Slashdot Mirror
To Hack Back Or Not To Hack Back?
dinscott writes "If you think of cyberspace as a resource for you and your organization, it makes sense to protect your part of it as best you can. You build your defenses and train employees to recognize attacks, and you accept the fact that your government is the one that will pursue and prosecute those who try to hack you. But the challenge arises when you (possibly rightfully so) perceive that your government is not able do so, and you demand to be allowed to 'hack back.'"
Thing is, most of the "hack back" responses don't involve going after the hacker still in your system. They boil down to trying to figure out who the hacker is, where they live, and then going to that address and attacking whoever's there. Which of course raises such issues as "Did your attacker leave a false trail that would lead you to attack someone not involved in the attack on you?" and "What are you going to do if that uninvolved party decides to hack back themselves?". Few of the proponents of "hack back" seem willing to discuss those issues, they mostly brush them off as "That won't happen.". When probed as to exactly what it won't and what'll keep it from happening, though, they start flailing badly rather than giving coherent answers. And none of them want to commit to accepting full legal liability if it does happen. If it won't happen, what's the problem with agreeing to accept a liability you'll never need to accept?