Why Laws Won't Save Banks From DDoS Attacks
kierny writes "Rep. Mike Rogers (R-Mich.) should know better. The chairman of the House Intelligence Committee claimed to told NBC News that the Operation Ababil U.S. bank disruption DDoS campaign could be stopped, if only private businesses had unfettered access to top-flight U.S. government threat intelligence. Not coincidentally, Rogers is the author of CISPA (now v2.0), a bill that would provide legal immunity for businesses that share threat data with the government, while allowing intelligence agencies to use it for 'national security' purposes, thus raising the ire of privacy rights groups. Just one problem: Numerous security experts have rubbished Rogers' assertion that threat intelligence would have any effect on banks' ability to defend themselves. The bank disruptions aren't cutting-edge or stealthy. They're just about packets overwhelming targeted sites, despite what Congressionally delivered intelligence might suggest."
These folks obsessed with a "negative peace" by making more laws should study history.
In the name of fighting money laundering--an activity primarily associated with the War on Drugs--Congress passed a law requiring all transactions around $5k or more to be logged and sent to federal law enforcement. Paying in cash for everything is now being called a sign you might be a terrorist. Paying in cash is also *gasp* resistant to DDoS attacks. The coralling of most of our commerce into the hands of banks has effectively made banks a target that can cripple unrelated businesses. If we were mostly a cash society, it'd be no big deal. The worst a DDoS could do is delay the processing of your paycheck or an ATM withdrawal.