Secret Security Questions Are a Joke

Hugh Pickens writes "Rebecca Rosen writes that when hackers broke into Mat Honan's Apple account last week, they couldn't answer his security questions but Apple didn't care and issued a temporary password anyway. This was a company disregarding its own measure, saying, effectively, security questions are a joke and we don't take them very seriously. But even if Apple had required the hackers to answer the questions, it's very likely that the hackers would have been able to find the right answers. 'The answers to the most common security questions — where did you go to high school? what is the name of the first street you lived on? — are often a matter of the public record,' writes Rosen, 'even more easily so today than in the 1980s when security questions evolved as a means of protecting bank accounts.' Part of the problem is that a good security question is hard to design and has to meet four criteria: A good security question should be definitive — there should only be one correct answer; Applicable — the question should be possible to answer for as large a portion of users as possible; Memorable — the user should have little difficulty remembering it; and Safe — it should be difficult to guess or find through research. Unfortunately few questions fit all these criteria and are known only by you. 'Perhaps mother's maiden name was good enough for banking decades ago, but I'm pretty sure anyone with even a modicum of Google skills could figure out my mom's maiden's name,' concludes Rosen. Passwords have reached the end of their useful life adds Bruce Schneier. 'Today, they only work for low-security applications. The secret question is just one manifestation of that fact.'"

Comments

Simple solution

[Anonymous Coward]

Let people design their own question.

Re:Simple solution

[NeutronCowboy]

Even simpler solution: design your own answers. Yes, you'll get funny silences over the phone when you tell that the rep that you were born "On the moon", that the street you grew up on was "the yellow brick road", and that your mothers maiden name was Humpty Dumpty. The upshot is that no one can guess, the answers are meaningful to only you, there is only one answer (the fake, important name and place), and, because the answers are whatever you think they should be, applicable.

Re:Simple solution

[Hognoxious]

The problem is that if you don't use them very often (say only for a password reset) it's easy to forget what answers you gave.

On trick is to give true answers, but for someone else, i.e. you answer as if you were Linus Torvalds or Queen Victoria. But then you still have to remember who ...

Re:Simple solution

[fredprado]

And they are within their rights to do so and suffer the consequences for it.

Re:Simple solution

[Isaac-1]

And as long as you always answer 42, or 416 what is the problem with that?

Re:Simple solution

[MightyYar]

I don't think that would fly. If a person's bank account gets hacked, the bank usually (always?) picks up the tab. It's in their interests to get people to bank online - it is significantly cheaper than hiring tellers. If I were on the hook for security flaws at the bank, I'd never bank online.

Re:Simple solution

[Hythlodaeus]

The purpose of security questions is not security - its reducing customer service workload due to forgotten passwords.
In most implementations its an overall reduction in security, since the security questions constitute a backdoor to the password, rather than an additional factor of authentication.

Re:Simple solution

[Hatta]

That doesn't solve the real problem, that banks think that these question and answers provide any sort of security whatsoever. What is the difference between this Q&A scheme and a password? Specifically, these security questions are exactly identical to a password that is stored in the clear (no hash, no salt) and is intended to be communicated to humans, and for which an attacker only has to guess one out of 4 correctly?

We know that this is bad practice for passwords. Why do we tolerate it for "security questions"?

Re:Simple solution

[ultranova]

For phone stuff I set security questions like "Would you like to have dinner some time?" or "Wanna have sex when I get off?" and call to tease the cute customer service girl.

Nothing's funnier than harassing a minimum wage worker who has no choice but to take your shit or be fired, eh?

Let me guess: you're a CEO?

BYO

[wstrucke]

I find the security questions I like best are the ones I can make up myself. I typically use nonsense phrases that only I know the answer to. Unfortunately most sites would prefer you pick one of several 'standard' questions like the examples OP provided.

Re:BYO

[X0563511]

I'd rather just be able to disable the questions entirely, relying on a good password and if that is lost/whatever, account specific information being verified by a human on the phone.

My problems with these "secret questions" are:
1. They are obviously stored cleartext
2. They can be used to "substitute" for your non-cleartext password
3. Because 1+2=3, if someone breaks in and grabs a dump of the table, they now effectively have your account. These "insecurity questions" are more of a liability if you are not one to just lose passwords. Crutch for the stupid, barrier for the secure.

Who answers security questions honestly?

[BMOC]

The best use of security question is to answer them dishonestly/humorously with responses you will remember, or can write down.

Favorite movie? Gigli
First Car? Moon Rover
Mother In Laws Name? Dead
etc..etc..

Don't Give the Real Answer

[mikestew]

Google me all you want, the real answer to "mother's maiden name" for me is "{ah23#>K&Ep", which I store in 1Password.

Of course, that does no good if Apple simply ignores the security questions.

Security questions: FAIL

[macraig]

Many security questions are a failure from the start due to poor selection. While one would expect that a security question would challenge an objective fact, many of them don't. Instead they challenge subjective facts, most often "favorite" things. What happens to a person's answers when his mental list of favorite things has changed? I've encountered some instances where these "favorite" questions were so prevalent that there wasn't even one objective question as a choice. While it's true that "favorites" might be less susceptible to data mining than objective facts, the last thing security questions should ever do is create the possibility that the legitimate user might be locked out because he can't recall what his "favorite" was at the time of the account's creation. This is akin to the bad habit of using e-mail addresses as usernames. What's more, many of these choose very poor subjects that lead to potentially ambiguous answers; there have been many occasions when I couldn't decide the correct answer to a "favorite" question even at the time of creation, much less a year later.

Re:mother's name

[TaoPhoenix]

How did the summary miss the chance to mention Facebook? Oh, they don't mention the F-word (!!) for once when it makes the Zuck look bad?

For lists of questions that don't include "design it yourself", Facebook is the Walmart of Secret Question Busters.

(Simulation)
"Yay, I feel special, I made a Facebook account! Let's tell the whole world who I am! I'm ______ ______, I born and raised up in Philly, shout out to all the Main Street peeps! My whole family is there in Philly. Let's Like Mom, and Mom's whole family! I named my cat after Susan Boyle's, Pebbles."

(Later, looks at security questions. "Doh!")