Hitachi Develops Boarding Gate With Built-In Explosives Detector
An anonymous reader writes "Hitachi, in collaboration with Nippon Signal and the University of Yamanashi, have successfully prototyped a boarding gate with built-in explosives detection equipment as part of efforts to increase safety in public facilities such as airports. The prototype boarding gate efficiently collects minute particles which have affixed themselves to IC cards or portable devices used as boarding passes, and can detect within 1-2 seconds the presence of explosive compounds using internalized equipment. With this method, it is possible to inspect 1,200 passengers per hour."
Anything would be better then getting karate chopped in the crotch by the poorly trained TSA guy, every time I fly and refuse the body scanner.
I skimmed the link, looked like typical marketting pitch stuff. I didn't see any error rates on this marvelous new device. I'm curious as to how many false positives it's going to generate, and how often it will miss carry-on explosives. I'm also wondering how many days I'll need to stay away from the rifle range before I won't show any particulate explosives at one of these checkpoints.
Understanding the scope of the problem is the first step on the path to true panic.
I though that just read "Hitachi Develops Boarding Gate With Built-In Explosives" for a moment.
Doesn't look intrusive enough, so I guess it will not be used.
You've been though the perv-scan or the finger-rape, your carry on baggage has already been nuked, and you're at the boarding gate with only Sally Swipe-n-Smile between you and the 'plane.
Then the machine goes "ping" and the siren goes off. What now? How does that play out?
If it's a false positive (and it will be) then Sally asks you politely to step aside, and it's just another piece of minor inconvenience for the airline, and probably a missed flight and some more TSA probing for the traveller.
But let's pretend for a second that it's a true positive - which is surely the only scenario that we're actually interested in. What then?
Does Sally throw herself onto the passenger in slow motion, screaming "Nooooooo!" in order to save everyone else? And how does she know that this is the one time that it's a real threat, rather than the false ones that she's become used to, day after day?
Really, how does Sally react to the real threat, and what will be the results of that reaction?
If you were blocking sigs, you wouldn't have to read this.
Chemical sniffing boarding gate: $10,800,000
Government contract for the U.S. air travel system: Billions
$4 bag of potassium nitrate fertilizer sprinkled on sidewalk ice by a terrorist instead of salt: Priceless
I'm an American. I love this country and the freedoms that we used to have.
I made the mistake of going to the range before flying once. Despite washing my hands, I still had gunpowder residue on them and my clothing.
Missing my flight and 4 hours of coerced interrogation later (CPS and Phila PD showed up and threatened to take my kids away if I didn't talk, and they wouldn't allow me to call a lawyer), I was finally allowed to leave and go home, since I was put on the no-fly list.
Unsurprisingly, the ACLU did not want to take the case, seeing as how they are a staunch opponent of gun rights, and numerous civil rights attorneys I called said it would be pointless to sue, since apparently the courts have adopted the stance that you give implied cosent to both searches AND interrogations when you purchase a plane ticket.
No rights for you!
> Why should the false positive rate be so low?
Because it's multiplied by the millions of innocent passengers the gate will encounter.
The false negative rate, by contrast, is multiplied by the handful of terrorists.
1. It is not intrusive enough.
2. It replaces sullen TSA uniformed personal with hardware.
3. It reduces the DHS conditioning intended to make the general public accept arbitrary behavior by the government.
4. It is not as dangerous as full body radiation from scanners.
There are a few things that might make the TSA like it.
1. It is really expensive.
2. It doesn't actually work.
3. It will interfere with people for no discernible reason.
On the whole, it's reducing the number and visible presence of the TSA uniformed types that will keep it from being adopted. They are already so expensive, intrusive, arbitrary, and incompetent that they don't need that level of automation.
Why is Snark Required?
Imagine the IRL DDOS of an airport.
Can you see it?
Bring a small aerosol canister of basically liquid shit and spray it inconspicuously on people's luggage. For better results bring a few cans with you with slightly different composition, mix powder traces of real explosives as well.
Do it as a flash mob across the globe and shut down the entire airline industry.
You can't handle the truth.