Slashdot Mirror
Ask Slashdot: Simplifying Encryption and Backup?
New submitter FuzzNugget writes "A recent catastrophic hard drive failure has caused me to ponder whether the trade-off between security and convenience with software-based OTFE is worthwhile. My setup involves an encrypted Windows installation with TrueCrypt's pre-boot authentication, in addition to having data stored in a number of TrueCrypt file containers. While it is nice to have some amount of confidence that my data is safe from prying eyes in the case of loss or theft of my laptop, this setup poses a number of significant inconveniences." Read on below; FuzzNugget lists some problems with this set-up, and seeks advice on a simpler system for backing up while keeping things locked down.
FuzzNugget continues: "1. Backup images of the encrypted operating system can only be restored to the original hard drive (ie.: the drive that has failed). So, recovery from this failure requires the time-consuming process of re-installing the OS, re-installing my software and re-encrypting it. Upgrading the hard drive where both the old and new drives are still functional is not much better as it requires decryption, copying the partition(s) and re-encryption.
2. With the data being stored in large file containers, each around 100-200GB. It can be come quite burdensome to deal with these huge files all the time. It's also a particularly volatile situation, as the file container is functionally useless if it's not completely intact.
3. As much as I'd like to use this situation as an opportunity to upgrade to an SSD, use with OTFE is said to pose risks of data leaks, cause decreased performance and premature failure due to excessive write operations.
So, with that, I'm open to suggestions for alternatives. Do you use encryption for your hard drive(s)? What's your setup like and how manageable is it?"
2. With the data being stored in large file containers, each around 100-200GB. It can be come quite burdensome to deal with these huge files all the time. It's also a particularly volatile situation, as the file container is functionally useless if it's not completely intact.
3. As much as I'd like to use this situation as an opportunity to upgrade to an SSD, use with OTFE is said to pose risks of data leaks, cause decreased performance and premature failure due to excessive write operations.
So, with that, I'm open to suggestions for alternatives. Do you use encryption for your hard drive(s)? What's your setup like and how manageable is it?"
Aka: you are doing it wrong. First think of backup: you have a machine, and you copy its contents to another drive. Ok. Easy. Now take a breath, and use OTFE for the original hard disk, and now add OTFE for the external drive/media. There. The backup has NOTHING to do with encryption. If you have forced yourself into a backup solution which requires encryption integration to the point that it only restores to a specific hardware, you are failing hard time, precisely for the reason backups are for when you don't have the original hardware.
Again, separate backup from encryption. I mean, next you will want an integrated internet/remote backup and you will cry us a river? Compartimentalize each function and then you can mix them freely.
aside: "OFTE" seems to stand for "On The Fly Encryption" - an initialism I hadn't heard used by IT folks before ... but anyway....
Why aren't you backing up your files from one encrypted volume to another, at the file level? It sounds like you're doing block level backups of your container files. Do you not trust your backup computer to have those volumes open and decrypted at backup time? Dealing with block-level diffs isn't an easy way to approach the problem, but you could look at mirroring a copy-on-write filesystem, or a dedicated backup application that does its own block diffs and maps for incrementals.
I use LUKS on linux for my backups, and then the backup drives go offsite. But the backup computer is allowed to access the files while the backup is running - which isn't a problem for the risks I'm trying to defend against. If you can't trust your backup computer, another approach is to run Windows as a VM and handle your backups with linux, which has a lower intrusion rate.
My God, it's Full of Source!
OUTSIDE_IP=$(dig +short my.ip @outsideip.net)
...that it almost becomes a work of art. I want to just sit and admire it and try and tease out the nuances of idiocy and subtle details or inanity that lurk within the depths of its stupidity, in hopes that I'll reach some new plateau of understanding as I gain insight into the essential nature of the moron of the species.
alas, time is short, so I'll have to return another time to bask in the aura of this commentator's ignorance.
On Windows, I prefer to use Acronis software for imaging and TrueCrypt for encryption.
Since the TrueCrypt operations happen at a low level that's transparent to Windows and other applications that interact with the disk, once I enter the pre-boot password for TrueCrypt and load Windows I can interact with the disk as if it were not encrypted: by making images with Acronis after Windows has booted, Acronis sees the disk as a standard NTFS drive. I can save the image of the unencrypted contents of the disk to some sort of secure backup media.
The backup media may be encrypted on its own, or I could use the encryption mechanisms built into Acronis to protect the image files. If I were use Acronis bootable media and try imaging the disk, I'd only get an image of the encrypted data -- by booting into Windows first I can make an image of the unencrypted contents of the disk.
If the encrypted drive were to ever fail I could write the image back to a new drive sans encryption. This also allows me more flexibility in regards to resizing the filesystem to new disks: since I took the image of the unencrypted contents of the disk I can resize the filesystem to a new disk. If I had encrypted the raw disk itself then I would not have this option. After restoring, I can then encrypt-in-place using TrueCrypt to secure the new drive.
As for the encrypted containers, mount them and back up their contents.
Do you live in an underground bunker, with automated blast doors and multi-layer security? I doubt it. Does anybody really care enough to defeat such measures to get into your house? I suspect you're like the rest of us, with standard locks and maybe an alarm system or a dog, or both. That is sufficient to deter all but the most determined criminals. And if anyone is determined enough, your extra security won't stop them anyway.
Your data isn't that different. Nobody is really after your data, at least not to the point of being willing to spend serious money and time getting into your system. The real threats are things like malware (which won't even be slowed down by your encrypted drive), or somebody snooping around on your hard drive after stealing your laptop (when actually they are more likely to want to just sell it).
Common sense is the best protection for most of us. Don't save passwords in an unencrypted file. Use a non-trivial password to log on to your system. Hang on to your stuff. You get the idea.
Get a Mac. Turn full disk encryption via Filevault2 on. Backup using Time Machine with an encrypted backup drive. The encryption is invisible except that you have to enter the password from time to time.