads, you have to get them their quickly. (Both the USA and the Roman Empire built their major roads for that purpose, the boost to trade was just a favorable byproduct.), etc.

    So if you want to ban research from being shared among the scientists in that field just because it might be used for non-peaceful purposes, then you'll just have to ban everything. And hey, once you've thrown a tablecloth over one genie lamp, it gets a lot easier to justify doing it again. After all, it's just one more...

    1. Re:Something to think about by shutdown+-p+now · · Score: 2

      Can something like this be used in a combat or terrorist situation? Yes, but it can also be used to develop countermeasures as well.

      Well, the argument from the biosecurity board essentially boils down to "there are no efficient countermeasures to this". In other words, they're claiming that we don't have any meaningful defense against this except for security though obscurity to buy off some time to better prepare to mitigate the consequences.

    2. Re:Something to think about by grumbel · · Score: 2

      Science is progressing at a reasonable pace BECAUSE scientists share data, results, ideas, etc.

      So should the Manhattan project have shared it's data with Nazi Germany? It might sure have speed up the science, but it might also have let to London getting nuked.

      Can something like this be used in a combat or terrorist situation? Yes, but it can also be used to develop countermeasures as well.

      The little problem with that is that we are getting to a point where an attack requires nothing more then a few thousands dollars and a mail order at your next biotech company, while a countermeasure might require billions of dollars and decades of work. So a little caution might not be such a bad idea.

  4. Re:Why assume engineered virus's... by ShooterNeo · · Score: 2

    No one has ever built the kind of nanotechnological mechanisms that would be capable of self replication, much less "grey goo". Thus, without working examples of nano-machinery, we don't actually know if grey goo is a real risk or not. Every thing we have ever discovered about fundamental physics and working mechanisms in life says that self-replicating nanotechnology IS possible. Existing life is a working example of it. However, the engineering and technical barriers to building some are very large, and it will take many advances before we have any. I personal think the grey goo scenario is plausible, however, safeguards can be taken to make the chance of it happening by accident essentially 0.

    Biological viruses are a different scenario. They are not hard to make, and while the chance of an accidental escape is low, if one WERE to happen and to reach a major hub, control would be impossible. Nature will not evolve organisms in the directions of deadly pandemics because evolutionary forces act against this sort of thing. However, doing it on purpose is straightforward and quite easy (the tough part is actually making the genetic changes actually stick in the real lab, but the code changes are not very complex at all)

  5. More War On Terror Horse Shit by Un+pobre+guey · · Score: 4, Insightful

    This "controversy" is largely driven by War on Terror scammers who want to 1) set up a bureaucratic lobbyist-driven police state gravy train, and 2) loot the treasury using War on Terror hype as a pretext, much as they have done with Iraq, Afghanistan, and now Iran. If you think that it is a new phenomenon to use the results of scientific research for nefarious purposes, or that the only major precedent is nuclear arms proliferation you are quite mistaken. Next time you have a few hours of free time and are near a university chemistry library with a hard-copy of Chemical Abstracts that goes back 100 years or so, I highly recommend browsing through it looking for the nastiest substances you can think of. They're in there, recipes and all.

    We really need to stop believing all that horse shit just because some pompous windbag politician says it's true. Scientists, who know the literature, are justifiably reticent to cooperate with that crap unless their political aspirations demand it.

    1. Re:More War On Terror Horse Shit by Phernost · · Score: 5, Insightful

      It's the excuse that is inexcusable. Anyone who wishes to make use of this, or other research, has to have a lab and funding, whether nefarious or not. If you have that level of resources, you can bribe people, infiltrate, recreate the research from scratch, etc. Pretending that hiding the information from general scientific publication is a form of security is delusional at best and intellectually dishonest at worst.

    2. Re:More War On Terror Horse Shit by Un+pobre+guey · · Score: 4, Insightful

      I get your point, but I suspect you are missing mine. Forget nuclear weapons, they are a red herring in the current discussion. It is a huge stretch of the imagination to expect that "terrorists" can cause a pandemic with virus genetically engineered in a lab. It is far too expensive and there are myriad factors that decelerate pandemics, which is why they are so rare. More to my point, that there is plenty of knowledge already accumulated over several generations, "terrorists" would be better off getting virus samples from several origins in the field (e.g. pig and chicken farms) and crossing them in Third World pig and chicken ranches at random, the more strains mixed in the better. That would eventually yield highly infectious strains by ordinary natural selection. They could then harvest samples from locations where the most people got cross infected and do it again, iterating until they have some suitably nasty specimens. Scientific censorship is a moot point. More than enough information is out there for all sorts of mischief, whether nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC). This "controversy" is plain old propaganda for the purposes of political manipulation, career advancement, and corruption, nothing more. We should stop believing this shit.

      Also, don't underestimate the stuff in Chemical Abstracts and related sources.

    3. Re:More War On Terror Horse Shit by shutdown+-p+now · · Score: 2

      It is a huge stretch of the imagination to expect that "terrorists" can cause a pandemic with virus genetically engineered in a lab. It is far too expensive

      But the whole point of this research was to prove that the virus can naturally mutate to the final state in the wild, it will just take it longer to do so. That's precisely why they didn't do gene splicing and such. So it shouldn't actually be all that hard to reproduce, especially if you aren't concerned much about safety.

      use a pandemic with virus genetically engineered in a lab. It is far too expensive and there are myriad factors that decelerate pandemics, which is why they are so rare. More to my point, that there is plenty of knowledge already accumulated over several generations, "terrorists" would be better off getting virus samples from several origins in the field (e.g. pig and chicken farms) and crossing them in Third World pig and chicken ranches at random, the more strains mixed in the better. That would eventually yield highly infectious strains by ordinary natural selection. They could then harvest samples from locations where the most people got cross infected and do it again, iterating until they have some suitably nasty specimens.

      Are you trying to get Slashdot censored? ~

      (though the geek in me does wonder how many NSA keyword alarms you have just triggered by that post, and how many more will get triggered by me quoting it)

  6. World War I by retroworks · · Score: 2

    They had a lot of mustard gases and viral agents developed in WWI, which were never used. But I do feel nervous. Maybe it's not that the weapons are getting more dangerous... maybe the people on the earth are getting worse.

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    Gently reply
  7. Blurring the line between science and alchemy by Daniel+Dvorkin · · Score: 5, Insightful

    A great deal of modern science comes from the practice of alchemy, which begat chemistry and (less directly) biology. And a lot of what alchemists did looked like what modern scientists do: they had laboratories, they did experiments, they weighed and measured and otherwise quantified their results, they developed theories consistent with their observations. Similarly, modern astronomy and much of physics grew out of the work of astrologers, who, although they obviously couldn't experiment on the subjects of their observation, did take precise, repeated measurements of the apparent motions of celestial bodies, and developed mathematically rigorous models with considerable predictive power.

    So what distinguishes the alchemist or astrologer from the modern scientist? The sharing of knowledge. Alchemy and astrology spread knowledge, if at all, by the apprenticeship system, in which well-respected practicioners would take on a small number of apprentices, swear them to secrecy, and slowly teach them the secrets of (their particular version of) the art, often with considerable penalties for revealing this knowledge to anyone outside the circle; the apprentices would then do the same in turn. The very idea of anything like the modern system of peer-reviewed, widely disseminated publication would have been anathema to them. The walls started to crumble during the late Renaissance period and were more or less completely down by the mid-eighteenth century, and thus modern science was born.

    Since then we've seen incremental improvements, of which the internet and open access -- fought tooth and nail by certain journal publishers, who used to be allies of the scientist's labor of spreading knowledge, but have now become the last gatekeepers of the alchemical worldview -- are among the most recent and the most successful. But the basic idea is centuries old. It's thoroughly tested, and it works, in a way that the old mysticism, for all its occasional brilliance, never could. And any attempt to drag us back to the days of sages locking up their knowledge behind guild walls must be fought tooth and nail, or science itself will be in danger.

    --
    The correlation between ignorance of statistics and using "correlation is not causation" as an argument is close to 1.
  8. Re:Why assume engineered virus's... by ShooterNeo · · Score: 2

    Let me give an example of an "on purpose" change. You could add extra proteins to the virus, that ONLY when present in a human cell with a specific messenger RNA, the messenger RNA would bind to a receptor site on the protein and activate it. This protein would cause the infected human cell to express a gene that would cause it to produce and export some product. I like steroids for this because they don't depend on external receptors that the immune system can detect. So suppose you have the infected cells producing a variant of testosterone borrowed from an animal, or some other steroid.

    Well, the infected cells would also express the nuclear receptor for that same animal-derived steroid, and be tuned so that ONLY if a critical mass of other infected cells is reached, the next phase begins.

    Once critical mass is reached, the infected cells start producing some type of toxin to kill human beings. Or, presumably, do some other unspeakable thing. (no, turning them into zombies is probably not technically possible).

    So you'd have a virus that spreads throughout a population, by aerosol, and ONLY once a certain incubation period has passed does it produce some horrible effect all at once, before medical treatment could possibly react. For example, if millions of the cells in the lining of your lungs made botulism toxin all at the same time, you'd be dead in a matter of minutes. There would be no treatment that could save you, and no way to easily detect you had been infected.

    Now, this kind of weapon wouldn't be the end of the world. However, in principle it could kill hundreds of thousands or millions of people in waves, all at once, and the first few waves could happen before anyone with authority could react to control the virus somehow. (with drugs, quarantine, etc)

    There are also only a limited number of people in the western world with the skills and training to do anything. Make ground zero for the weapon the CDC headquarters and the European equivalent, and I would imagine that the damage caused by this kind of weapon could be a catastrophic, western civilization collapsing event. Sort of how HIV targets the particular T cell type that is effective against HIV itself.

    And, I'm not a virologist or a scientist with the training to actually do these kinds of code tweaking. I'm sure much more clever doomsday solutions could be thought of.

    Another imbalance is this : making a biological weapon that causes harm is like a BILLION times easier than making one that heals. If it causes harm, but doesn't work correctly, the "bugs" are probably nasty side effects that still accomplish the goal of causing harm. To make something that would heal, you have to make countless tries to find a change that is safe, and then spend billions of dollars proving it is safe enough, and then more billions defending yourself in court when it turns out not to be perfect. It's a lot easier to break something than to repair it, especially a system as complex as a human being.

    So forget the idea of using the same tech to build a defense.