Secret Security Questions Are a Joke
Hugh Pickens writes "Rebecca Rosen writes that when hackers broke into Mat Honan's Apple account last week, they couldn't answer his security questions but Apple didn't care and issued a temporary password anyway. This was a company disregarding its own measure, saying, effectively, security questions are a joke and we don't take them very seriously. But even if Apple had required the hackers to answer the questions, it's very likely that the hackers would have been able to find the right answers. 'The answers to the most common security questions — where did you go to high school? what is the name of the first street you lived on? — are often a matter of the public record,' writes Rosen, 'even more easily so today than in the 1980s when security questions evolved as a means of protecting bank accounts.' Part of the problem is that a good security question is hard to design and has to meet four criteria: A good security question should be definitive — there should only be one correct answer; Applicable — the question should be possible to answer for as large a portion of users as possible; Memorable — the user should have little difficulty remembering it; and Safe — it should be difficult to guess or find through research. Unfortunately few questions fit all these criteria and are known only by you. 'Perhaps mother's maiden name was good enough for banking decades ago, but I'm pretty sure anyone with even a modicum of Google skills could figure out my mom's maiden's name,' concludes Rosen. Passwords have reached the end of their useful life adds Bruce Schneier. 'Today, they only work for low-security applications. The secret question is just one manifestation of that fact.'"
Let people design their own question.
What is your quest?
What is the air-speed velocity of a coconut-laden swallow?
"Flyin' in just a sweet place,
Never been known to fail..."
My favorite make-up-your-own pair, which a CSR at a bank was once forced to read to me over the phone:
Q: "You're not going out dressed like that are you?"
A: "You can't tell me what to do! You're not my real father!"
Never attribute to malice that which can be explained by mere idiocy.
I'd rather just be able to disable the questions entirely, relying on a good password and if that is lost/whatever, account specific information being verified by a human on the phone.
My problems with these "secret questions" are:
1. They are obviously stored cleartext
2. They can be used to "substitute" for your non-cleartext password
3. Because 1+2=3, if someone breaks in and grabs a dump of the table, they now effectively have your account. These "insecurity questions" are more of a liability if you are not one to just lose passwords. Crutch for the stupid, barrier for the secure.
For large sets, this will be our guide even unto death, for the LORD will work for each type of data it is applied to...
From Bruce Schneier: Q: Do you know why I think you're so sexy? A: Probably because you're totally in love with me. Q: Need any weed? Grass? Kind bud? Shrooms? A: No thanks hippie, I'd just like to do some banking. Q: The Penis shoots Seeds, and makes new Life to poison the Earth with a plague of men. A: Go forth, and kill. Zardoz has spoken. Q: What the hell is your fucking problem, sir? A: This is completely inappropriate and I'd like to speak to your supervisor. Q: I've been embezzling hundreds of thousands of dollars from my employer, and I don't care who knows it. A: It's a good thing they're recording this call, because I'm going to have to report you. Q: Are you really who you say you are? A: No, I am a Russian identity thief.
Just because I can hook a shark from a boat, I do no offer to wrestle it in the water.