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Is the DEA Lying About iMessage Security?
First time accepted submitter snobody writes "Recently, an article was posted on Slashdot about the claim that law enforcement made about being frustrated by their inability to decrypt messages using Apple's iMessage. However, this article on Techdirt suggests that the DEA may be spewing out disinformation. As the Techdirt article says, if you switch to a new iDevice, you still are able to access your old iMessages, suggesting that Apple has the key somewhere in the cloud. Thus, if law enforcement goes directly to Apple, they should be able to get the key."
If you're using software created in the US by a commercial company you can bet the government has access to it. Who would believe any different?
I think one of the main problems law enforcement has with iMessages is that it is ridiculously easy to get a pen register from a telco for a phone number. This is a list of the calls made to/from that number and a list of SMS/MMS to/from that number. iMessage bypasses SMS/MMS if both the origin and destination device are iMessage capable, so those interactions do not show in a pen register. The same could be said for many other text/chat services, but iMessage is the default texting client for a large number of people and does not require the user to do anything special to message others without the telco knowing, unlike many other services.
iMessage isn't that special, the memo could just as easily been talking about FaceBook messages, which also won't appear in a pen register.
Just because your messages are accessible on a new device, it does not necessarily mean that your messages are readable or key is accessible by Apple. For instance, if the decryption key for iMessage were encrypted with your Apple ID password, then your key could be transferred around between devices, but Apple or the DEA would still have to brute-force/social engineer/whatever to get your password and decrypt the key. Whether or not it's actually set up that way...
Political dissidents, whistle blowers... and FREEDOM LOVERS.
Unless the DEA is actively 'leaking' in order to attempt to move people into a vulnerable channel with a false sense of security(not impossible; but I'm inclined to suspect that the higher level drug runners take their paranoia seriously, or they wouldn't have lasted long enough to level up, and the lower level ones are probably more often foiled by the fact that they need to solicit customers, any one of which could be a plant), I'd be inclined to a more prosaic explanation.
With SMS, architectural security during transmission is somewhere between pitiful and nonexistent and the entity that handles the messages during their voyage is the phone company, which has substantial legal incentives to, and a long history of, supine cooperation with the authorities.
With iMessage, it looks pretty much like SMS on the handset; but it's all just data to the telco, and Apple presumably included some SSL/TLS or similar implementation that isn't totally broken, meaning that going through the telco is totally useless(this would also be why the leaked memo specifically mentioned that iMessages sent to non-Apple devices, which would be crunched into SMS at some stage, were still often recoverable).
The fact that Apple can, apparently, retrieve your iMessage history for you suggests that, indeed, a subpoena of Apple would leave you in the open; but I imagine that the DEA is much more familiar with, and pleased by, the 'service-oriented' attitudes of the phone companies, who are extremely forthcoming with customer information, with very low bars to clear, and minimal pesky judicial process.
Certainly not a good idea to trust anything that the service operator can 'recover' or 'restore' for you to be secure(since it can't possibly be); but the DEA jackboots probably do encounter significantly greater hassle with a message that is never available to the notoriously friendly telcos. You are still up shit creek if they are building a case against you specifically(or if Apple caves and starts providing bulk access at some future time); but casual fishing is likely to be more difficult.
Getting the key from Apple isn't really "technically interceptible" anyway. The problem, from their end, is likely that they need to subpoena the information from Apple (both past messages and the key for future use), rather than intercept it easily.
The issue is not that the DEA cannot lawfully acquire the messages... It's that THEY HAVE TO ASK , EVERY TIME.
Most taps are just "wide open" until the warrant expires and the telco turns the tap off... There is very little oversight. Many online services give law enforcement more of an "open ticket" to keep coming back for email or Facebook as often as they need. While the line isn't "tapped" LEOs can refresh every twenty minutes if they want.
They are attepting to bully Apple into allowing a MITM or wide open ticket to people's accounts. The first post on this very carefully NEGLECTED to mention that Apple COMPLIES with lawful requests. Which they most certainly would. The issue is that Apple won't open a giant backdoors and look the other way while LEOs look up their ex-girlfriends, or people with fancy cars to pick on. Apple is probably making them request transcripts with dates and times... And then APPLE SENDS it to them.
This is probably the crux of their complaint - they can't intercept the messages without going through proper procedures, getting a warrant, and leaving a paper trail. This is precisely how things should work.
The cesspool just got a check and balance.
I was with you until you said this:
Worst that could happen is everyone walking out calmly and in order.
That is far from the worst that can happen. That is in fact the best case scenario outside of no one believing them and there truly not being a fire. Provoking people into violent acts of desperation by instilling the immediate fear of death into them, such that their rationality is severely compromised is outright negligent. This is why we have things like temporary insanity and heat of passion defenses.
I feel that you should be perfectly free to shout "Fire!" in a theater. However I also feel that if you end up causing a situation where someone is injured, you should be held liable for your negligent actions. Freedom of speech should not mean freedom from responsibility of that speech.
What if you told a blind person that the light at an intersection was green and there was no traffic, causing them to walk into the street and get run over? Would you push the free speech argument? You didn't kill him; the guy behind the wheel of the car did. That doesn't mean you weren't immensely negligent as a result of what you said.
As a closer example to the theater, what if in that same situation you screamed in front of a blind man "Everyone get out of the way! A car is heading straight for us!" causing him to jump out of the way and into actual traffic? Would you still feel like you were completely free of the burden of responsibility?
Exactly. The problem (as far as the DEA is concerned) is that they might be forced to actually obey the law themselves for a change. They much prefer tapping what they want with no oversight.
Getting the key from Apple isn't really "technically interceptible" anyway. The problem, from their end, is likely that they need to subpoena the information from Apple (both past messages and the key for future use),
This assumes a certain architecture. If the cryptosystem is strong, there is probably a frequent key rotation schedule, in which, the same key that encrypted past messages will potentially be replaced in the future by the time any new messages are exchanged.
It would be ideal, if some portion of this key were secured by the password, e.g. a SCRPT, BCRYPT or PBKDF2 hash of the password, is part of the secret material required to decrypt the key on the client, and any change of the user's password results in key rotation.
It is conceivable that Apple could design a system, in which, the keys would be available on multiple of your devices (because you knew an additional secret), but not available to Apple, to extract or find out what the key is (because Apple denies themselves access to the secret)
Do I think it's designed that way? No... it would not happen by coincidence, for sure.
Could they have designed it that way? Yes
The DEA lies about everything else. Why would this be any different? The very fact that the DEA exists is an affront to personal liberty; We have decades of detailed records of them spreading falsehoods, destroying families, in general doing far more harm than drugs ever did or ever could.
DEA Informers: They lie about who they are, what they do, what their intent is -- and just about anything else they're asked. This is who they are. Liars. But that's not all they are. They're also as dangerous as any government agent you can imagine, wholly without concern for anyone but themselves.
DEA agents: They lie about where the danger comes from; they lie about toxicity; they lie about addictiveness. They lie about consequences (they ARE the primary consequences), and they have been known to attempt to trade your personal honor for your freedom if you fall into their hands. They created the violence underlying the black market drug trade; they created the black market itself. They're not shy of interfering with other sovereign countries, nor of playing fast and loose with our own "justice" system.
So when a DEA "anything" tells you something, you're best off assuming they're lying. It's what they do. Aside from destroying families, that is. If they're not lying, they're likely trying to hurt you some other way. Get away and stay away. Nothing truly good can ever come of contact with people so bereft of personal honor -- or so outright stupid -- that they would work for the DEA.
To heck with them. And the laws they rode in on. And those who made the laws. And those in the general population who thought, and perhaps still think, agencies like the DEA were ever a good idea.
The drug war: It's a war on you and your family and your friends.
I've fallen off your lawn, and I can't get up.