Australian Economists Predictions No Better Than Flipping a Coin
First time accepted submitter ras writes "The Reserve Bank of Australia did some investigation into the accuracy of their economic predictions — the ones they use to run the country — with less than flattering results. '70 per cent of the RBA's forecasts for underlying inflation for the year ahead were close to the mark, but its predictions of economic growth were less accurate, and its unemployment rate estimates no better than [chance] ... The Reserve Bank employs numbers of people on very high pay and what they're admitting now is that their — all of this so-called science — has produced nothing more than what a roll of the dice could produce.'"
Economy is not science and won't ever be.
If 'the market' makes decisions based on the predictions of the RBA, it's no wonder the predictions about 'the market' don't often hold up.
Economics is the only field where one can be considered an expert without ever having once been right.
Except that in this casino, friends of the owner are allowed access to cameras looking into your cards, to react a fraction of second before you do.
The creatures outside looked from Alt-Right to Antifa; but already it was impossible to say which was which.
No, his analogy (high speed trading) is exactly correct. The stock market is not out of business because most people understand card sharping, but they do not understand how bank traders work. If they actually did and understood the implications, people would be hanging from lamp posts.
From scarped cliff or quarried stone she cries "A thousand types are gone, I care for nothing, no not one."
The roots of Austrian economics begin with Carl Menger, not Bohm-Bawerk.
You're right, thanks.
From your other note, if Austrian economics is non-scientific then mathematics is also non-scientific. IMO (as an economist and not a philosopher) Austrian econ can make an even stronger case than than math for being scientific because I'm satisfied that the action axiom is a priori true whereas the fundamental axioms of math are not. You can probably deduce that I don't believe 'science' is defined by induction :-)
The problem with this line of reasoning is that it confuses two meaning of "science". Since you mention math, let me use it as an example.
Nowadays it's an accepted matter that you can select basically any set of axioms you wish, and from those you'll be able to fully develop an entire math from them. So, if I want, I can, let's say, determine that the division by 0 has a finite result, and as long as I follow rigorous a logical reasoning, I'll get a consistent, with-division-by-0 math. Some other things will work differently from what we're used, but that's about it.
Now, for us to go from math as a whole, which includes the set of all possible combinations of all possible arbitrarily chosen non-contradictory axioms, to that specific subset that applies to the real world and in turn can be used to describe it, we need a non-a priori component, in that we must observe the actual world and find what of those axioms apply here.
Praxeology doesn't do that for its own axioms. It defines with extreme precision what it understands by "action", and derive lots of conclusions from it, which for the sake of argument we can assume are valid. But it doesn't come and actually prove empirically that what specific thing it calls "action" is the only one at play in economic relations. So, since we're assuming the conclusions from the axiom, if 100% of economics is built upon "action", then praxeology describes all of economics. But this hasn't been proven. It could be that the actual number is 99.999%, or 50%, or 0.001%, or even that the percentage varies given changing factors.
Thus, even with praxeology being valid from one extreme to the other, we still need to actually look into the world to find how much of it actually applies. There's no way around it.
Additionally, the logic upon which deductions from the action axiom are obtained can itself be challenged. It's for the most part classic logic with Kantian additions. What does happen if we were to start deducing with, let's say, para-consistent logic instead? Would it work better or worse in the real world? This, too, is a matter that can only be solved with experimentation.
And so on and so forth. Nothing in this is as straightforward as Austrian economists make it to be.
Conservatism: (n.) love of the existing evils. Liberalism: (n.) desire to substitute new evils for the existing ones.