Boston Officials Did Not Shut Down Cell Network After Marathon Bombing
An anonymous reader writes with this excerpt from Motherboard about the immediate aftermath of yesterday's bomb attack in Boston, which attempts to explain the (unsurprisingly) poor accessibility of the cellular network after the blasts: "Gut instinct suggests that the network must've been overloaded with people trying to find loved ones. At first, the Associated Press said it was a concerted effort to prevent any remote detonators from being used, citing a law enforcement official. After some disputed that report, the AP reversed its report, citing officials from Verizon and Sprint who said they'd never had a request to shut down the network, and who blamed slowdowns on heavy load. (Motherboard's Derek Mead was able to send text messages to both his sister and her boyfriend, who were very near the finish line, shortly after the bombing, which suggests that networks were never totally shut down. Still, shutting down cell phone networks to prevent remote detonation wouldn't be without precedent: It is a common tactic in Pakistan, where bombings happen with regularity.)"
Why the network operators didn't get requests to shutdown the network, that doesn't mean it wasn't jammed. The military has jammers it uses where they suspect IEDs to prevent triggering via the cell network. There is no reason why the BPD, DHS or other agency would not have jammers for such an occasion. I would be surprised if they did not with all the money that was thrown around after 9/11
I would think that shutting down cell towers wouldn't be particularly effective, given that the same mechanism that would allow one to trigger a bomb with a cell phone is also present in other RF devices such as baby monitors and walkie-talkies.
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So... considering that's we hear about this with EVERY major catastrophe, would this be the sort of national infrastructure concern that we would want to mandate that the cell companies install extra capacity? You know, in case of emergencies. Are we at the point that we can consider cellular connection, or generically wireless connection, to be a basic utility and not a cutting edge hip new ordeal that only the rich can afford?
And hey, since they've got ALL THAT BANDWIDTH, just lying about in case shit hits the fan, it'd be great to sell it on the cheap. You know, that idea that society and the fundamental utilities is here to foster growth rather than wringing out the last coin from the customer's pockets.
Uh.. doesn't this happen after just about every disaster?
If you design the networks to work at the utilization that you see after a disaster there would be cell phone towers at every corner, our bills would be $500 or more a month, and it would be using a very low percentage of its capacity 99.99% of the time.
It isn't what is important at the moment, anyway.
Officials also announced a twist in the probe: Suspicious packages that were detonated out of precaution were not explosive devices after all.
That's not a twist, it's just a thing. A twist is if it turns out to have been Richard Simmons.
systemd is Roko's Basilisk.
As someone who had a loved one in the World Trade Center on 9/11 and couldn't reach her on her mobile until the afternoon, I'm not surprised that a cell network became overloaded. It's happened in other times too.
Considering this wreaked of terrorism, especially to those on the scene, things really blew up. Marathoners calling loved ones and even just REGULAR citizens in Boston (perhaps far away from the site) getting / making calls in a panic, etc.
Cell towers aren't magic, they can only support so much. And since the phone companies aren't using their profits to expand their existing networks then a large metro getting hit with an event is going to overload it... or at least a general region. I mean, in that immediate area alone you had: people living / working in the buildings, LOTS of runners, LOTS of spectators, etc.
Perhaps the feds DID put up a jammer. Perhaps we don't know the whole story. I'm just saying, that an overloaded network sounds perfectly plausible.