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Researchers Can Generate RSA SecurID Random Numbers Flawlessly
Fluffeh writes "A researcher has found and published a way to tune into an RSA SecurID Token. Once a few easy steps are followed, anyone can generate the exact numbers shown on the token. The method relies on finding the seed that is used to generate the numbers in a way that seems random. Once it is known, it can be used to generate the exact numbers displayed on the targeted Token. The technique, described on Thursday by a senior security analyst at a firm called SensePost, has important implications for the safekeeping of the tokens. An estimated 40 million people use these to access confidential data belonging to government agencies, military contractors, and corporations. Scrutiny of the widely used two-factor authentication system has grown since last year, when RSA revealed that intruders on its networks stole sensitive SecurID information that could be used to reduce its security. Defense contractor Lockheed Martin later confirmed that a separate attack on its systems was aided by the theft of the RSA data."
It's my understanding of the system (from dealing with one years ago)... the server can recover the seed used by a hardware token given it's serial number, and two sequential tokens. Perhaps the serial number is the "seed" and it's figuring out the tokens clock. However, it's perfectly clear the server can generate the same numbers as the token. The strength of the system is keyed to protecting that algorithm. Soft-tokens are a bad joke and only slightly better than a password, but are themselves based on a "password".