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Google Security Expert Finds, Publicly Discloses Windows Kernel Bug
hypnosec writes "Security expert Tavis Ormandy has discovered a vulnerability in the Windows kernel which, when exploited, would allow an ordinary user to obtain administrative privileges of the system. Google's security pro posted the details of the vulnerability back in May through the Full Disclosure mailing list rather than reporting it to Microsoft first. He has now gone ahead and published a working exploit. This is not the first instance where Ormandy has opted for full disclosure without first informing the vendor of the affected software."
if he was an independent researcher doing this it might be one thing, but in this case he's not revealing the vulnerability based on full disclosure principals, he's doing it to give his employer's largest competitor a black eye. Motives matter
Yeah, ok. troll better please.
it's been 4 weeks. Clearly we should go after those who disclose vulnerabilities instead of those responsible for fixing them. /sarcasm
That's bad. That's destructive and dangerous
No more dangerous than publishing the blueprints for a gun or the instructions to 3d print one. Someone could use that information to perpetrate a crime. Why do you throw freedom of speech out the window when it comes to software bugs?
The general tolerance of latent vulnerabilities and the expectation that whitehats should give companies time to patch them at least expense is what's truly destructive and dangerous.
That is correct for home users.
But for corporate users, a system level exploit allows things like installing sniffers and key loggers so that more passwords can be collected. Including the admin/root passwords.
Which can be used against the computers in the Accounting department to transfer money from the corporate accounts to "money mules".
Security through obscurity is no security at all.
A security hole is a security hole. A hole that is not widely known about is not in any credible sense "safer" than one with a demonstration exploit posted on mailing lists.
I would rather that news of exploitable security holes be widely published, so that mitigating secondary security blocks can help cover the hole, and reduce the attack surface as soon as the exploit is discovered. While you can't recompile the kernel on day-0, you CAN filter network traffic, isolate unprotected systems, and take other affirmative actions to safeguard company and private data from unauthorized persons, and prevent the silent execution of malicious software early.
The problem one runs into there, is that most software out there today is not so much "secure", so much as it actually is analogous to a block of aged swiss cheese. Hardened in some places, and totally see-through in others. Managing many disparate suites of software packages means dealing with, and mitigating the risks, of a great, great many peepholes.
But again, a security hole is a security hole, and security through obscurity is no security at all. Wishful thinking that "if nobody says anything, then its perfectly safe to let slide for now!" Puts systems, data, and people at risk for the sake of convenience.
Look at the fallout of the near miss between that german drone aircraft and a small passenger plane that just came to light. Secrecy of the problem does not make the problem go away, and hiding the risks from people (for any reason) who are at risk is beyond inconscionable.
Microsoft never gets off its ass and fixes stuff before it goes public.
Really? Every bug fix they ever made was from public disclosure? News to me, since I personally have seen them fix things disclosed only to them.
What you actually mean is that you, a home user, with a best a handful of machines, thinks its better to rush a patch out that could break shit, than to do a proper fix and test cycle.
What this lets the rest of us know is that you have no fucking clue what its like to deal with large scale software maintenance. Any admin worth his salt knows that if you can mitigate the problem away and wait for a proper patch that has been thoroughly tested is about 10 billion times better than some random hack made by some guy at 3am this morning.
There are few exploits that can not be mitigated in some way. This particular issue is easy to mitigate at most companies by simply firing any jack ass caught exploiting it. It requires local access (via RDP counts), so its not like we're talking about an internet facing, anyone can take you down, kind of bug.
On top of that, any admin worth his salt his going to do proper testing, which means even if they got a patch 10 seconds after the exploit was found, its STILL GOING TO BE A WHILE BEFORE THE ADMIN DEPLOYS THE PATCH ... unless he is some ignorant clueless douche like you who doesn't have any idea what he's doing.
All your post does is shows your complete ignorance of the bigger picture.
Persistent Volume manager for Kubernetes - https://github.com/dwimsey/openshift-pvmanager
Except that he's right. The "Security through obscurity is no security at all" mantra is the first thing that people who know nothing about security fall back on again and again. Asymmetric keys are merely *better* obscurity than most other means. You're still just counting on not being a sufficiently interesting target that your keys are not going to be put to the test by somebody with access to a proper compute cluster (or maybe a quantum computer), or that they won't bypass that and exploit you some other way.
You should know this already. Speaking generally, all security mechanisms can be broken, so you need to ensure the cost of exploiting is greater than the thing you get access to after exploiting.
The only reason not to do would be if you knew someone was already taking advantage of the vulnerability in the wild.
Google is in competition with Microsoft. Google would prefer people to use chromebooks and android so raising anxiety about Microsoft based products furthers their corporate goals. It could easily be as simple as that.
Some of us have empathy and like to live in a working society.
Not all of us can be narcissistic sociopaths.
I never said I believed in "unbeatable protection". That's a strawman. I basically said that "out of sight, out of mind!" Is not a proper risk mitigation practice. Most certainly NOT the same thing as professing a belief in perfect security.
"out of sight, out of mind!" is a bigger strawman than anything I said. Responsible disclosure, so MS has at least a chance to respond -- that's all people are calling for. And the point wasn't about unbeatable protection -- the point was to dispel of this silly one-liner that only serves to hinder meaningful discussion of security issues.
Shitty obscurity based half-assery fakes being strong, to detur attempts, but fails easily on inspection. Something like using a password to XOR a file, and calling it "encrypted.", or doing what sony did and reusing the sae salt over and over again, completly defeating the purpose of the salt in the process.
*This* is a strawman. Don't point out stupid shit that other people did, and claim that it makes your point valid. Remember again the general recommendation -- the cost of breaking your scheme must be greater than the value of what you're protecting. If you're using the scheme above, you should be using it to protect minesweeper scores at best.
Relying on "don't tell anybody! We'l get to it eventually, and if you don't tell, nobody will find out!" Is bullshit, which is what typically happens with so called "responsible disclosure." I have heard of serious exploits hanging around for YEARS after being "responsibly disclosed."
This is a strawman again. Simply, disclose responsibly. The patch cycle is well documented. If 1 cycle goes without a patch, you can remind them. If they second one goes by and no patch, disclose. How hard is that? Answer -- not hard at all. When you're not out to fuck people over, and don't have some agenda you're trying to further, it's really not that hard to be reasonable.
I understand that you can't fix the hole instantly, and that the patch needs to be tested to make sure it doesn't poke another hole elsewhere.
It's not just that. The patch needs to be tested to ensure that it actually works! That was an issue the last time Ormandy did this -- he provided a binary patch that did not fix the issue! In addition to that, it has to not cause other bugs (not necessarily exploits -- but bugs -- because those too can cause work stoppage etc.). When the hole is being exploited already, all this goes out the window -- exchange information openly and get that shit fixed ASAP. When it's not yet being exploited actively, you can spare users a lot of headache, and a lot of lost productivity by simply following responsible disclosure guidelines that are well documented and well-known to Ormandy himself.
However, informing the people at the most risk, (customers), that they need to take some mitigating actions to reduce the threat, and to watch for signs of exploit until the patch is ready is what is the responsible thing for the software vendor to do.
Dude, you can drop the veneer about caring about MS's customers. Ormandy can drop that too. There's a clear course of action by which Ormandy and MS could have done right by them together. Ormandy made sure that's no longer an option, and they are in greater danger now than was strictly necessary. And you are defending his actions out of glee that MS is looking like an idiot.
NOT hide the exploit and try to forget about it, while less scrupulous crackers silently use it in combination with other exploits to commit fraud, steal company prividleged information, steal user persona data, build botnets, and worse, while pretending that "it won't happen, because nobody squealed!"
Nobody is asking to HIDE anything! You complained about a strawman earlier??? Responsible disclosure does not imply infinite time. Ormandy works for Google right? He can
Nope, just making exploits public without even trying to tell the vendor about them first is just a dickhead move, esp. on the users.