First Apps Targeting Android Key Vulnerability Found in the Wild
wiredmikey writes with this tidbit from Security Week: "Earlier this month, researchers from Bluebox Security uncovered a serious vulnerability in Android that allowed for the modification of apps without affecting the cryptographic signature, making it possible for attackers to turn legitimate apps into Trojans. ... Now, Symantec says it has uncovered the first malicious apps making use of the exploit in the wild. Symantec discovered two mobile applications that were infected by an attacker, which are legitimate applications used to help find and make doctor appointments and distributed on Android marketplaces in China. 'An attacker has taken both of these applications and added code to allow them to remotely control devices, steal sensitive data such as IMEI and phone numbers, send premium SMS messages, and disable a few Chinese mobile security software applications by using root commands, if available,' Symantec explained in a blog post. ... Google has fixed the security hole in Android, but it is now in the control of handset manufacturers to produce and release the updates for mobile devices to patch the flaws."
So, in other words, most people are screwed, because most of the manufacturers pretty much never really do updates.
I think that has to be the biggest limitation of the platform -- it is so fragmented, you could easily end up with a device which is never going to see updates.
Lost at C:>. Found at C.
That says it all right there. Be careful about the sources of your software. If you're installing software from shady sources or vendors, you probably don't care that the signature matches one of a legitimate program or not.
Anthropic principle: We see the universe the way it is because if it were different we would not be here to see it.
For people in China, it probably was, until this news!
There are two separate keys that were compromised, if I understand the output of the scanner correctly. KatKiss ROM for Transformer TF-101 has been patched for both since Version 220 or 221. I haven't tried V223b yet because it purports to change a bunch of defaults for performance reasons that I don't want to have to change back again every time I re-flash (but it's out).
Incidentally the source is not available at this time! EOS4 git repos went down when the TeamEOS broke up, I don't know for sure but http://git.teameos.org/ is a cgit with at least web reader access to help tell which repos have changes from AOSP, but they are not available for cloning. Bummer.
I am sure timduru could use some help from anyone with the source, or with a lot of patience to read the individual repo commit ids from EOS4 cgit while it's still up, and check AOSP to see if they are present somewhere in history or divergent. (I've talked to him. It's a big job. I'm sure he could use the help, just not sure how to provide it best.)
I get my OS from these guys. But yeah, I would not be downloading apps from android marketplaces in China.
Restating the obvious since nineteen aught five.
Problem is, the Play Store is not available in China. In fact, it's not available in a lot of places.
And even in the US there are many legitimate reasons WHY you'd want to "allow non-marketplace apps" to be checked. Say, the Amazon App Store. Or Humble Bundle for Android. Or many legitimate sellers of Android apps who refuse to use the Play Store.
The problem with Android is it's an "all or none" proposition - you can choose the safety of the Play Store, or you can have it all. You can't choose the safety of the Play Store and other stores you trust (though there is legitimate reason why it's not necessarily a good idea).
The legitimate reason? It doesn't really protect anything - thanks to the dancing pigs (or rabbits) issue, even if you made it so a user could "approve" a store, guess what? They'll approve illegitimate ones because they want the app.