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The Panic Over Fukushima

An anonymous reader points out an article in the Wall Street Journal about how irrational fear of nuclear reactors made people worry much more about last year's incident at Fukushima than they should have. Quoting: "Denver has particularly high natural radioactivity. It comes primarily from radioactive radon gas, emitted from tiny concentrations of uranium found in local granite. If you live there, you get, on average, an extra dose of .3 rem of radiation per year (on top of the .62 rem that the average American absorbs annually from various sources). A rem is the unit of measure used to gauge radiation damage to human tissue. ... Now consider the most famous victim of the March 2011 tsunami in Japan: the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. Two workers at the reactor were killed by the tsunami, which is believed to have been 50 feet high at the site. But over the following weeks and months, the fear grew that the ultimate victims of this damaged nuke would number in the thousands or tens of thousands. The 'hot spots' in Japan that frightened many people showed radiation at the level of .1 rem, a number quite small compared with the average excess dose that people happily live with in Denver. What explains the disparity? Why this enormous difference in what is considered an acceptable level of exposure to radiation?"

12 of 536 comments (clear)

  1. I'm still blown away by 93+Escort+Wagon · · Score: 5, Interesting

    Not by the Fukushima thing - but by the fact that the tsunami was 50 feet high at the plant. I understand how it can happen; but that is truly awesome (in the literal sense of the word).

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    1. Re:I'm still blown away by Anne_Nonymous · · Score: 5, Informative

      If that is awesome, what is this?

    2. Re:I'm still blown away by Solandri · · Score: 5, Insightful
      I've been saying since March of last year, it really looks like a case of probability analysis failure, like happened with the O-rings in the shuttle's boosters. In the boosters, they noticed sometimes the propellant could burn through two O-rings. So they added a third O-ring, on the theory that if there's a 1 in 100 chance of burning through two O-rings, then each O-ring has a 1 in 10 chance of burning through, and there's a 1 in 1000 chance of burning through three O-rings.

      That ain't how it works. For the probabilities to multiply like that and provide redundancy, the vulnerabilities have to be independent events. Burning through O-rings isn't an independent event. A condition which causes one O-ring to leak and burn through (cold weather) is highly likely to affect subsequent O-rings. So you aren't really making things safer by adding an extra O-ring.

      At Fukushima, it looks like they had a dozen or so backup generators on the theory that if one has a (say) 1 in 10 chance of failing, then the chance of all of them failing is 1 in 10^12. But nearly all of them were located in the same place, so a single event (a tsunami) which took out one generator took out all of them. Having multiple generators situated this way did not provide redundancy because they weren't vulnerable to independent events. They were vulnerable to the same event.

      What they needed to do was put the generators in different locations, with different fuel sources, probably even different manufacturers and fuel types. That way an event which affected one would not affect the others, making their vulnerabilities independent events. The generators at reactors 5-6 were located further uphill, and thus survived the tsunami intact and were able to keep the fuel storage tanks there cooled.

      This confirms (for me, at least) Amory Lovins' assertion that the US will never build another nuclear plant because there's no way it will ever be cost effective, even when most of the liability risk is assumed by the government. This WSJ article is snake oil being sold by some would-be investors (or sellers of investments).

      Actually the WSJ article is by a professor of physics at UC Berkeley. And he is spot on about the huge mischaracterization of the risk assigned to nuclear power (including by insurance adjusters). People in general suck at rationally analyzing extremely rare events with huge consequences. For nuclear power, fear of another Chernobyl overwhelms the rational fact that historically it's the safest power source man has ever invented. For lotteries, the desire to hit the jackpot overwhelms the rational fact that nearly everyone who plays loses money, and even on average you lose money.

    3. Re:I'm still blown away by AmiMoJo · · Score: 5, Interesting

      At Fukushima, it looks like they had a dozen or so backup generators on the theory that if one has a (say) 1 in 10 chance of failing, then the chance of all of them failing is 1 in 10^12. But nearly all of them were located in the same place, so a single event (a tsunami) which took out one generator took out all of them. Having multiple generators situated this way did not provide redundancy because they weren't vulnerable to independent events. They were vulnerable to the same event.

      What they needed to do was put the generators in different locations, with different fuel sources, probably even different manufacturers and fuel types. That way an event which affected one would not affect the others, making their vulnerabilities independent events. The generators at reactors 5-6 were located further uphill, and thus survived the tsunami intact and were able to keep the fuel storage tanks there cooled.

      They did actually do that. TEPCO had plenty of reserve equipment stored at a location about 50KM from the plant, so it would cover both Fukushima Daiichi and Daini. Unfortunately infrastructure damage prevented them getting the equipment to Daiichi, even by helicopter. The plant itself was damaged so that even if the spare generators had been located up on a hill it wouldn't really have helped much anyway because there was no quick way of attaching them to the cooling system. The entire plant design was flawed in that respect.

      The cooling system was also damaged by the earthquake and tsunami. Valves failed and even though they had power available (taking car batteries out of staff vehicles) they couldn't operate them.

      This is only now coming to light and data is analysed, CCTV footage released and the wrecked plant explored. The initial assumption that there was a single point of failure and that the tsunami caused all the damage has turned out to be wrong.

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  2. Because silence is the worst reaction. by bmo · · Score: 5, Insightful

    But over the following weeks and months, the fear grew that the ultimate victims of this damaged nuke would number in the thousands or tens of thousands. The 'hot spots' in Japan that frightened many people showed radiation at the level of .1 rem, a number quite small compared with the average excess dose that people happily live with in Denver. What explains the disparity? Why this enormous difference in what is considered an acceptable level of exposure to radiation?"

    Because the government and the electrical utility had been completely opaque and not forthcoming with any useful information and preferred to treat the public like children and tell them to go pound sand at public meetings. The government's handling of this from the beginning was a textbook example of how to *not* handle something like this.

    So what do people do when they can't get any valid information from their own government? Assume the government is covering it up and assume the worst. And there are plenty of people out there willing to fill the information void with the most outlandish "facts" going.

    That's why.

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    BMO

  3. Re:Radiation in Denver is unavoidable by Man+On+Pink+Corner · · Score: 5, Insightful

    Radiation in Fukushima was manmade, and the inadequate safety features and inept management seem to be common problems with nuclear (and other) power plants.

    Yeah, for definitions of "common" of perhaps one in a thousand.

    Of course, coal plants kill people when working as intended, but it doesn't look scary on CNN, so nobody cares.

  4. Re:Right...just change the "acceptable level"! by sjames · · Score: 5, Insightful

    Mostly when they discovered to their embarrassment that the nearly arbitrary number they picked was less than the natural background and so wasn't attainable.

  5. Re:Radiation in Denver is unavoidable by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Informative

    It's worse than that. Coal plants on average emit more radiation per kWh than nuclear plants. Including all the disasters of the past few decades.

    People suck at dealing with low probabilities of very high magnitude. Which is why we're so scared of terrorists we can't leave our homes...except to get in a two ton killing machine to which tens of thousands die per year in the US alone.

  6. Not a good comparison by todfm · · Score: 5, Informative

    While the Fukushima disaster may have increased the background radiation by a small amount, this isn't the end of the story on radiation exposure from that event. Fukushima also released radioactive particles that, when inhaled or ingested by humans, will expose their tissues to ionizing radiation for the rest of their lives. This is why you can't compare the exposure from events like international flights, which are distributed across your entire body and are transient in nature, to the total effects of a nuclear disaster. Some of the exposures from Fukushima were and will be much more than tolerable, transient increases in the background radiation a la living in Denver. For many people, the hot particles they inhaled or ingested will stay with them forever and will lead to significant cell damage and cancer.

  7. Re:Why? This: by cheater512 · · Score: 5, Insightful

    Which is exactly why it was created without a scale.

  8. Re:Wrong scare by cgaertner · · Score: 5, Informative

    The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission disagrees with your assessment - this is what the chairman has to say in the official report:

    Message from the Chairman

    THE EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMI of March 11, 2011 were natural disasters of a magnitude
    that shocked the entire world. Although triggered by these cataclysmic events, the subsequent
    accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant cannot be regarded as a natural
    disaster. It was a profoundly manmade disaster – that could and should have been foreseen
    and prevented. And its effects could have been mitigated by a more effective human response.
    How could such an accident occur in Japan, a nation that takes such great pride in its global
    reputation for excellence in engineering and technology? This Commission believes the
    Japanese people – and the global community – deserve a full, honest and transparent answer
    to this question.

    Our report catalogues a multitude of errors and willful negligence that left the Fukushima
    plant unprepared for the events of March 11. And it examines serious deficiencies in the
    response to the accident by TEPCO, regulators and the government.

    For all the extensive detail it provides, what this report cannot fully convey – especially to
    a global audience – is the mindset that supported the negligence behind this disaster.
    What must be admitted – very painfully – is that this was a disaster “Made in Japan.”
    Its fundamental causes are to be found in the ingrained conventions of Japanese culture:
    our reflexive obedience; our reluctance to question authority; our devotion to ‘sticking with
    the program’; our groupism; and our insularity.

    Had other Japanese been in the shoes of those who bear responsibility for this accident,
    the result may well have been the same.

    Following the 1970s “oil shocks,” Japan accelerated the development of nuclear power in
    an effort to achieve national energy security. As such, it was embraced as a policy goal by
    government and business alike, and pursued with the same single-minded determination
    that drove Japan’s postwar economic miracle.

    With such a powerful mandate, nuclear power became an unstoppable force, immune to
    scrutiny by civil society. Its regulation was entrusted to the same government bureaucracy
    responsible for its promotion. At a time when Japan’s self-confidence was soaring, a tightly
    knit elite with enormous financial resources had diminishing regard for anything ‘not
    invented here.’

    This conceit was reinforced by the collective mindset of Japanese bureaucracy, by which
    the first duty of any individual bureaucrat is to defend the interests of his organization.
    Carried to an extreme, this led bureaucrats to put organizational interests ahead of their
    paramount duty to protect public safety.

    Only by grasping this mindset can one understand how Japan’s nuclear industry managed
    to avoid absorbing the critical lessons learned from Three Mile Island and Chernobyl; and how
    it became accepted practice to resist regulatory pressure and cover up small-scale accidents.
    It was this mindset that led to the disaster at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant.
    This report singles out numerous individuals and organizations for harsh criticism, but the
    goal is not—and should not be—to lay blame. The goal must be to learn from this disaster,
    and reflect deeply on its fundamental causes, in order to ensure that it is never repeated.
    Many of the lessons relate to policies and procedures, but the most important is one upon
    which each and every Japanese citizen should reflect very deeply.

    The consequences of negligence at Fukushima stand out as catastrophic, but the mindset
    that supported it can be found across Japan

  9. Re:Radiation in Denver is unavoidable by SydShamino · · Score: 5, Insightful

    Far more generally, people fear sudden or unusual events far more than they fear regular smaller events, even if those regular smaller events add up to far more damage over time. The panic over such low levels of Fukushima radiation compared to Denver radiation may be an example of this. Another example is the panic in Dallas over the West Nile virus. The virus has killed 13-15 or so people this year, mostly the old and infirm. Guess what also kills the old in infirm? The regular flu. How many have been killed in Texas this year? No one knows, because the government doesn't bother to collect that information. The most recent information indicates some dozen children died of the flu in the 2010-2011 flu season in Texas. Numbers of adults and seniors aren't tracked and aren't available, but the CDC estimates somewhere between like 4000 and 30000 flu deaths a year, depending on the severity of that year's outbreak.

    So, a dozen+ people die from something slightly unusual. Odds are pretty good that they all would have died from the flu in a few months anyway. But now the citizens and the government all in a panic to "do something" so they start aerial spraying of pesticides. How do you opt out of aerial spraying of pesticides where you live?

    Car crashes, the flu, heart disease, cancer from Denver's background radiation - no one really cares. But risk or kill a small fraction of that number of people - but do it all at once and in some novel way - and people will react with exponentially higher fervor.

    I think I saw someone on Slashdot once explain this as human instinct. Things that are unusual are more likely to get cave-man-proto-humans killed, so humans developed or evolved enhanced reactions to them. All I know is that we as a species are smart enough to overcome our instincts and react appropriately to situations, so we should do it in these types of situations, too.

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