Robotic Kiosk Stores Digital Copies of Physical Keys

An anonymous reader writes "The New York Daily News reports that a startup company in Manhattan is putting robotic key copying machines in 7-Eleven stores. The machines can automatically create physical copies of common apartment and office keys. What's more interesting is that they allow users to save digital copies of their keys, which can later be created when the original is lost or the user is locked out of their home."

Comments

What could possibly go wrong?

[Simulant]

May as well just get rid of physical keys altogether.

Re:What could possibly go wrong?

[Smidge204]

Crowbar marks, splintered door jams and broken glass are evidence of forced entry.

Using a key leaves no evidence and may not even raise suspicion should anyone see you do it.
=Smidge=

Re:What could possibly go wrong?

[calzones]

I see a potential problem where if you loan your key to someone, they can duck into the store and quickly save a copy for themselves to retrieve at any time in the future. Or they might "borrow" your keys for this very purpose and give them back before you realize they are missing.

Yes, they could theoretically do this with physical copies as well, but that it more cumbersome and takes longer (having to go to a dedicated hardware store to do so).

I also see landlords not liking this technology.

Re:What could possibly go wrong?

[king neckbeard]

You can have copies of house keys made at Wal-Mart.

Re:What could possibly go wrong?

[Charliemopps]

I used to think this to. Then, about 10 years ago, an apartment complex I lived in turned on the heat for the winter. It was set to 65. This is when I realized that I had no thermostat in the apartment. They told me there was no way to turn it up, it was a "fixed system" uh huh... after a bit of exploring I found a locked door in the basement. I did a couple of internet searches, watched some videos and an hour later I was standing in the now unlocked utility room looking at a VERY adjustable thermostat which then got set to 75 for the rest of the winter. When it got too hot we'd just open a window.

And just for clarification, picking a dead-bolt by a complete novice that had never done it before took all of 2min.

Re:What could possibly go wrong?

[TubeSteak]

This is what insurance for, though. Both ways of a thief getting in are what insurance is for.

Your insurance policy probably doesn't cover shit if there's no evidence of forced entry, but YMMV.
The police might not even take a report.

Re:What could possibly go wrong?

[Nukenbar]

Locks also keep homeless people from shitting in my car.

Public keys

[ChumpusRex2003]

Could this be the first case of public key encryption getting broken?

Double edged sword...

[mlts]

Copy of physical key's bitting dimensions + address info from a credit card. A remote intruder could download that, then sell lists of those to local gangs wanting some easy prey for home invasions.

Of course, there is the fact that if you want to buy a bump-resistant lock [1], it won't be something a key copying kiosk can copy easily.

[1]: I'm partial to Abloy's Protec2 Cliq line because it has the top tier mechanical pick resistance in addition to an electronic lock. Makes life easier to reprogram the lock to deny access just to the single lost key than have to rekey the lock and hand out new keys.

It could work securely

[jtownatpunk.net]

There's no technical reason why the kiosk system needs to "know" or store the physical location of the locks that match the keys. Create an account and pay with cash and there's no reason to enter any personally identifying information.

I think charging $20 for an emergency key is a kick in the nuts, tho. They're only charging $3.50 for a standard copy of a key you have in-hand so why are they being dicks about the price of printing a key you've stored? Well, obviously, the reason is, "Because they can." But it's still a dick move.

Also, I hope they've got some sort of approval method where a human looks at a picture of the key to see if it's marked "do not duplicate" before a copy is made. That's something I wouldn't trust to OCR.

Re:It could work securely

[ChumpusRex2003]

This type of scanning key cutting machine has been around for ages - the storing of the key bitting is new.

In general, this type of machine designed for public use, is only loaded with blanks for "unrestricted" keys.

"Do not duplicate" keys are not protected by just being labelled, they are physically a different shape (often with patented curves and bends), and genuine blanks can only be bought by registered locksmiths who have signed an agreement with the manufacturer not to duplicate keys without proof that the customer is authorised to duplicate that key.

Manufacturers do cut off supply to locksmiths that engage in unauthorized duplication (if they find out). Similarly, the manufacturers will use patent laws to block sale of 3rd party key blanks.

You can still get unauthorized copies made, but it's more difficult. The higher end manufacturers part-key the key blanks to a locksmith's unique code (using difficult to copy modifications - e.g. holes drilled to a specific depth along the length of the key, or curves engraved on the side of the key); a locksmith can only obtain blanks to duplicate keys that he himself sold, making it much easier to trace unauthorized duplication.

Burglary Convenience?

[Mad-Bassist]

Now we can't even trust the babysitter to grab a Slurpee down the street...

I can only see this inspiring people with shifty morals to try something new because it's now more convenient. Good thing car keys are more complex these days.

IAALS

[Anonymous Coward]

I Am A LockSmith. The fastest and easiest way to get a bump resistant lock is add one or two tried and tested bump resistant pins. The variety Masterlock came up with does not work. T-pins work well. Dramatically different spring strengths or top pin weights will stop bumping. All three of those methods cost pennies.

As for the Abloy's of the world, well- they have a problem. Great fun for picking enthusiasts. A good way to kill free time. As for opening them- it takes less time than a Schlage with some spools:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uj4myR2XlWc

This is what professionals use. There really is nothing short of a vault door that cannot be opened in seconds. Personally, if you are willing to put the money into a Protec2, you really should consider putting ballistic film on your windows and replacing your door frames with steel. They are on the same level. You can't just increase the strength of one link on a chain and call it good.

Re:IAALS

[adolf]

That may cause problems if the fire department wants to get in in a hurry, for example if your house is on fire.

If the maximum level of security for a home is governed by a fireman's ability to break in, then we're done here. There's nothing left to discuss.

Sure, why not?

[Valdrax]

That's what my roommates did at the house I live at. Keyless entry via numeric pad attached to a battery-powered* dead bolt. Simple, convenient, and no less secure than physical keys. It just replaces "something I have" with "something I know," and it isn't vulnerable to bump-keys or lock-picking tools.

*Lasts for months and gives plenty of warning before it goes out, so no worries there.

Re:Sure, why not?

[Anonymous Coward]

High voltage electricity acts funny. It doesn't really respect things like insulation or air gaps. Normally-insulating materials like concrete become conductive. When indiscriminately applied to electronics, high voltage doesn't generally do what you want.

Inappropriately high voltage to the contacts on a digital lock keypad -- not the faceplate, which is floating on a wooden jamb or grounded for a metal jamb -- will, at best, burn out the microcontroller which is responsible for engaging the relay which releases the door. At worst it will simply burn out the input pins responsible for the keypad, leaving a perfectly functional digital lock with no input available to unlock it.

If you're lucky, or the protagonist in a drama, it will fail in exactly the right way to engage the relay while not damaging any of the other circuitry in the device. This is difficult to achieve in practice and rarely occurs outside of high-pressure situations in TV shows or movies.

If the bolt relay is activated by putting +Vcc on a transistor or the legs of a solid-state relay, you will have to apply just the right voltage and current through the keypad in order to turn the microcontroller into a blob of solder. However, the resulting blob will simply short out the batteries, either sending no current to the relay, or leaving insufficient current available to drive the bolt motor. If the device has a pair of relays (one per motor direction) then both may become energized, resulting in no motion or a dead short.

If the bolt relay is activated by grounding a pin, you're screwed unless the circuit designer added a failsafe where the bolt will be released if the microcontroller fails to initialize. Since the failsafe circuitry in most keypad locks is a few lines of code inside the microcontroller's interrupt handler, this is not likely to be triggered by the protagonist's magic lightning.

I've seen a badly designed keypad lock drain its batteries trying to lock itself repeatedly when the batteries got low. The device had a beeper in it to alert users that its batteries were running low. After several days of unattended beeping, the lock suddenly began to beep twice a second while simultaneously engaging its lock motor. The low voltage began playing havoc with the latches on the keypad input pins and it was interpreting the incoming noise as a user pressing the "lock" button on the keypad. The batteries died in seconds once this failure mode took hold. Fortunately, people were on the correct side of the door to replace them.

Re:Don't kid yourself.

[adolf]

Heh.

Whenever someone I've known has had their house robbed by a stranger, there's tons of evidence: The place gets trashed.

It is a different story when you're being robbed by someone you know: They're neat and clean and precise. All you notice is that you go looking for your diamond-studded Rolex, and it isn't there anymore. But chances are good that you've already invited them in, anyway, so a lock doesn't help that situation at all either.