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Heml.is, New Encrypted Messaging Service From Brokep of the Pirate Bay

First time accepted submitter freddej writes "Heml.is ("secret" in Swedish), is a new peer encrypted messaging service from some of the guys behind TPB and Flattr. They describe it as this: 'Our focus is your privacy so we are building everything from software to company structure to protect that. The others are focused on maximizing profit.' So if you agree on the mantra that 'if you're not paying, you're the product' then you might want to check them out." Caveats: they are begging for money and there is no mention whether this will be Free Software or some kind of proprietary service (in which case, how can you really trust it?). It looks more likely it will be a closed application/service: "We're building a message app where no one can listen in, not even us. We would rather close down the service before letting anyone in ... [what will codes unlock?] It will give you access to extended features of Heml.is like sending image messages and other stuff in the future. Pre-register username will let you register your username before the app is released."

144 comments

  1. no crystal ball required by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Predicted this. First of many products that will try to offer security in lieu of ads after the Snowden leaks. I feel smart today. It's funding faster than a kickstarter... this gives me a page to refresh today instead of the dislikes on that Miley Cyrus video - good times that one.

    1. Re:no crystal ball required by FriendlyLurker · · Score: 2

      Predicted this. First of many products that will try to offer security in lieu of ads after the Snowden leaks.

      True. I am looking forward to more focus on security plugins and extensions to existing products. Been waiting years for mozilla Thunderbrid chat to get OTR up and running. Also, if any semi decent email encryption method that wants to be even moderately adopted really needs to be next to zero configuration for up-front use or it just wont catch on *at all* (like OTR is a good example, and Enigmail/GPG are defiantly not good examples). Let the ones that really care be able to dive into the configs, check fingerprints, confirm there is no MITM etc... I mean, it cant get any worse than what we have now - 99.999% plain text email traffic, now can it.

    2. Re:no crystal ball required by dc29A · · Score: 2, Insightful

      This is borderline useless for the following reason, all the NSA needs is metadata. With metadata they can know a lot about you. They don't need the content of the message when they know who do you communicate with, what frequency, and whatnot. You already use the internet, they should be able easily to associate your IP with your identity. Unless you stop using cloud based services, this alone won't keep NSA in the dark about you.

    3. Re:no crystal ball required by Lumpy · · Score: 3, Insightful

      "You already use the internet, they should be able easily to associate your IP with your identity. "

      only if you are a complete fool and use your home internet for most things.

      they cant find me in the noise of a starbucks connection.

      --
      Do not look at laser with remaining good eye.
    4. Re:no crystal ball required by fustakrakich · · Score: 1

      they cant find me in the noise of a starbucks connection.

      Wanna bet?

      --
      “He’s not deformed, he’s just drunk!”
    5. Re:no crystal ball required by Fnord666 · · Score: 1

      . I mean, it cant get any worse than what we have now - 99.999% plain text email traffic, now can it.

      Sure it can. If this is compromised or backdoored, it gives users a false sense of security. At least right now they know their email is wide open. If they chose to not care, then so be it.

      --
      'The tyrant will always find pretext for his tyranny.' - Aesop's Fables
    6. Re:no crystal ball required by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      You mean the font order that your machine reports to places changes? I'd check with EFF's panopticlick before I say that you can't be found... most machines out there have a unique fingerprint.

    7. Re:no crystal ball required by trifish · · Score: 3, Insightful

      Is this a joke?

      If what you do in the various Starbucks venues is even slight statistically related, you can rest assured that there are automated methods to identify you.

    8. Re:no crystal ball required by FriendlyLurker · · Score: 1
      Lets turn that logic around and throw it right back at you: Anybody who cares about a high level of security will bother following the simple procedure to check that they do indeed have a secure, non MITM compromised connection. If they chose not to care, then so be it (but their connection is still encrypted, raising security bar vs the solution your logic proposes.

      If we followed the logic you presented then OTR would not exist, dismissed as giving users a false sense of security.

    9. Re:no crystal ball required by Sloppy · · Score: 2

      I predict most of them will be broken, and not generate or exchange keys competently.

      --
      As copyright owner of this comment, I authorize everyone to defeat any technological measure which limits access to it.
    10. Re:no crystal ball required by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      > it gives users a false sense of security

      I am so tired of seeing this phrase. Most users have exactly ZERO sense of security. Some don't have any! And for those people it doesn't matter anyway because they don't give a shit about how something is sent or who reads it!

      Besides, there is no such thing as "real" security! Even the most security-conscious person can be subject to a number of side-channel attacks, burglaries etc., that will render any security implementations a moot point!

      So enough of that crap of "sense of security"! Make the options available for those, who want to go the extra mile and keep it simple (bubt encrypted!) for those, who don't!

    11. Re:no crystal ball required by Lumpy · · Score: 1

      Yup I'll bet a bunch. It is not hard if you have a clue as to what you are doing to hide in a public net connection.

      Professional hackers do it every single day. And yes it takes more knowledge about networking and computers than 80% of the population has to do it, bit it certainly can be done.

      --
      Do not look at laser with remaining good eye.
    12. Re:no crystal ball required by chuckinator · · Score: 3, Insightful

      Unless you go to the trouble of changing your wifi mac address and many other uniquely identifying signatures of your computer and the software it runs, you can very easily be found and tracked inside your starbucks. Considering you probably have a smartphone in your pocket with an always on wifi radio, too, you can probably be very easily tracked all around town all the way back to your house for someone with the resources and determination to do so.

    13. Re:no crystal ball required by rvw · · Score: 1

      Yup I'll bet a bunch. It is not hard if you have a clue as to what you are doing to hide in a public net connection.

      Professional hackers do it every single day. And yes it takes more knowledge about networking and computers than 80% of the population has to do it, bit it certainly can be done.

      Please give a link to a tutorial! I'm pretty sure I know more about networking and computers than 80% of the population, probably 90% or even 98% (and still I don't consider myself a system or network admin), but I don't know how to do this.

    14. Re:no crystal ball required by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      My KDE desktop supports random number generated mac addresses for connection with essids of my choice. I usually use that for starbucks. I use a firewall that prevents OS fingerprinting and rotate my browser user-agents. Also, I do not have a cell phone.

      And I am not even trying to be anonymous (I would probably use several anon proxies if I wanted to)!

    15. Re:no crystal ball required by Sloppy · · Score: 1

      all the NSA needs is metadata. With metadata they can know a lot about you.

      NSA is merely the excuse/cover for people securing the things that have always needed securing. Don't look at things from the PoV of the NSA or the kinds of people they're supposedly supposed to (?) be peeking at. Look at it from your own PoV.

      When a burglar sees you send a mundane message to your friend, it matters to you whether or not he is able to tell the difference between

      Come check out my new pump shotgun. I can't wait for someone to break in and give me an excuse to use it. God damn I have wanted to kill someone, anyone, for so so long. Blood! I MUST HAVE BLOOD!

      or

      I'll be right over in a few minutes and we can begin our long night of drinking, as part of the wake for my recently-deceased guard dog. I can crash at your place, right? No, I don't want to carry over my solid gold food bowl; that'll just remind me of him. OMG, he'll never eat out of that bowl again. I'm going to have a cry now... you have tissues?

      These are the kind of messages which are important to 99.999% of people, the kind of info that we're constantly leaking to fuck-knows-who, which needs to be transmitted securely.

      --
      As copyright owner of this comment, I authorize everyone to defeat any technological measure which limits access to it.
    16. Re:no crystal ball required by Em+Adespoton · · Score: 1

      Only thing I can think of is to run one of those utilities that sniffs the WiFi channel for MAC IDs and randomly switches to one that's been seen but isn't currently on the network. Of course, you'd also have to be clearing all your tracking markers continuously, and not log in to any cloud-based services (including webmail, social network, etc.).

      Hopping from the WiFi to an anonymous VPN service /could/ add an extra layer of misdirection, *if* you trust the service. Over this, you run TOR.

      So the end result is:
      Trackable web apps purged regularly
      Using Ghostery and/or Albine and NoScript and AdBlockPlus
      Over TOR
      Over Anonymous VPN
      Via shared but traceable Starbucks IP
      Via Spoofed MAC ID pool

      Did I miss a step? There's of course the entire DNS issue (ISP and Google DNS are tracked), so you really want a DNS somewhere under a jurisdiction that you don't mind tracking you (don't assume they're not tracking you). I suppose you could limit yourself to the i2p network to mitigate this issue.

    17. Re:no crystal ball required by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      I'm totally anonymous and posting from Starbucks!

      BRB, buying another drink with my credit card/debit card/cash from the cashpoint nearby/totally anonymous cash that doesn't matter because if they really want me, they have security camera footage.

    18. Re:no crystal ball required by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      It's "seven" proxies, not "several."

    19. Re:no crystal ball required by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Is this a joke?

      If what you do in the various Starbucks venues is even slight statistically related, you can rest assured that there are automated methods to identify you.

      Only if you go to the Starbucks, and not sit far away with a (concealed) directional antenna.

      Of course you should turn off your mobile phone so they can't track you down via that as well. And manually override the MAC address of your computer.

    20. Re:no crystal ball required by Vintermann · · Score: 1

      No, they don't generally know that their email is wide open. I guarantee you, if a large batch of random intercepted emails was suddenly published, regular people would be shocked.

      And not all compromising is equal. If it takes even a modest effort for NSA to read my mail, that's better than nothing. That ultimately limits how much they can do.

      --
      xkcd is not in the sudoers file. This incident will be reported.
    21. Re:no crystal ball required by Vintermann · · Score: 1

      You can extract metadata from the content of your message too. They can't automatically understand it yet, but they can probably guess whether you're talking about something political, whether you're angry, certainly what languages you speak...

      It can also enhance their understanding of your social connections. If there are certain words that show up in mails to recipient A which never shows up in any other mail (say, like the words "your body"), that's valuable to them, that can tell you something about what kind of relationship you have to A. Now if those words suddenly start turning up in messages to someone else... whoops, automatically collected blackm.. I mean opposition research material!

      --
      xkcd is not in the sudoers file. This incident will be reported.
    22. Re:no crystal ball required by Vintermann · · Score: 1

      You have an account with five digits, and you're still using it after all these years? Yeah, I think they can find you.

      --
      xkcd is not in the sudoers file. This incident will be reported.
    23. Re:no crystal ball required by Vintermann · · Score: 1

      The problem is, they don't even need very much determination to do so today. It could all be automated, and run on your entire demographic (just in case) rather than targeted at you.

      --
      xkcd is not in the sudoers file. This incident will be reported.
    24. Re:no crystal ball required by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      This is only true if you only communicate with others who also are using public wifi to hide their identity and have the same skillset. If you communicate with people who aren't and don't, then they can deduce from those people's metadata who you are or at least narrow it down to a very small list of possibilities.

      Every person you communicate with is a liability, no matter how skilled you think you are.

    25. Re:no crystal ball required by Lumpy · · Score: 1

      "There's of course the entire DNS issue"

      It is not hard to run your own DNS locally, plus you can always use a connection elsewhere to do a DNS lookup from outside the USA via IP address.

      Add one more step, high gain directional antenna. I can be 500 meters away from the starbucks and use the wifi there, or pick another open or public wireless source. Easy to fit in a backpack and works even if it's inside the backpack, so nothing is visible and you dont attract attention.

      Lastly, Everyone assumes that you have to use a web browser.

      --
      Do not look at laser with remaining good eye.
    26. Re:no crystal ball required by Lumpy · · Score: 1

      Very true. IT was one of the vectors how mitnick got lazy and got caught. Manning simply was dumb and was bragging about it to someone, Rule #1 of what you never do. Rule #2 is never brag to a known government mole, again another mistake he made.

      --
      Do not look at laser with remaining good eye.
    27. Re:no crystal ball required by mu22le · · Score: 1

      "You already use the internet, they should be able easily to associate your IP with your identity. "

      only if you are a complete fool and use your home internet for most things.

      they cant find me in the noise of a starbucks connection.

      Unfortunately for you, the combination of browser plugins you use is basically unique (see https://panopticlick.eff.org/) and more than sufficient to track you.

    28. Re:no crystal ball required by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      And don't forget the time stamped cameras in every store, so they can cross reference the access to accurately ID you. Then its just a matter of facial recognition against the local BMV to get a name. From that point, its childs play.

    29. Re:no crystal ball required by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      It's not so easy. A glance at some of the issues.
      1) Browser. Let's say that you were able to block all the stateful information (cookie, flash cookie, ...). Your browser send nonetheless a lot of information and that alone can be enough to identify you: https://panopticlick.eff.org
      2) Security cameras. Even if you manage to get a secure internet connection on Starbuck your connections could be related to your phisical presence.
      3) Even if you manage to get inernet and physical security you could be identified. Becouse you are yourself and you do the things that you do that are different from the one that I do. And even if we do the same things we do them in different ways.
      The list of the sites you look at can be enough to identify you. What you write can be enough to identify you. How you write can be enough to identify you. Even the timing could be enough to identify you.

    30. Re:no crystal ball required by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I think Lumpy owes fustakrakich "a bunch" plus one cold beer. Point of access (IP, VPN, etc) seems irrelevant when one's User ID is willingly compromised at (sub) service provider level. Unless you're using the equivalent of "One Time Pads" for your User ID the Devil is in the details (metadata).

      In such a case, Anonymous Coward (even via open wi-fi) is not anonymous enough to hide your posterior. Recent reports seem to further assert that encryption simply attracts more attention and does not mask the relevant identifiers. At some point one must simply accept that this 'tis the nature of the beast.

      Tossing all your computers and net capable electronics in a pile and setting them on fire is the only sure bet (an action which is also likely illegal under various leg... run forest, run!).

      Good day to you Sirs.

    31. Re:no crystal ball required by plover · · Score: 1

      Check out https://panopticlick.eff.org/ and all the things that JavaScript can potentially reveal to the sites that you trust to execute JS. My favorite is that the list of fonts you have installed can uniquely identify you.

      You also missed the obvious settings regarding cookies, your browser cache, referrer tags, and user agents. I assume that was just oversight.

      Yes, I know NoScript will block all JavaScript if you're ruthless, but that means never letting your desire for convenience, functionality, or access to a site allow you to bypass NoScript, ever. And make sure you're blocking Flash and Java as well.

      --
      John
  2. Invalid certificate :-| by BrokenHalo · · Score: 1
    Hmmm. Link in first line spits an issue with an invalid certificate:

    The certificate is not trusted because no issuer chain was provided.

    1. Re:Invalid certificate :-| by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Hmmm. Link in first line spits an issue with an invalid certificate:

      The certificate is not trusted because no issuer chain was provided.

      So they're keeping everthing encrypted, but aren't paying some company like Verisign to look things over and say "yup, it's really encrypted."

      It fucking sickens me that browsers display huge and scary messages about "bad" certs. but do practically NOTHING when there is no cert. at all.....

    2. Re:Invalid certificate :-| by gl4ss · · Score: 1

      didn't do that for me. a reload did a 500 error.
      "the beautiful secure com-blabalbalbalblalbalbal". and a pretty picture on iphone.

      how can it be secure if it is to be distributed through a company potentially under secret orders? just make it work - and multi platform. don't care for the beautiful part.

      --
      world was created 5 seconds before this post as it is.
    3. Re:Invalid certificate :-| by Barefoot+Monkey · · Score: 1

      I got a valid certificate verified by Thawte.

    4. Re:Invalid certificate :-| by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      If there's no certificate, then there's no encryption. Are you wanting browsers to warn you about every non-encrypted website you visit? Because I'd wager that that'd make you sick even more quickly.

    5. Re:Invalid certificate :-| by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      The certification company doesn't say "this is encrypted" but "this certificate belongs to who it claims to belong to." So if you trust VeriSign to only issue certificates to the owners of the corresponding site, the fact that VeriSign issued that certificate tells you that the site you contacted is likely the real site (you cannot be completely sure because someone might have managed to get the private key). If you do not trust VeriSign, you should remove their root certificate from your browser. Then the browser will start giving security alerts for VeriSign issued certificates as well.

      Also, technically everyone can create a root certificate, and everyone can add any root certificate to his browser. The only difference is that the root certificates of the big certification agencies are preloaded in your browser, and companies are going to get their certificates from them exactly for this reason. But in principle nobody stops you from generating a root certificate and issuing certificates from that. Anyone who trusts you then can add that root certificate to their browser and won't get warnings any more for any certificate issued from that root certificate.

    6. Re:Invalid certificate :-| by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Informative

      You can encrypt it without a cert. You just can't be sure of a man in the middle attack.

    7. Re:Invalid certificate :-| by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      > Are you wanting browsers to warn you about every non-encrypted website you visit?

      Yes!

    8. Re:Invalid certificate :-| by MickLinux · · Score: 1

      This is key -- but full of irony. The only thing worse than no security, is security that you don't know, but only think is secure.

      So if you really want security, you have to abandon -- first and foremost -- these certificates. You don't know how they run.

      You can forget about Linux -- you didn't program it, and you don't know what code obfusciation might do.

      For sure you can forget Microsoft, Android, and whatnot. You'd be more secure speaking in person.

      For those for whom relative security is enough -- for example, those who want to pay by credit card and be reasonably secure against loss, that's easier. Then you can go with all those established security procedures.

      More to the point... now that the Transparent President has issued orders for government employees to spy on each other, lest the misdeeds of the powerful be leaked, more at issues is whom might you annoy?

      (Caveat: I have nothing for Obama; but I have nothing for any Republican candidate either. I'd say I have nothing against them, but it's more like I have nothing for them. In my book, they're equally evil and undeserving of votes.)

      --
      Correct Horse Battery Staple: 72 bits of entropy. Enter "Correct H" into google. When it generates the phrase, that's
    9. Re:Invalid certificate :-| by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      You've misunderstood what encryption is.

      Encryption is not a security guarantee no matter what, all encryption including OTPs can be broken or similar even if some ways of doing it are supposedly impossible.

      The solution is to use encryption and any encryption is better than none because you should know and act as if it is already compromised.

      If it isn't compromised you've gained something, possibly privacy, possibly a layer of security, possibly something else.

      If it is compromised you have lost nothing (and in addition you might actually have lost less than you would lose if you didn't use anything at all but I'll stop here).

      TL;DR: you lose when you don't try

  3. Wait, what!? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 4, Insightful

    Sorry but I threw out all of my iOS/Android devices when Snowden blew that whistle.

    1. Re:Wait, what!? by Lumpy · · Score: 1

      That was stupid. You should have sold them on Ebay for top dollar. only a complete idiot would throw them away.

      --
      Do not look at laser with remaining good eye.
    2. Re:Wait, what!? by wmac1 · · Score: 1

      I hope I can have the courage to do the same. I even think of carrying only a dumb phone (and its battery separately) just in case I need to use it for an emergency call.

      I guess people had a more happy life with land-line phones.

    3. Re:Wait, what!? by loufoque · · Score: 1

      That's stupid. The tracking in Android in software-only, and you can change the software.

    4. Re: Wait, what!? by nospam007 · · Score: 1

      "I guess people had a more happy life with land-line phones."

      Yes, the NSA thought they stayed always at home.

    5. Re:Wait, what!? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      For however long that lasts. http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2013/07/09/verizon-using-fire-island-to-test-getting-rid-of-landline-phones/

    6. Re:Wait, what!? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I guess people had a more happy life with land-line phones.

      The NSA sure did, they were way easier to tap.

    7. Re: Wait, what!? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Leave your cell phone at home 90% of the time. trade it with others when you actually take it somewhere.

    8. Re:Wait, what!? by Vintermann · · Score: 1

      Not true if the NSA has a deal with the telco. They can use base station and signal strength to determine your position accurately. This was part of the metadata NSA collected from Verizon in the initial scandal.

      --
      xkcd is not in the sudoers file. This incident will be reported.
    9. Re:Wait, what!? by loufoque · · Score: 1

      That applies to any cellphone, not just iOS/Android devices.

    10. Re:Wait, what!? by L4t3r4lu5 · · Score: 1

      Or download the AOSP code, strip out the tracking functions and compile it yourself.

      --
      Finally had enough. Come see us over at https://soylentnews.org/
  4. No Crystal Ball? by DavidClarkeHR · · Score: 4, Interesting

    Predicted this. First of many products that will try to offer security in lieu of ads after the Snowden leaks. I feel smart today. It's funding faster than a kickstarter... this gives me a page to refresh today instead of the dislikes on that Miley Cyrus video - good times that one.

    Without going all "conspiracy theory" here, what if this is part of a secret arrangement with the secret police for each of the founders to get out of secret jail avoid the secret prosecution and additional secret jail time?

    To paraphrase Admiral Ackbar, this could be an elaborate ruse. Realistically though? Its an excellent idea to cash in on the concept of the right to privacy.

    --
    - Nec Impar Pluribus, or so I'm told.
    1. Re:No Crystal Ball? by poetmatt · · Score: 4, Insightful

      If anyone knows something about how to make a resilient private service, it's probably the TPB crew. Considering how strong the site is running even though countries around the world (namely the US) are going to great lengths trying to take it down.

    2. Re:No Crystal Ball? by cgt · · Score: 2

      I don't understand why they don't make TPB a Tor hidden service. Why go to all the trouble of changing domain names all the time when they could just get an .onion/.tor2web.org address?

    3. Re:No Crystal Ball? by oodaloop · · Score: 1

      You can't repell tinfoil-hattery of that magnitude!

      --
      Tic-Tac-Toe, Global Thermonuclear War, and relationships all have the same winning move.
    4. Re:No Crystal Ball? by SuricouRaven · · Score: 2, Insightful

      User numbers. Tor takes effort to set up, while the greatest appeal of piracy is the speed and convenience.

    5. Re:No Crystal Ball? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Ancient Chinese Secret huh ( http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZjNRXfRXnoc )

    6. Re:No Crystal Ball? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      User numbers. - this

      There are torrent trackers that operate completely inside i2p that are pretty cool, but they don't have anywhere the number of users as more visible services.

    7. Re:No Crystal Ball? by cgt · · Score: 1

      I explicitly mentioned tor2web.

    8. Re:No Crystal Ball? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Pirate Bay makes a loooooot of money from ads, sacrificing any userbase isn't really worth it to hide the server IP. Are TOR sites even search engine discoverable? I know if you type in "ThePirateBay" to google, you get one of their active domains, would that likely work as a TOR address?

      If you want privacy just use TOR as an end user. TOR-to-TOR doesn't offer you any extra protection.

    9. Re:No Crystal Ball? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      TPB as hidden service

      http://jntlesnev5o7zysa.onion/

    10. Re:No Crystal Ball? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Resilience and security are two different things.

    11. Re:No Crystal Ball? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      I2P is damn simple to install and use though and seems technically superior to most things / for most uses, keep spreading the word :)

      I think I2P will become the new web. Wikipedia, GNU sites, EFF sites, F/OSS sites & collaboration, Linux nad BSD system sites etc. should establish their presence there and help route around the damage.

    12. Re:No Crystal Ball? by Vintermann · · Score: 1

      It's not so easy to turn a genuine idealist, and The Pirate Bay folks were in fact that. Greedy maybe, but not willing to compromise on certain things.

      --
      xkcd is not in the sudoers file. This incident will be reported.
    13. Re:No Crystal Ball? by L4t3r4lu5 · · Score: 1

      The TorBrowser Bundle requires you to download the TorBrowser Bundle, and then run the TorBrowser Bundle. Running Tales is as simple as downloading the ISO and burning it to a CD, then booting from the CD. It can even be run in a VM, though not recommended for the exceptionally paranoid.

      How is this not convenient?

      --
      Finally had enough. Come see us over at https://soylentnews.org/
    14. Re:No Crystal Ball? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      retroshare is also a very interesting application for secure communication and content sharing

    15. Re:No Crystal Ball? by SuricouRaven · · Score: 1

      I've been trying to get friends to use it myself. Only got a small network running, but it certainly holds potential.

  5. Threema Messaging App by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    This one already exists and looks pretty decent:

    https://threema.ch/en/

    1. Re:Threema Messaging App by TheP4st · · Score: 1

      If I would have a need for encrypted mobile communications I'd probably opt for the open source options from WhisperSystems, rather than a closed source option. Incidentally I asked on the heml.is blog if the source would be open and under what license terms the software would be released and 4 hours later my post is still awaiting an answer.

      --
      "I have downloaded hundreds and hundreds of records, why would I care if somebody downloads ours?" Robin Pecknold
    2. Re:Threema Messaging App by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      > WhisperSystems

      Agree that OSS is preferable. Threema has the advantage, though, of having both Android and iOS covered.

    3. Re:Threema Messaging App by mwvdlee · · Score: 1

      and 4 hours later my post is still awaiting an answer.

      Those darn other-timezonians!

      --
      Slashdot social media options: AIM, ICQ, Yahoo, Jabber and Mobile Text. Why no MySpace?
    4. Re:Threema Messaging App by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      > If I would have a need for encrypted mobile communications

      You do! ;-)

      > I'd probably opt for the open source options from WhisperSystems

      Just looked at it. Not the same thing.
      Threema is essentially messaging over IP/data connection, whereas TextSecure is a secure SMS app (over Telco), as far as I see.

  6. Dat swedish! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Helmis is not secret in swedish. Hemlig is. Hemlis is a slang version used by tots.

    1. Re:Dat swedish! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Well, technically "hemlig" is "secret" as an adjective. "Hemlis" is a noun, so "hemlighet" would be the proper non-slang word.

      Even more importantly though, "hemlis" is indeed a proper word in Swedish, as it's in SAOL (the official Swedish dictionary). Page 331, to be exact.

  7. OS backdoors by Keruo · · Score: 3, Insightful

    What good will this do if they've backdoored your device and are reading the keyboard input and taking screenshots?

    --
    There are no atheists when recovering from tape backup.
    1. Re:OS backdoors by onceuponatime · · Score: 1

      Exactly! If the device itself is compromised you simply can't build a secure service on top of it. End of story.

      At least. That is what I believe I'd like to see a compelling argument as to this is not the case. The same comment applies to the whisper systems app, what is the argument that implies that the platform itself is safe?

    2. Re:OS backdoors by FriendlyLurker · · Score: 4, Insightful

      That takes more effort, targeting you more specifically. Very different from always on dragnet slurping up everyones communication all the time.

    3. Re:OS backdoors by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      What good will this do if they've backdoored your device and are reading the keyboard input and taking screenshots?

      Well Duh. None.

      Same as if 'they' have already got secret cameras and bugs in your house.

      What's your point? Surely not the retarded "It doesn't do everything so it's worth nothing" crap?

    4. Re:OS backdoors by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      How do you suggest that they transfer the screenshots/keyboard data from the compromised device?
      We know that they are monitoring the communication so encrypting the messages makes sure that they can't spy on you that way. You can't be sure that they don't monitor the rest of the device but you can check the network communication to make sure that any gathered data stays in the device and isn't sent anywhere. (Yes, you can buy your own base station/repeater for $500 and even make sure that nothing odd is sent over GPRS.)

    5. Re:OS backdoors by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Keyboard input could be covered by clicking on words instead of them being typed. Surely there are a list of commonly used words. Wheel of Fortune taught us RSTLNE so that's a start. Screenshots, no clue unless you put noise on the screen like a Captcha so that the glyphs can't be easily counted by color difference from their background. Oh, that's a plan, any glyphs are in colors that match the background and only show if highlighted or something like lemon on paper for kids secret messages that you derive from heating. They could also randomly cut parts of the letters off so it's mangled and must be reconstructed. Instead of being real text, make them pixels or shapes in a graphic language. Larger message probably but more to sort on the other side too.

    6. Re:OS backdoors by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      If they're being so bloody nosy about you and everyone else it will do the good that you force them to do that!

      And it's quite a lot more effort to do so than to "simply" duplex every signal travelling down a line. In fact if everyone no wait ten thousand no wait one thousand people did use something sensible like I2P (and more than a thousand people do!) they don't stand a chance (but only against those who use it), because they do not have that kind of capacity.

      Freedom: use it or lose it.

    7. Re:OS backdoors by Vintermann · · Score: 1

      That's high-effort spying. Because it's so detectable, it's also very risky, so it's highly unlikely they would use it other than on high-value targets.

      Our goal is first and foremost to stop low-effort, safe (for them) mass surveillance.

      --
      xkcd is not in the sudoers file. This incident will be reported.
    8. Re:OS backdoors by Ronin+Developer · · Score: 1

      The data could be piggybacked onto other "legit" transmissions using steganographic techniques. And, if you are so inclined to encrypt your transmissions, it makes it all that much easier to hide the bits. If they bits are removed at the first gateway or cell tower, the receiver would never know the packet had been tampered with in the first place.

      Or, and for those of the real conspiracy theorist mentality, they could also monitor the emissions from you screen such as modulating the screens brightness (or the backlight leds) to send the data. Of course, that would mean they are actually watching you, bugging your home, etc, in which case, you be hosed.

      Just say'n.

    9. Re:OS backdoors by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      >

      The data could be piggybacked onto other "legit" transmissions using steganographic techniques. And, if you are so inclined to encrypt your transmissions, it makes it all that much easier to hide the bits.

      Steganography still requires that you send data where it can be applied. This means that you have control of when you can be snooped on and since you are the source of the data it is trivial to check every now and then that the data haven't been tampered with.

      If they bits are removed at the first gateway or cell tower, the receiver would never know the packet had been tampered with in the first place.

      The receiver doesn't need to know and probably don't care if you are being snooped on. You as a transmitter will have to check yourself. If the data is encrypted it will also be a lot harder to restore the modified bits at the first gateway.
      It is theoretically possible but pretty much assumes a targeted attack rather than an automated one.

      Or, and for those of the real conspiracy theorist mentality, they could also monitor the emissions from you screen such as modulating the screens brightness (or the backlight leds) to send the data. Of course, that would mean they are actually watching you, bugging your home, etc, in which case, you be hosed.

      Just say'n.

      Well, considering that we know that widespread surveillance is going on it is perfectly possible to discuss this without bringing in conspiracy theory nutjobs.
      We only need to find something that works against any current reasonable surveillance method, not something that works against any theoretical but impractical method.

  8. What's wrong with OTR? by knopf · · Score: 5, Informative
    Off-the-Record messaging already provides encryption of chat messages, works on top of existing IM services, and you get the bonus that you can get the warm fuzzy feeling from sticking it to the man by using a company's service (like Google talk) that tries to log/mine data, but they can't use your data.

    Many clients already support OTR: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Off-the-Record_Messaging#Native
    Many clients have plugins for OTR: http://www.cypherpunks.ca/otr/

    1. Re:What's wrong with OTR? by FriendlyLurker · · Score: 1

      Exactly. OTR is excellent. If only email encryption was as easy and straight forward for non technical, "security... meh", people to use. Zero configuration it just works.

    2. Re:What's wrong with OTR? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      AFAIK, you can't use OTR for 'disconnected' messaging, where one user is offline atm.

    3. Re:What's wrong with OTR? by loufoque · · Score: 1

      That's useless. My facebook contacts don't have such sophisticated software installed, and they will not install it just to avoid wiretapping.

    4. Re:What's wrong with OTR? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      According to police forces, they.re not really interested in the *content*. The metadata/headers are far more useful, and easily allow them to create a social graph and even data on your habits easily.

      OTR only protects the contents.

      And btw: Unless you physically checked if the key is only in control of the person you think it is, it's all pointless or even more dangerous anyway.

    5. Re:What's wrong with OTR? by Hatta · · Score: 1

      Then its your facebook contacts who are useless.

      --
      Give me Classic Slashdot or give me death!
    6. Re:What's wrong with OTR? by cryptizard · · Score: 1

      OTR only works if you either:

      1) Trust the network
      2) Have a shared secret between the users or
      3) Have an out of band channel to compare public key fingerprints

      Now, this service is probably going to use the same (or a similar) protocol but fall under category 1 by distributing everyone's public keys. If you trust them to give you the correct key then the system can be secure.

    7. Re:What's wrong with OTR? by cryptizard · · Score: 1

      Unless you are using an out of band channel to compare public key fingerprints, it is not "just working" and you are vulnerable to a man in the middle attack. It has the same problem as secure mail, only people ignore it.

    8. Re:What's wrong with OTR? by loufoque · · Score: 1

      They're simply not tech-savvy, like most ordinary people.

    9. Re:What's wrong with OTR? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      Encryption which is vulnerable to MitM isn't as good as encryption which is invulnerable to MitM, but it's still pretty damn good. Make them do the MitM. And best of all: the attacker doesn't know whether you're MitM vulnerable or not. When he spends his money and exposure risk by launching the MitM attack, he might be walking right into your honeypot and become tomorrow's New York Times front page story. No outside observer can detect whether or not you have compared keys out of band.

    10. Re:What's wrong with OTR? by FriendlyLurker · · Score: 1
      You are correct about the extra check to avoid MITM attacks, however your definition of "just working" is too narrow IMO and leads to a much bigger security headache/problem. Having it just work zero configuration with possibility of MITM as OTR does is a small price to pay to have encryption on by default and even more importantly, the ability to use it correctly without MITM for little extra hassle. OTR is already out there ready to go on a wide range of clients so users do not have to jump through hoops to get people they want to communicate with securely to install it. See this thread above, specifically the "false sense of security" replies for more. Reproduced:

      Anybody who cares about a high level of security will bother following the simple procedure to check that they do indeed have a secure, non MITM compromised connection [check the fingerprint]. If they chose not to care, then so be it (but their connection is still encrypted, raising security bar vs the solution your logic proposes.

      Unfortunately this little extra step to make sure there is no MITM is held up and championed as the basis for the "false sense of security" argument, which leads to default of no encryption at all available to anyone using email. Worse and the real problem with this argument that compounds the bad state of email encryption security software, there is no ready to go defacto standard software in the majority of email and web clients even closely equivalent to what OTR enjoys because non of it "just works" out of the box like OTR does. Even if you want to encrypt properly you have to go through lengthy process to get second and third parties to install and setup correctly... which in reality just does not happen at all. Compared to OTR, email encryption just does not work in reality and the biggest culprit is all those so called security experts that cry "false sense of security is wore than no security". What a load of **ap - they really need to get a reality check Viz. the Snowden revelations.

    11. Re:What's wrong with OTR? by mu22le · · Score: 1

      There is also a user friendly in-browser implementation: https://crypto.cat/ Go check it out.

      They have been working on an smartphone version for a while but it's not ready for prime time yet.

    12. Re:What's wrong with OTR? by mu22le · · Score: 1

      There are ways to prevent MitM attacks. The crypto.cat people were working on an implementation of the scialist millionaire protocol (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Socialist_millionaire) that would use a simple password, exchanged via secure means (read: in person) to validate the partecipant public keys.

    13. Re:What's wrong with OTR? by mu22le · · Score: 1

      AFAIK, you can't use OTR for 'disconnected' messaging, where one user is offline atm.

      Actually, you can, even if it is a bit impratical. The original OTR paper (http://www.cypherpunks.ca/otr/otr-wpes.pdf) even discussed a way to use OTR with emails. Unfortunately that never gained much support.

    14. Re:What's wrong with OTR? by cryptizard · · Score: 1

      The equivalent in email is self-signed SMIME certificates or PGP without a key server. I would argue that PGP is just as easy to set up and use in every major email client.

    15. Re:What's wrong with OTR? by cryptizard · · Score: 1

      You still need an out of band channel, which I just said.

    16. Re:What's wrong with OTR? by FriendlyLurker · · Score: 1
      OTR comes with most major chat applications and if not can be a one click install, zero configuration setup in some cases. After that the user changes zero habits to begin using it - if the party your writing a message to has it, it just starts automatically. SMIME certs and P/GPG without the key server are defiantly not equivalent to that, not even close. Many more hoops to jump through both in installation, setup and when it comes to actually send or reply to emails. That is why these products have completely failed to make any inroads despite decades on the market (in the case of PGP). For the record, I used to use PGP and GPG religiously back when email was young - the eudora days. Unfortunately I was an army of one.

      I can guarantee that the majority of non technical people send emails everyday with the false sense of security that their email message is somehow private.

    17. Re:What's wrong with OTR? by mu22le · · Score: 1

      True that, but agreeing on a password is a lot easier than comparing key fingerprints. A phone call, if you trust you can recognize your partner voice, could suffice.

      You may not even need a sideband channel, the name of the place where you met for the first time would probably be secure enough for most purposes.

  9. Connect to IRC via Loopback by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    How is this any more secure than a locked down SSH server (& Locked down user accounts) that runs an IRC Client when bash is called and connects via loopback/SSL to an IRC server?

    If this is a serious contender to say a darknet, or to Retroshare, then I might be interested.

  10. "That which does not kill us makes us stronger." by seoras · · Score: 5, Insightful

    When you try to eradicate anything and fail you only succeed in make it stronger and more menacing.
    It's true in medicine with antibiotics and bacteria, it's true in nature with mosquitoes and the various failed attempts to defeat their spread of malaria.

    Skype was born from the technology to evade detection and network filtering (Kazaa).
    First time I fire up Skype I couldn't believe the complexity of the networking it got into.
    A close friend, who worked in networking with me, un-installed it immediately as it looked like a trojan at the network layer.

    TPB people have learned some very hard lessons about evasion, law and staying alive online under extreme hostilities.

    It'll be interesting to see what the next "Skype" will be and this could be either it, or one more step towards it.

  11. OTOH... by BrokenHalo · · Score: 1

    On the other hand, such a certificate may be redundant in the case of a properly P2P process, as TFS suggests re their app. However, I can't see any reason why they need one for their homepage, which (from having looked at the content in Links) shouldn't need https at all.

  12. Official communication tool for the EU-parliament? by colordev · · Score: 0

    Peter Sunde will run for European Parliament in 2014 election with Pirate Party of Finland. Quite impossible to think any intelligent person not voting for him.

  13. Proprietary AND for money!? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    So let me get this straight: it's closed source, will have "premium features" for paid apps, AND they want $100k? Yeah, no, they can go shove it up their ass.

  14. Re:Official communication tool for the EU-parliame by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    So it's impossible to think there are intelligent people outside of Finland?

  15. So, "don't be evil" Heard that before. by stevegee58 · · Score: 1

    It all boils down to trusting a company once again.

  16. Re:Official communication tool for the EU-parliame by mwvdlee · · Score: 3, Funny

    Peter Sunde will run for European Parliament in 2014 election with Pirate Party of Finland. Quite impossible to think any intelligent person not voting for him.

    Indeed his ideas on medical healthcare, social welfare, military spending and road infrastructure are renowned and undeniable.
    Quite impossible to think any intelligens person would care for anything besides those particular issues.

    --
    Slashdot social media options: AIM, ICQ, Yahoo, Jabber and Mobile Text. Why no MySpace?
  17. In Soviet Russia, the iron solders YOU! by Thor+Ablestar · · Score: 4, Insightful

    I agree 100 per cent. And I must add that all these so called crypto or secure apps that don't hide the fact of connections are absolutely unsafe. If the FSB (KGB, Russian equivalent of NSA) can compile my contact list they can just torture the content out of them. There is a specific Russian term - "rectothermal cryptoanalyzer" (meaning the hot soldering iron to suspect's anus).

    BTW: Hemlis is suspicious because the usernames must be preregistered. The really secure app should have no any central server for the registration info. The admins of such server can be too easily tortured to disclose or stop everything.

    1. Re:In Soviet Russia, the iron solders YOU! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Good comment, I'll add that in I2P they would have to rectally solder a significant number of people before they even know if there's anything to look for (there might be absolutely nothing). Far easier to do old style surveillance directly on the person in question thus the "surveillance efficiency" of old style unprotected internet is defeated.

      I hope I2P becomes common, I think it will. Use it even if you don't actually use it much, keep it up and running as much as possible like I do.

    2. Re:In Soviet Russia, the iron solders YOU! by Vintermann · · Score: 1

      Torture, torture, torture. What you must realize is that if you demand the perfect protection, the kind that is resistant to FSB kidnapping and torturing all your friends, then you're going to have to wait. While there are easy steps you can take now, which won't stop NSA for all eternity, but can make their business much harder when it comes to spying on you.

      It's a bit like securing webservers. It's extremely likely that there's an exploit somewhere in the software you run on it, that could be found by a very determined adversary. Do you refuse to run even a simple firewall because of that? No, that would be stupid. The most important thing is to protect from casual, easy attacks - the targeted nuclear attacks you can worry about later.

      (To be more specific: Man in the middle attacks against the likes of PGP or OTR chat are a bit like targeted nuclear attacks. Sure they work, but they have so much potential fallout that you're not going to see it very often. Unless you have a specific reason to think you are a high-value target and an immediate risk,it's scarcely worth thinking about!)

      --
      xkcd is not in the sudoers file. This incident will be reported.
    3. Re:In Soviet Russia, the iron solders YOU! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      The English equivalent is rubber-hose cryptanalysis. Somewhat less violent sounding than the Russian term.

  18. Fast??? by Thor+Ablestar · · Score: 1

    The fundamental problem of the next Skype is that any attempt to produce a really anonymous network will need lots of nodes in delivery chain and will correspondingly produce too long delays, but texting-only app suffers at least since users cannot verify their correspondents by known voice. And you should not trust a network where the intermediary nodes are not under direct control of participants since they all may belong to FSB (KGB, NSA, aso).

    1. Re:Fast??? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I2P check it out, use it, keep it running even when you don't, move your websites and whatever onto the I2P network.

      Take your freedom for yourself and give freedom for others to use as badly or wisely as they themselves choose. Contribute however you can.

  19. Torchat by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    What about torchat, it is supposed to be encrypted, anonymous, decentralized and open source, does not anyone use it?

  20. Then there's Serval Mesh... by complete+loony · · Score: 1

    ... which works for local communications even when the internet itself is down. Importantly, this is an application that already exists. Plus everything we're doing is open source and we'll never lock any features behind a paywall.

    I've been working on Serval's software for a couple of years now building the core feature set; encrypted calling and messaging, distributed phone number lookups, file distribution, software updates and installs in the field...

    But since we're initially targeting android phones, we're stuck with the range limitations of Wi-Fi. So we're trying to fund the design and manufacture of a pocket sized device with much longer range (totally shameless plug).

    There's still a few missing features in our software that we'll need to finish before we call it version 1.0. But with a enough funding I could easily build a P2P directory to provide services across the internet. With no centrally controlled servers at all.

    --
    09F91102 no, 455FE104 nope, F190A1E8 uh-uh, 7A5F8A09 that's not it, C87294CE no. Ah! 452F6E403CDF10714E41DFAA257D313F.
  21. Cryptocat by bemasher · · Score: 1

    Is this any better or more useful than the service Cryptocat (https://crypto.cat/)? Seems like a duplication of efforts to me.

    1. Re:Cryptocat by krenaud · · Score: 1

      It is difficult to comment on differences since Heml.is doesn't actually exist yet. But, one major difference is that Heml.is will exist as phone apps and there will be secure syncing of keys between devices. CryptoCat is a web-based solution which doesn't sync private keys between devices.

    2. Re:Cryptocat by Pike · · Score: 1

      I'd say we definitely need something besides Cryptocat:

      "Cryptocat is run by people that don't know crypto, make stupid mistakes, and not enough eyes are looking at their code to find the bugs. Cryptographers know the minimums or at least know you should look them up. Cryptocat tried PBKDF2, RSA, Diffie-Hellman, and ECC and managed to mess them all up because they used iterations or key sizes less than the minimums. There was a bug in the generation of ECC private keys that went unchecked for 347 days."

      (As far as the competence of the people behind heml.is, I can't say one way or the other.)

    3. Re:Cryptocat by bemasher · · Score: 1

      The list of things wrong with cryptocat in that post is kind of scary, particularly since I imagine quite a lot of people that use the service will never see that post (or understand it).

  22. Skeptical by IamTheRealMike · · Score: 1

    Any application intended to resist modern government surveillance is going to be extremely difficult to write, because it has to be resistant to bogus secret "court orders". The only way I know to do that is to have many independent developers engage in multi-party signatures of reproducible builds based on audited and reviewed open source code. If they're just going to run a company that develops it in a proprietary manner how will they achieve that?

    I am more interested in Pond. It's being written by an actual cryptographer and he already has real, working code (though it's nowhere near releasable). It's up front about its security model and which threats can break it. It's built on top of Tor and even supports using the TPM chip so that when you press delete, the data is really really gone beyond the ability of any forensics tools to recover. It's even designed to resist traffic analysis. Anyone can run a server.

    The main differences are that, obviously, Pond is not developed by a company, and it is focussed on asynchronous email style messaging rather than instant messaging. It's also got a very strong threat model that means it compromises on usability - for instance, there are no addresses in Pond, instead you are expected to hand out small files (perhaps on NFC tags?) to people who you want to be able to receive messages from (this is an anti-spam measure).

    Despite all that it's a very interesting piece of research.

    1. Re:Skeptical by Vintermann · · Score: 1

      Not everything you could do to resist modern government surveillance is going to be hard. Here's an easy one:

      Every time you send a mail, your app zip it and encrypt it with a small, randomly chosen key. You don't transmit the key. Instead, the recipient has to brute force it, it takes about 5 seconds.

      That thing does extremely little to protect your message from a determined attacker. But it also stops mass scanning of message content dead in its tracks.

      We need different forms of protection. Some are very hard to get. Let's not get so discouraged by that that we don't bother with the protection we can easily take.

      --
      xkcd is not in the sudoers file. This incident will be reported.
    2. Re:Skeptical by F.Ultra · · Score: 1

      Still they can extract meta data from this which is what they want most of the time, so what we really need is a way for me to send a message somewhere in such a way that someone with full MITM cannot understand that the message came from my machine and also when you receive it the MITM should not be able to see which message that you fetched.

      The only solution that I can come up with is if every party gets the complete communications, that way no MITM can ever see which message that you are interested in since you got them all, and sending could be hidden by syncing messages between parties combined with every node creating bogus messages randomly. However such a scheme would never work as a mobile app since there is not enough storage space on those devices and since many also have GB limits on their phone plans.

    3. Re:Skeptical by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      just buy a new cell each time you need to send a text message..

      problem solved.

  23. tormail anyone? by slashmydots · · Score: 1

    Tormail is free and already well established.

  24. Re:Official communication tool for the EU-parliame by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Indeed his ideas on medical healthcare, social welfare, military spending and road infrastructure are renowned and undeniable.
    Quite impossible to think any intelligens person would care for anything besides those particular issues.

    Well, look at the alternatives. Every other candidate is all about removing your rights. What good is roads if you can't travel freely? What good is the military if it is used against you?
    None of the other issues matters at all until the freedom part is fixed.

    Also I wouldn't call his ideas on those subjects renowned. They are just not very radical. Pretty much like the other candidates.

  25. Re:Official communication tool for the EU-parliame by colordev · · Score: 1

    oh, quite the opposite

  26. Re:"That which does not kill us makes us stronger. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    A close friend, who worked in networking with me, un-installed it immediately as it looked like a trojan at the network layer.

    What kind of logic is that? I look like a Mexican AND like an Arab too. Doesn't mean I go suicide-bomb some pools or crops </stereotypes>. :P
    If you know what I mean...

    Your "trojan" detection clearly is off.

  27. Re:"That which does not kill us makes us stronger. by seoras · · Score: 1

    I worked in Cisco System R&D on IOS for 12 years (1994-2006).
    I have patents on network monitoring specific to NetFlow (or Flexible NetFlow) which came from being on the team that redesigned Cisco's netflow on IOS.

    That's how I spotted what Skype was doing, and so did my colleague.
    We had Cisco routers at home, running our own dev code, watching our own home network traffic.

    He thought the skype traffic looked like something a Trojan would do, but since neither of us worked in Anti-virus software or hacking, what would we know?
    I, being less paranoid, stuck with Skype as I figure it was just being clever in avoiding network filtering.
    After all why would the telco's, who provide our networks, let some hackers from Sweden steal all their long distance voice calls...? :)

  28. Email OTR wouldn't need it by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    If the email client simply generated a private/public key pair, and attacked the public key, tracking an building up confidence in the public key associated with each email address, then your Facebook friends wouldn't care.

    It would just work, as OTR does now.

    As Skype use to work, before MS bought them and backdoored it.

  29. Surespot - Free as in beer, free as in freedom. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    This android app (currently under development for iOS) is open source (github.com/surespot) and gaining momentum. "Exceptional encryption for everyone."

    https://www.surespot.me/

    Disclaimer: I know the developer.

  30. Surespot.me - Free as in beer, free as in freedom by bwhaley · · Score: 1

    This android app (currently under development for iOS) is open source (github.com/surespot) and gaining momentum. "Exceptional encryption for everyone."

    https://www.surespot.me/

    Disclaimer: I know the developer.

    --
    "I either want less corruption, or more chance
    to participate in it." -- Ashleigh Brilliant
  31. If it's not open, forget - don't kid yourself by Kimomaru · · Score: 1

    It's a proprietary service, so you don't know if they're doing what they say they are. Forget it. Absolutely rediculous - it's the same problem we have now in that few people really know what's going on. Let the project drown.

  32. Re:Official communication tool for the EU-parliame by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Totally! He is the only one helping me to pirate "Game of Thrones!" He is fighting on *my* side!

  33. Re:Official communication tool for the EU-parliame by Vintermann · · Score: 1

    Before you care about those issues one way or another, you've got to care about your freedom and ability to actually make a difference on either of those issues.

    If you have no power, if the spy agencies are in charge and could manipulate the majority's public opinion on those issues any way they wanted, what would it matter what you thought about them?

    Democracy first, then politics.

    --
    xkcd is not in the sudoers file. This incident will be reported.
  34. In Soviet Russia, pussy doesn't fight government by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    If the FSB (KGB, Russian equivalent of NSA) can compile my contact list they can just torture the content out of them.

    Everybody has always lived with the possibility that their government (or anyone who is powerful) might decide to use violence against them. It can happen if you don't encrypt, too. Maybe your plaintext didn't happen to contain the information they wanted. Or maybe they're just sadistic bastards. You've premised a powerful and psychopathic adversary, so I think even your best case scenarios are pretty bad. IMHO that's all the more reason to encrypt.

    But violence is much harder to get away with, undetected, compared to passive plaintext capturing. Somebody's going to notice that people are missing. People knew about the gulags. And even Stalin couldn't "process" people as fast as a modern computer can process plaintext. (And lots of people will balk too; maybe your FSB is more steel-hearted but I think in USA we'd likely end up with a few thousand Snowdens in the first week. (And yes, some psychos too; I'm not denying that, I just think not everyone would go that way.))

    When the adversary brandishes his $5 wrench, the crypto-nerd might be in for the worst (and last) night of his life, but the big game is one step closer to being over and the wrench guys are looking at a good possibility of seeing a firing squad, noose or guillotine. And it's really hard to believe that seeing ciphertext will just happen to be the one thing that pushes them over the edge, from civilized protector of the nation, to enemy of the people. You were going to get into a violent conflict with them anyway. If you really think FSB is start going to do that to most Russian citizens who use the Internet but check the "encrypt" box, then you ought to start killing them now.

  35. Re:Official communication tool for the EU-parliame by colordev · · Score: 1

    I think protecting the freedom of speech, democracy, human rights and civil liberties is the new 'environmental' issue that matters the most. And it appears the pirate party is the most active in resisting human-right supressing stasi-like activities... and quite frankly I don't care that much for Sunde's or pirate party's other ideas or priorities.

    In the 80's green party movement/party was a great political invention, which eventually helped in ending the acid rains, CFC-freons, overuse of farm pesticides and other nasty things. The industry would not have stopped poisoning the environment without a clear political guidance. For me the pirate party is like the 80's green party movement... this time it's just protecting humans instead/besides the nature. Ok, not everybody needs to have these political priorities ;)

  36. Re:Official communication tool for the EU-parliame by F.Ultra · · Score: 1

    Exactly how much of Finland's medical health care, social welfare, military spending and road infrastructure will be determined by the European Parliament? Yes that is right, exactly nothing.

    And even if it where, Finland has 14 seats so that would leave 13 to deal with those issues.

  37. Free Encrypted Tweet app by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    ultra-social.com - for iOS and Android. Twitter only.

  38. GPG? by hobarrera · · Score: 1

    What's wrong with email+gpg and xmpp+gpg? Did it get broken? Why the need for a new protocol?

    Obligatory XKCD: http://xkcd.com/927/