NASA To Encrypt All of Its Laptops
pev writes "After losing another laptop containing personal information, NASA wants to have all of its laptops encrypted within a month's time with an intermediate ban on laptops containing sensitive information leaving its facilities. Between April 2009 and April 2011 it lost or had stolen 48 'mobile computing devices.' I wonder how long it will be before other large organizations start following suit as a sensible precaution?"
They waited this long because? First?
NASA is a huge bureaucracy that is behind the curve in this aspect. The sad part is that they apparently have more laptops to lose with HR type information on them than they do ITAR. Which pretty much sums up NASA right now.
You know, we've been doing this for four years where I work. And yes, I know everyone here is going to espouse Truecrypt as the one true solution, but the simple fact is NASA is run as a corporation... as such they'll probably go for a solution that's vendor supported. The fact that they're NASA will probably mean they'll get a pretty decent price on the software too.
Now, the downside of full-disk encryption (which many lazy corporations do instead of home directory only) is that it does increase the load on your system, slow it down and make recovery if/when it breaks a royal pain. Our helpdesk has an almost constant stream of laptops coming and going through their hands that they have to decrypt and re-encrypt because something got out of sync. Time consuming, and leads to downtime for the users. I've often suggested home folder only encryption... but the higher ups want it all encrypted... right up to the point that their laptop is down for two days because they've broken it.
By the way, another horrible side effect of whole disk encryption is that our experience says that it'll kill SSD's pretty rapidly. Our average SSD life is less than a year at this point because there doesn't seem to be a good full-disk encryption software that properly implements TRIM... so spinning disk or hybrid disk is the way to go.
I was in charge of testing/verification of full disk crypto when my then-employer (Hydro) mandated it almost 20 years ago:
At that time 5 vendors made it through our pre-qualification tests, among these I was able to trivially break 3 of them (replace a conditional branch with its opposite), one took 20 minutes and only Utmaco's SafeGuard Easy had done a proper security design, where the user password was used as (part of) the seed for the key used to decrypt a copy of the master disk key.
I.e. the system _must_ be safe against attack from anyone, including the vendor!
I wrote a longer post about this the previous time the same issue came up on /.
Terje
"almost all programming can be viewed as an exercise in caching"
NASA has employees. Those employees have things like SSNs and disabilities and other such things that go in personnel files. It's one thing to say that all NASA's mission data should be completely open, and quite another to say that means everyone who works there should expect the public to be pawing through their data when that data would be afforded protection at any other employer.