Researcher Reverse-Engineers Pacemaker Transmitter To Deliver Deadly Shocks
Bismillah writes "Pacemakers seem to be hackable now too, if researcher Barnaby Jack is to be believed. And the consequences of that are deadly. Anonymous assassinations within 30 feet of the pacemaker seem to be possible. From the article: 'In a video demonstration, which Jack declined to release publicly because it may reveal the name of the manufacturer, he issued a series of 830 volt shocks to the pacemaker using a laptop. The pacemakers contained a "secret function" which could be used to activate all pacemakers and implantable cardioverter-defibrillators (ICDs) in a 30 foot -plus vicinity. ... In reverse-engineering the terminals – which communicate with the pacemakers – he discovered no obfuscation efforts and even found usernames and passwords for what appeared to be the manufacturer’s development server. That data could be used to load rogue firmware which could spread between pacemakers with the "potential to commit mass murder."'"
Shocking!
I talk about stuff.
... he discovered no obfuscation efforts and even found usernames and passwords ...
How come such pacemakers were ever approved by the FDA?
Nae king! Nae laird! Nae yurrupiean pressedent! We willna be fooled again!
I'm sure the developer was thinking, "Who would even think of trying to hack a pacemaker? Who would even want to?"
Unfortunately, it only takes one sociopath.
// file: mice.h
#include "frickin_lasers.h"
Cardiologists commonly communicate electronically with the pacemaker after its insertion to adjust numerous parameters of its function. The pacemaker can also deliver information to the cardiologist about its usage history, battery state, etc. (Doctor) Richard Cavell
Sounds like it could be the plot of the new Crank movie!
...the state of computer "engineering" is complete and utter shit if a fucking pacemaker can be hacked and compromised? What the mother fuck? Are you fucking kidding me? Shouldn't those be among the best designed, safest, most reliable and secure of devices? God help us all. Just wait until they drag us into this war with Iran here soon, and China and Russia decide to team up to end our bullshit and we end up descending into WW3.
Can you imagine the utter chaos in the U.S. when all our magic electronic boxes suddenly stop working, or worse, work silently behind our backs to sabotage and/or kill us? According to another /. article, it's 300+ days on average (sometimes years) between the finding of a typical "zero day" exploit and when it was actually found (kept hidden, and potentially exploited) by attackers. Who wants to bet money China and Russia both have teams of hackers dedicated to finding exploits for all common software and systems in the U.S., extensively documenting and writing code against them, nicely sorting and tabulating it all out and filing it away in an archive, then keeping this info close at hand at all times for when the right opportunity presents itself?
Right now we are more vulnerable than ever. Hands up: who here is looking forward to jumping into a world war with both feet, then being surprised by how much we don't know about our own security vulnerabilities, learning the hard way from powerful foreign countries that just might kick our asses, or at the very least cause massive damage (bombing, etc) to the mainland U.S.? We're learning now that pacemakers have huge gaping security holes. Holy fucking Christ. What else is out there waiting to be compromised and exploited?
Dick Cheney has a pacemaker...
C|N>K
There is the other side of this - if the pacemaker was protected by a password, what if a cardiologist other than the one that installed it had to access/update/configure it? Either there would have to be a commonly-known access code (negating all attempts at securing the device) OR the doctor would have to contact the Mfg. or some central password authority to get the codes to access the device, and that might be an unacceptable delay in a life-or-death scenario.
Sure, you could ask patients to carry password cards OR tattoo the password on a body part if you really felt the need to password-protect the device.
Not so sure about one pacemaker updating another pacemaker, as the description mentions - does the pacemaker really have a strong enough transmitter to download a new firmware image onto another pacemaker in another body?
Ken
Seems like this was demonstrated four years ago, no?
Pacemakers and Implantable Cardiac Defibrillators: Software Radio Attacks and Zero-Power Defenses.
D. Halperin, T.S. Heydt-Benjamin, B. Ransford, S.S. Clark, B. Defend, W. Morgan, K. Fu, T. Kohno, and W.H. Maisel.
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, May 18-21, 2008.
See: http://www.secure-medicine.org/icd-study/icd-study.pdf
Tin foil vest.
Pacemakers are used to establish a regular heartbeat (pacing) at a specific interval. Implantable Cardiac Defibrillators (ICDs) are used to deliver high-voltage shocks at a precise moment in time to stop an arrhythmia. Delivered at exactly the wrong time, this can induce an arrhythmia.
(2) "he issued a series of 830 volt shocks to the pacemaker using a laptop". Sorry pal, thanks for playing, hit the bricks, you're done. The ICD (not pacemaker) is the one issuing the shocks. At least the voltage level sounds about right. All of this starting from a ~3V battery too.
The wireless interfaces (telemetry) into pacemakers and ICDs are notoriously insecure, from all major device manufacturers. They are playing catch up now. Believe me, there is a lot of heartburn (no pun intended) in the ranks of corporate/executive management in the device companies when it comes to this topic.
A couple points worth remembering:
(1) These devices have very long lifetimes. The typical implant is expected to last 6-10 years (usually the battery is the limiting factor). So there are people walking around with devices in them with security problems from 10 years ago in some cases.
(2) It takes a tremendous amount of money to develop a new device in this class. All the testing, certification, trials, etc. The electronics and firmware are incredibly optimized for their specific function, the test suites are massive, the verification & validation processes are lengthy.
(3) Regarding (1) above about 10 year old firmware - essentially all devices support near-range telemetry, which allows a physician / tech within physical proximity (a few inches) to download logs about what events the device has seen / experienced. It also allows the device to be updated with firmware patches. Having been around this enough in different places, I'm pretty confident saying that it's always in the form of patches, as opposed to wholesale forklift updates.
Patches aren't just pushed out like Firefox releases, even the smallest one is a massive amount of effort -- even if the change is a one-line change in code. And more importantly, any patch requires the patient to visit the physician, the physician to be up to date on patches & warnings, etc.. I've seen data first-hand from 2 device manufacturers showing the distribution of devices & updates in the field, and believe me, not everyone is anywhere near up to date. Actually, it probably looks a lot like the Firefox version distribution...
I built a stun gun capable of generating 900,000 volts on-demand out of a few dollars worth of parts and a 9 volt battery, and it fits in the palm of your hand
900V or 9 kV I would believe, 900 kV not so much.
You would need creeping distances of more than 300 mm just to prevent arcing and making the voltage collapse before it even reached the 900 kV.
"900 kV" and "fits into the palm of your hand" are mutually exclusive, I think.
(and yes, I've designed and built multi-kV devices myself)
Hackable medical devices are a known problem -- there's a great paper on it from Karen Sandler, at that time at the Software Freedom Law Center (she's given OSCON talks about it too):
Killed by Code: Software Transparency in Implantable Medical Devices
And the SFLC's announcement / summary of the paper:
Software Defects in Cardiac Medical Devices are a Life-or-Death Issue
http://www.red-bean.com/kfogel
... Reminds me of the TV-B-Gone.
Father-in-law begone.
Better.
Faster! Faster! Faster would be better!
I think you're close. You need a secondary access method that requires direct skin contact near the device in order to bypass the front-line wireless security. Same concept as how most people will protect wireless access to their home network, but rely on physical security to prevent someone replacing their router: if someone can get close enough to get physical access, you'll know it and know to stop it before it's too late.
What do you mean they cut the power? How can they cut the power, man? They're animals!
12 years too late...
“He’s not deformed, he’s just drunk!”
Anybody got Dick Cheney's IP address? Just curious; totally unrelated to this story. Honest.
No, seriously, it sounds like he isn't getting any, in which case he might want to try clomipramine / Anafranil.
Apparently around 5% of users report spontaneous orgasm when yawning.
I wish more things in life had side effects like that. Of course, that would necessitate certain changes to one's wardrobe, but I think the minor additional hassle would be well worth it...
:-P
"What in the name of Fats Waller is that?"
"A four-foot prune."