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Book Reviews: Lockpicking Books From Deviant Ollam
benrothke writes "It is well known that the password, while the most widespread information security mechanism, is also one of the most insecure. It comes down to the fact that the average person can't create and maintain secure passwords. When it comes to physical locks, the average lock on your home and in your office is equally insecure. How insecure it in? In two fascinating books on the topic, Deviant Ollam writes in Practical Lock Picking, Second Edition: A Physical Penetration Testers Training Guide and Keys to the Kingdom: Impressioning, Privilege Escalation, Bumping, and Other Key-Based Attacks Against Physical Locks that it is really not that difficult. When it comes to information security penetration tests done on the client site, the testers will most often have permission to be inside the facility. On rare occasions, the testers need to find alternative means to gain entrance. Sometimes that means picking the locks." Keep reading to learn if you'll be picking locks soon.
Practical Lock Picking, 2nd ed. / Keys to the Kingdom
author
Deviant Ollam
pages
296 / 256
publisher
Syngress
rating
9/10
reviewer
Ben Rothke
ISBN
978-1597499897 / 978-1597499835
summary
Two excellent books on the fundamentals of lockpicking
All of the information in the books is long known to professional locksmiths. For those whose responsibilities include physical security, it is hoped that they are at least at the level of the locksmiths, and have designed their physical security plant accordingly.
Ollam is a member of The Open Organization Of Lockpickers (TOOOL), a group whose goal is to advance the general public knowledge about locks and lock picking. TOOL'S mantra is that the more that people know about lock technology, the better they are capable of understanding how and where certain weaknesses are present. This makes them well-equipped to participate in sport picking endeavors and also helps them simply be better consumers in the marketplace, making decisions based on sound fact and research. In these books, Ollam stays true to that mantra.
The two books have some overlap. Practical Lock Picking is meant as a beginners guide to lock picking, and is intended to be a hands-on guide with hundreds of pictures and diagrams.
Ollam writes in a clear-cut and systematic manner, describing all of the details needed. Nearly every page includes pictures and diagrams to illustrate the point. In 6 easily readable chapters, Ollam covers the core areas needed to gain a comprehensive understanding of the topic of lock picking. By the end of the book, you won't be a locksmith or even close. But for those that have locksmithing in their blood, or want to get greater insights, the book will be a great resource that will help them get there.
Chapter 1 starts the book on the fundamentals of pin tumbler and wafer locks; which are two of the most common types of locks in use. Ollam notes that while there are a multitude of lock designs on the market today produced by many different manufactures, the bulk of these locks are not in widespread use. With that, he notes that if the reader can understand the basics of just a few styles of locks, he is confident that the reader should be open top open with great east at least 75% of the locks they are likely to encounter, and even more as you become more skilled with them.
After the introduction, chapter 2 gets into the basics of lock picking and how to exploit weaknesses that most locks have. Many of these weaknesses are due to errors in the manufacturing process, which the book details. Information security guru has observed that "security is a tax on the honest majority". He writes that security often does not keep that bad guys out. Similarly, insecure physical locks will do little to keep the bad guys out, which Ollam so persuasively writes about.
In chapter 5, Ollam details what he terms quick-entry tricks, which is done via shimming, bumping and bypassing. Lock bumping has gotten a lot of media exposure in the last few years, but has been around for nearly 100 years. Specifically, it is a pin tumbler lock picking technique using a special bump key. Not that there is a universal bump key that can open all locks. Rather the bump key must correspond to the lock in question. Ollam shows that if one has such a key, many of these locks can quickly be compromised.
The book closes with an appendix that provides a list to the types of tools and toolkits necessary to pick locks.
After completing Practical Lock Picking, one should check out Keys to the Kingdom: Impressioning, Privilege Escalation, Bumping, and Other Key-Based Attacks Against Physical Locks, which is a great follow-on reference.
The main difference between the two is that the latter provides a lot of details on impressioning, which is a covert technique to create a usable key for a lock without picking the lock or taking it apart, in addition to some other types of more sophisticated attacks.
Chapter 2 of the book is on soft medium attacks and is particularly fascinating. Ollam writes of mold-and-cast attacks, which is a technique of opening a lock by covertly copying a legitimate key by making a cast of it in a soft material, then using it to imprint and fabricate a working key. Such a technique was used in real-life and detailed in the 1979 movie The First Great Train Robbery. Ollam writes how the movie was very true to the methods and technology available at that time, when the train robbery occurred in the 1850's.
The chapter walks the reader through the Quick-Key duplication kit method, in which most common key forms can be replicated with the kits molding and casting forms. The kit Ollam references is for the serious student of the craft, as it costs over $700- and can only be purchased from a firm in Germany.
Chapter 3 on master-keyed systems is particularly interesting as Ollam shows how a master key privilege escalation attack can often be easily done. Master-key systems make the logistics of granting access easier. But with that ease of use, comes the potential for abuse, as that single key will now have global access to the physical site.
Ollam writes that dedicated attackers who have the ability to spend a bit of time will often have the ability to compromise the code for the top master key (the one with the most access privileges) in nearly all master-keyed systems, even with only a small amount of preliminary information and a small number of blank keys.
In the same way that passwords often provide very little network security, Keys to the Kingdom shows that much of the security provided by physical locks is an illusion, given the ease at which these keys can be manipulated and copied.
Practical Lock Picking, Second Edition: A Physical Penetration Testers Training Guide is a great introduction to the topic of lock picking, while Keys to the Kingdom: Impressioning, Privilege Escalation, Bumping, and Other Key-Based Attacks Against Physical Locks takes that base knowledge and builds upon.
For those who perform physical penetration testing, these two books will prove to be invaluable. For those that simply want to understand what their locks are and aren't doing, they will find these to be a fascinating read.
Ben Rothke is the author of Computer Security: 20 Things Every Employee Should Know.
You can purchase Practical Lock Picking, Second Edition: A Physical Penetration Testers Training Guide and Keys to the Kingdom: Impressioning, Privilege Escalation, Bumping, and Other Key-Based Attacks Against Physical Locks from amazon.com. Slashdot welcomes readers' book reviews -- to see your own review here, read the book review guidelines, then visit the submission page.
Ollam is a member of The Open Organization Of Lockpickers (TOOOL), a group whose goal is to advance the general public knowledge about locks and lock picking. TOOL'S mantra is that the more that people know about lock technology, the better they are capable of understanding how and where certain weaknesses are present. This makes them well-equipped to participate in sport picking endeavors and also helps them simply be better consumers in the marketplace, making decisions based on sound fact and research. In these books, Ollam stays true to that mantra.
The two books have some overlap. Practical Lock Picking is meant as a beginners guide to lock picking, and is intended to be a hands-on guide with hundreds of pictures and diagrams.
Ollam writes in a clear-cut and systematic manner, describing all of the details needed. Nearly every page includes pictures and diagrams to illustrate the point. In 6 easily readable chapters, Ollam covers the core areas needed to gain a comprehensive understanding of the topic of lock picking. By the end of the book, you won't be a locksmith or even close. But for those that have locksmithing in their blood, or want to get greater insights, the book will be a great resource that will help them get there.
Chapter 1 starts the book on the fundamentals of pin tumbler and wafer locks; which are two of the most common types of locks in use. Ollam notes that while there are a multitude of lock designs on the market today produced by many different manufactures, the bulk of these locks are not in widespread use. With that, he notes that if the reader can understand the basics of just a few styles of locks, he is confident that the reader should be open top open with great east at least 75% of the locks they are likely to encounter, and even more as you become more skilled with them.
After the introduction, chapter 2 gets into the basics of lock picking and how to exploit weaknesses that most locks have. Many of these weaknesses are due to errors in the manufacturing process, which the book details. Information security guru has observed that "security is a tax on the honest majority". He writes that security often does not keep that bad guys out. Similarly, insecure physical locks will do little to keep the bad guys out, which Ollam so persuasively writes about.
In chapter 5, Ollam details what he terms quick-entry tricks, which is done via shimming, bumping and bypassing. Lock bumping has gotten a lot of media exposure in the last few years, but has been around for nearly 100 years. Specifically, it is a pin tumbler lock picking technique using a special bump key. Not that there is a universal bump key that can open all locks. Rather the bump key must correspond to the lock in question. Ollam shows that if one has such a key, many of these locks can quickly be compromised.
The book closes with an appendix that provides a list to the types of tools and toolkits necessary to pick locks.
After completing Practical Lock Picking, one should check out Keys to the Kingdom: Impressioning, Privilege Escalation, Bumping, and Other Key-Based Attacks Against Physical Locks, which is a great follow-on reference.
The main difference between the two is that the latter provides a lot of details on impressioning, which is a covert technique to create a usable key for a lock without picking the lock or taking it apart, in addition to some other types of more sophisticated attacks.
Chapter 2 of the book is on soft medium attacks and is particularly fascinating. Ollam writes of mold-and-cast attacks, which is a technique of opening a lock by covertly copying a legitimate key by making a cast of it in a soft material, then using it to imprint and fabricate a working key. Such a technique was used in real-life and detailed in the 1979 movie The First Great Train Robbery. Ollam writes how the movie was very true to the methods and technology available at that time, when the train robbery occurred in the 1850's.
The chapter walks the reader through the Quick-Key duplication kit method, in which most common key forms can be replicated with the kits molding and casting forms. The kit Ollam references is for the serious student of the craft, as it costs over $700- and can only be purchased from a firm in Germany.
Chapter 3 on master-keyed systems is particularly interesting as Ollam shows how a master key privilege escalation attack can often be easily done. Master-key systems make the logistics of granting access easier. But with that ease of use, comes the potential for abuse, as that single key will now have global access to the physical site.
Ollam writes that dedicated attackers who have the ability to spend a bit of time will often have the ability to compromise the code for the top master key (the one with the most access privileges) in nearly all master-keyed systems, even with only a small amount of preliminary information and a small number of blank keys.
In the same way that passwords often provide very little network security, Keys to the Kingdom shows that much of the security provided by physical locks is an illusion, given the ease at which these keys can be manipulated and copied.
Practical Lock Picking, Second Edition: A Physical Penetration Testers Training Guide is a great introduction to the topic of lock picking, while Keys to the Kingdom: Impressioning, Privilege Escalation, Bumping, and Other Key-Based Attacks Against Physical Locks takes that base knowledge and builds upon.
For those who perform physical penetration testing, these two books will prove to be invaluable. For those that simply want to understand what their locks are and aren't doing, they will find these to be a fascinating read.
Ben Rothke is the author of Computer Security: 20 Things Every Employee Should Know.
You can purchase Practical Lock Picking, Second Edition: A Physical Penetration Testers Training Guide and Keys to the Kingdom: Impressioning, Privilege Escalation, Bumping, and Other Key-Based Attacks Against Physical Locks from amazon.com. Slashdot welcomes readers' book reviews -- to see your own review here, read the book review guidelines, then visit the submission page.
How secure it in?
"insecure physical locks will do little to keep the bad guys out"
I think this is unfair. The lock on my front door has a 100% record of keeping bad guys out. That's because it's intended to deter casual thieves, not secret agents. Knowing what your security is protecting against and choosing the right level is important. And I could buy the best lock in the world and someone could just smash a window...
Any place with any real security is going to have a LOT more than just key locks in place. It's the same layered security stuff that applies to network security. The userid/password is just ONE PART of the security. If someone isn't watching for abnormal behavior on the network too, you're already asking for trouble.
What political party do you join when you don't like Bible-thumpers *or* hippies?
That or to keep out drunk people and kids. My wife and I always lock all of our doors every night. We both realize those locks would never keep a professional out, but they will keep out drunk people who think they are home when they aren't, and kids playing games for the most part.
The real problem is that it takes time to pick a lock and criminals don't like taking the chance of being seen stooped over looking a lock. They are really easy to pick, however. I taught myself how to pick locks while working one summer for a builders hardware company.
AC speaks the truth. I was burglarized last year. The door was picked by force (kicked open). Picking locks as described in this book is for those that don't want people to know someone has been in your private spaces.
Beware of those who profit off the docile and persecute the unbelievers.
"average person can't create and maintain secure passwords."
This is utterly false. The average, even Dumb people CAN create and maintain secure passwords. The problem is, that what was once considered "secure" is 1) hard to remember meaningless letters, numbers and symbols (some of which can't be used on some systems), and 2) limited to 8 characters, and 3) easy for computers to crack using brute force.
If we changed short hard to remember passwords with longer easier to remember passwords, they become much harder to brute force.
Pa55W0rD! Hard to remember (did I use a o or O or 0)? was it d or D?), easy for computer
RockylovesEmily3Ninjas (22 characters) is much easier to remember, and nearly impossible to brute force crack using today's technology.
Your average person can easily think of a phrase that has meaning to them, that is long, secure and hard to crack, IF they are taught how to, and IF the systems allowed really long passwords. Changing how we think of passwords is key.
Agent K: A *person* is smart. People are dumb, stupid, panicky animals, and you know it.
My dad was a locksmith, so I learned a bit here and there about lock-picking as well as physical security.
It was best expressed to me this way. Most people believe that locks are meant to prevent access. This is incorrect. Locks are there to allow access. After, all, if you want to prevent access, build a wall, not a door with a lock. The lock is there to limit access. Ideally, a standard lock limits access to those people with a key or with knowledge of the combination. But a simple lock only prevents access to honest people or to those without the time or desire to enter. (These days, that is a very small segment of the popluation.) With each group of people that you wish to keep out, the cost of security goes up. Reinforced doors, sturdier frames, multiple locks, higher quality locks, combinations of different types of locks, electronic keys and biometrics are all steps to preventing different groups of people from entering. With each level of security, there is an increased cost, and, with most levels, and increased inconvenience to those who have permission to enter.
I am sure that most people here know the questions to ask when determining computer security, and the same questions apply to physical security. It comes down to How can someone gain access?, and What am I willing to spend to prevent it?
I think it is good that these books are published, because many people are clueless about physical security. "Put an expensive lock on it. We should be okay." I was surprised to learn how much of my prossesions I kept, simply because it wasn't worth someone's time or effort to steal it.
Great civilizations have lived and died on false theories. Don't mess up mine with a few facts.
Can't argue with that, mate, I do agree that my toothbrush should be allocated to me only.
It's the way the resources are allocated that puzzles me.
Of course Windows are generally a quicker way to get access, and breaking them is pretty quick.
There are very few professional thieves, and the ones there are don't generally use the door.
If you can prevent someone that is going door to door looking for an open one, you've blocked the vast majoraty, after that, if you don't have much more than the next schmo, you're pretty safe.
Wow, sent an e-mail as suggested when clicking on "use classic" banner, and got a fast response that addressed my msg
I usually leave him in a ditch, while I help myself to his wallet.
I don't have many friends.
Yeah, right.
Windows in buildings actually follow the same principle. (Computer Windows is a completely different topic not addressed in these posts.) Windows are built to allow access as well. The primary access for windows is light. Either sunlight to warm or provide illumination, or for vision of what is on the other side.
To secure windows, you either need to limit how much light is allowed, such as making the window only 6 inches square, or placing barriers on either side of the window to make it more difficult for things other than light to enter. Such barriers coud include signs to discourage, hedges, bars, dogs (on either side), traps, moats, and/or landmines. (Some of those options may have questionable legal issues depending on where your building is.)
As with doors, the questions remain, is the stuff inside worth someone's time or effort to get in, and how much am I willing to spend to prevent access. The books dealt specifically with raising awareness about locks, so I concentrated on that aspect. But, if the stuff inside is sufficiently valuable, whole perimeter security needs to be addressed. Is tunnelling a viable option? What about vents? Even if the vent or window is too small for a person to enter, can something be put inside that will compromise the security from the inside?
Great civilizations have lived and died on false theories. Don't mess up mine with a few facts.
And of course you need to consider other risks, not just theft. If the place catches fire, you may not be able to get out of the window.
But a simple lock only prevents access to honest people or to those without the time or desire to enter. (These days, that is a very small segment of the popluation.)
That is paranoid bullshit. The vast majority of people are not criminals or psychopaths and will respect other people and their property quite happily.
To have a right to do a thing is not at all the same as to be right in doing it