Poor SSL Implementations Leave Many Android Apps Vulnerable
Trailrunner7 writes "There are thousands of apps in the Google Play mobile market that contain serious mistakes in the way that SSL/TLS is implemented, leaving them vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks that could compromise sensitive user data such as banking credentials, credit card numbers and other information. Researchers from a pair of German universities conducted a detailed analysis of thousands of Android apps and found that better than 15 percent of those apps had weak or bad SSL implementations. The researchers conducted a detailed study of 13,500 of the more popular free apps on Google Play, the official Android app store, looking at the SSL/TLS implementations in them and trying to determine how complete and effective those implementations are. What they found is that more than 1,000 of the apps have serious problems with their SSL implementations that make them vulnerable to MITM attacks, a common technique used by attackers to intercept wireless data traffic. In its research, the team was able to intercept sensitive user data from these apps, including credit card numbers, bank account information, PayPal credentials and social network credentials."
I myself have implemented them for shopping apps (SSL for anything dealing with user details, payment, etc.). When you're communicating with an external service that requires (or where you want to use) encrypted connections and that service only offers SSL (this is probably 90% of the time) you need to use it. Now the catch here is that the standard SSL handlers available to you in Android provide an "ideal" setup, where servers and certs are exactly as they "should" be. The problem is unless you are paying rediculous ammounts for dedicated SSL services and high quality certs your setup will not be the "ideal", and you'll have to make exceptions by overriding code.
As an example, in the shopping system I set up there were two sets of certs, one set was signed [payment gateway] the other wasn't [user control pannel]. I had to jump through a few hoops, and the app would be open for man-in-the-middle if set up right - but luckilly all they'd get would be user login details, address and phone number - billing is all external and requires a separate authorization.
This is not a platform problem, this is a matter of the choices made by application developers. I can guarantee this same sort of analysis would fail a similar number of apps across the board for Windows, OSX, or *any* platform with a sufficient number of applications making use of SSL sockets. I know the sort of developers that do this and they'll do it *everywhere*, because of some mix of not quite understanding the point of the CA and the hassle they perceive in trying to find a way to do it right (admittedly, the logistics of doing it right in certain scenarios is daunting and necessarily puts work on the enduser if you want to be truly secure).
I would never consider using an Android phone for any banking access. Never.
I would never consider using an Android phone for any access. Never.
FTFY