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Calculating the Cost of Full Disk Encryption
CowboyRobot writes "Is full disk encryption (FDE) worth it? A recent study conducted by the Ponemon Institute shows that the expected benefits of FDE exceed cost by a factor ranging from 4 to 20, based on a reduction in the probability that data will be compromised as the result of the loss or theft of a digital device. 'After doing all of the math, Ponemon found that the cost of FDE on laptop and desktop computers in the U.S. per year was $235, while the cost savings from reduced data breach exposure was $4,650.'"
I am expensive, but not that expensive. I don't charge a customer $235 to click a full disk encryption check box while installing Fedora Linux. Maybe I should...
Excuse me, but please get off my Pennisetum Clandestinum, eh!
A recent study conducted by the Pokemon Institute... :-P
One issue with IT security is that policies and security measures like this are only one small part of the picture. My partner works in a government affiliated company and has to use FDE for all PCs. Because of how they have implemented it they virtually all still use the default key (which wasn't random) and if you change it then you thwart the original intent of having quasi-hotdesks.
Passwords written on desks, stuck to the screen etc are common in many places. Sending files off-network to places like dropbox or email to get around security 'hassles' is widespread. The owner of my current firm wants to use an iPad, because we won't let it on network he does most email from a web email account!
FDE with rubbish passwords is entirely pointless as anyone with motivation to get in can. If you start requiring complex passwords the risk of people writing it down and storing it with the PC increases. We need to stop thinking about security as a technical issue and work out how to produce 'secure enough' systems which users don't subvert or misuse.
If removing security breaches is worth nearly $5k a year then surely using some kind of RFID security card that must be near the PC/Laptop to unlock would be cost effective. I could keep it in my wallet or as a keyring. Even better would be combine it with a RSA style password device for two-factor authentication when providing a password (thus making less complex passwords less of an issue).
'After doing all of the math,
"After applying some simplistic formula"
Ponemon
"the guy promoting his firm with this /. article"
found that the cost of FDE
"without specifying any important parameters such as number of computers or environment in which they are used"
on laptop and desktop computers
"but noting that some were laptop and some were desktop because that makes the result sound a little more convincing"
in the U.S. per year
Encryption is a lot more expensive in Scotland. They can always look up yer kilt and ken yer keys!
was $235,
If this were a porn moneyshot, TFA author would now be panning away from the dick and squirting liquid soap everywhere, seemingly drenching the victim.
while the cost savings from reduced data breach exposure was $4,650.
Or $100,000, or life imprisonment, depending on your particular situation. Statistics: on average, not very useful.
At least partially:
"The study found that the most expensive element of FDE is not the hardware or software involved, but the value of user time it takes to start up, shut down and hibernate computing systems while using FDE. "
But this study doesn't pass the smell test. Take this, for instance: "The cost savings from reduced data breach exposure was $4,650." Imagine that FDE takes the risk of data breach on a stolen disk from 100% down to 0%. And imagine that any given computer has a 1% chance each year of being stolen by someone who's going to exploit the data on it (rather than just reformat it and sell or use it). Both of those are very generous estimates.
The average value of a lost computer to my company--either in terms of profits lost or competitor's profits gained--would have to be $465,000 for the math to work. Which as a median doesn't make sense.
If it's a mean, it only makes sense because there are a handful of computers whose value is tens or hundreds of millions of dollars counterbalancing the vast array of other computers worth far less--but if that's the case, the right solution probably isn't to lump all machines together for analysis purposes, it's to segregate out the high-value targets and treat their security differently from the low-value targets.
rage, rage against the dying of the light
Agreed on the smell-test. No matter how good a security-measure is, it cannot save more money than is lost without it. (i.e. the best possible security is 100%)
Thus for FDE to save $4650/computer/year, the current cost of data-loss that would be avoided with FDE must be atleast the same amount.
There's about 100 million computers sold annually in USA, essentially none of which have FDE. The average computer is used for atleast 3 years. The total *current* cost of data-losses must thus be atleast: 100M * $4650 *3 = $1395 billion/year.
That doesn't pass the smell-test. It would mean the losses add up to $12500 a year for each household, which is utterly ridicolous.
In a corporate environment, you have to have some kind of key management system. You can't do FDE with a free utility that is just "Enter the password to get in to the computer." Well why not? Tow big reasons:
1) What if the person suddenly up and dies, and you need to get at the data? A backup won't help if said backup is also encrypted with the same password that only they knew. You need to have a system to get in.
2) More commonly, what do you do when a user forgets their password? This happens ALL the fucking time. People cannot remember passwords, just how it is. Just losing data is not an acceptable answer, so you have to have a system that can get in.
Now there are systems out there like that. They have central key stores, key recovery facilities and so on all while maintaining cryptographic security. However all the ones I've seen cost money. Then on top of that is the cost of administering such a system.
As an example at work a lady forgot her password, as she is known to do on days ending in "y". So she couldn't get in the encrypted laptop that has key codes for the doors (she deals with that). She also hadn't put the laptop on the 'net in like a year, so it was all desync'd with the Active Directory. This meant my boss couldn't log in to do any kind of override. So he had to hook it up, go through this key recovery thing where the console give you a bigass key to enter in to the system, then get it to sync passwords, then he could log in and get everything working. Took a fair bit of time to do.
You have to count all that kind of thing in cost calculations. You can't pretend like it isn't a cost. Yes you already pay his salary but he has about 5,000 other thing to be doing that weren't being done while he worked on that. Needless to say if this were being used for more than a couple systems (we only use it in special cases) it would quickly need one or more people who's job was to administer it and deal with all the problems caused by it (meaning by users).
Why do we need to encrypt an 18 year old game that has had the source code released? ;-p
So, how well do you stand up to beatings/torture, tough guy?
I run: Windows, OS X, Linux, FreeBSD. Just because you have a hammer, doesn't mean everything is a nail.
And in your fantasy, does the Lady Cop say "Oh, Mr Neckbeard, your fingering is so... virile," then bow-chicka-wow?
There's nothing so sad as preparing for an apocalyptic showdown with The Man, when The Man could not possibly care less about you or your data. Encrypt, don't encrypt, you've got more chance of being eaten by badgers than subjected to a search-and-seizure.
If you were blocking sigs, you wouldn't have to read this.
If you live in a fucked up police state where this is considered possible, you have more problems to care for than merely encrypting data.
cpghost at Cordula's Web.