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After Lavabit Shut-Down, Dotcom's Mega Promises Secure Mail
Lavabit may no longer be an option, but recent events have driven interest in email and other ways to communicate without exposing quite so much, quite so fast, to organizations like the NSA (and DEA, and other agencies). Kim Dotcom as usual enjoys filling the spotlight, when it comes to shuttling bits around in ways that don't please the U.S. government, and Dotcom's privacy-oriented Mega has disclosed plans to serve as an email provider with an emphasis on encryption. ZDNet features an interview with Mega's CEO Vikram Kumar about the complications of keeping email relatively secure; it's not so much the encryption itself, as keeping bits encrypted while still providing the kind of features that users have come to expect from modern webmail providers like Gmail:
"'The biggest tech hurdle is providing email functionality that people expect, such as searching emails, that are trivial to provide if emails are stored in plain text (or available in plain text) on the server side,' Kumar said. 'If all the server can see is encrypted text, as is the case with true end-to-end encryption, then all the functionality has to be built client side. [That’s] not quite impossible but very, very hard. That’s why even Silent Circle didn’t go there.'"
The latency is really bad, but at least your information will be secure!
Heh heh, secure. Heh.
"You're right," Fisheye says. "I should have set it on 'whip' or 'chop.'"
I think you need a new new plan
http://news.yahoo.com/ap-interview-usps-takes-photos-mail-072949079.html
Are those actual links, or just the <a> tags?
Learning HOW to think is more important than learning WHAT to think.
http://torrentfreak.com/dotcoms-mega-debuts-spy-proof-messaging-this-summer-email-follows-130711/
A link to an actual article.
Learning HOW to think is more important than learning WHAT to think.
The should be developed an international mechanism of verifications of the Article #12 of The Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Many countries have signed it. The should be international inspections of data centers, telephone companies, etc.
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml#a12
Article 12. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.
Ok I actually tried to read the article and those links don't work. A low day for Slashdot editors.
Check out the new Slashdot iPad app
http://www.zdnet.com/mega-to-fill-secure-email-gap-left-by-lavabit-7000019232/
I find this farcical, so the NSA is going to start playing whack-a-mole with a what will be in the near future, a plethora of alternative secure email providers. Ask the RIAA how well that works out.
AC.. because I can.
According to Security Now/Steve Gibson, the encryption/security on the MEGA file site is not very sound
https://www.grc.com/sn/sn-390.htm (search for "Java Crypto" to get about 3/4 way through the show) or listen to the podcast..
MEGA is well intentioned Im sure, but the Javascript code in MEGA does not cut it for serious security, and they need to dp waaay better for an email service.
Remember that ALL THE DATA is being retained now, so one crack in the system and there is a way in.
Air tight security is do-able, but needs to be serious - I wish Mega lots of luck.
Move along... there is no sig here.
Actually, there's a product in there.
Envelopes for the paranoid. Made of extra-thick paper, with an aluminium foil lining. Each pack comes with very, very thin stickers bearing a pack-unique printing that can be placed over the seal, making it impossible to open the envelope without tearing.
The problem is that private key, in server solution, are available on the server. Even in Mega, the private key is located server side and the password/passphrase is supplied by the end user over SSL. So, the weakpoints are SSL and the domestic machine, as well as an intercept placed on a server at Mega.
What we require is a private key that a person hold, on a smartcard type arrangement. From this we derive a personal certificate authority and a public key. We issue certificates through our personal CA for particular roles and upload them to our provider. This then acts as our transport encryption, digital signatures, email encryption and so forth. The private key never enters the network and everyone has a unique encrypted layer, rather than a common SSL certificate.
Decryption is performed by streaming the contents through the smartcard. We can add additional factors to this authentication such as biometrics, pin, etc. In fact, the user should be able to determine the amount of factors, their order, etc. The decrypted output can either be sent back into the machine (if you feel it is secure), or forwarded to a secure offline machine.
We only need to make sure that this forwarding eliminates the possibility of an exploit and that means a limited stack that only provides certain features. Such as text and/or video.
There is no reason that a standard mobile phone could not have two physical portions, one connected to the web and another for secure comms.
Not so much:
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/04/us/monitoring-of-snail-mail.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
Taxation is legalized theft, no more, no less.
No, it works. Uncle Sam can't read it. You just print your document, then scan it on a Xerox printer/scanner like the Workcenter 7335. http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2013/08/confused-photocopiers-randomly-rewriting-scanned-documents/. If your document is carefully crafted, your message will be obfuscated by the scanner. Print and send that. The receiving party must then send it through another Xerox to get your actual message back.
Not at all.
1. Press soft clay up to the seal to get an impression..
2. Open envelope, read, close.
3. Fire clay. Smooth it down a little carefully.
4. Melt wax, apply clay stamp.
The problem is that email is managed from a central location.
If email clients opereated as fully encrypted standalone, "peer to peer" entities, the central mail server would be eliminated, and snoops would only be able to grab the encrypted content, and perhaps the locations of sender and receiver.
I've said it before and I'll say it again, this concentration on encryption is fiddling while the house burns. Encryption is sexy, and easy, and kewl, and l33t... but it won't protect against the real threat - traffic analysis.
Going Galt then are we?
I symphathize and have thought much the same myself.
But I recommend you think first before adding one unwise decision on top of another.
A restaurant is one of the most common business to fail, and that's in a good economy. It's hard work to boot.
Plus now you have to deal with increasing taxes, Obamacare and on top of that you get to be on the top of the list of IRS targets.
http://rt.com/usa/irs-taxes-small-business-898/
Good luck. Maybe they'll let us bunk together at the re-education camps.
Step 1: Kim Dotcom starts Mega Crypto, which is promptly adopted by the world's political dissidents and leakers.
Step 2: All pending government litigation against Mega suspiciously disappears and his assets are unfrozen.
The guy's accustomed to his ill-gotten gains -- even setting aside the rampant piracy of Megaupload, he's a convicted fraudster and embezzler, and has bribed public officials for protection before.
I suspect that if offered the choice between losing his $20 million house, his 12 cars, his yacht, and becoming a partner of the US government, it wouldn't take him much to crack.
Don't blame me, I voted for Baltar.
The matter of protecting your e-mail is a simple one - there are standards (S/MIME). What you need to look in a provider is:
(1) They SHOULD NEVER have copies of your private keys
(2) They should follow published standards
(3) Allow S/MIME e-mails
For example, if you want to use your Gmail account with military-grade security that neither NSA can read, just install Penango in your browser and send messages encrypted - this solution is also used by US military and corporations. Penango does not hold any of your private information and/or your keys - so they can not be forced by anybody to give out your secret.. simply because they do not have it!!!! For more info, go to http://www.penango.com/
This whole thing about privacy will be a non-issue in about 2 years.
There's currently a mass-exodus away from US-based cloud services, and (within the US) away from all cloud services.
Cloud services will have to provide privacy or go out of business. The only way to ensure privacy is client-based encryption keys and open-source software. Since it's impossible to control the distribution of open-source software, the client-side package will end up being free.
This is a good thing, IMHO. Cloud services will focus on the actual service, they won't be able to rummage around in our lives (both corporate and personal), they won't be able to "monetize" their customers as products to advertisers, and the NSA will be shut out of much illegal snooping.
People are already thinking about how to encrypt existing web-based mail services, and I'm even hearing rumors about replacing SMTP altogether with a more secure protocol.
Expect a lot of wailing and gnashing-of-teeth from the government, proposals to make this or that protocol "illegal" or to require government backdoor access, but in the end it will come down to simple economics.
There is an enormous market-driven push towards more privacy. Edward Snowden has had a measurable effect on the world, and probably deserves the Nobel peace prize he was nominated for.
If you want secure email, don't put it in the cloud. People who try to set up new cloud services to get attacked aren't helping, and can't deliver on what they want to make people believe they can.
It's not hard to set up a mail server. It's not hard to use PGP. Be at least a little harder target.
Just say no to the goddamn cloud, already.
Only the outside of the envelope. They can't see contents unless they open the envelope, which requires a warrant. They can't retroactively open your letter once it has been delivered. If you want to encrypt the contents, you can do that too, but you can't encrypt the routing information.
With encrypted email, the header is unencrypted because it's needed for routing, so the government can record every entire message that passes through a cooperating server. With encrypted email, you could copy every message that passes through a server and decide later which ones you want to try and decrypt.
If you want to add real anonymity, you can use anonymous email accounts. But that's thin security. A government really interested in who's getting and sending anonymous emails can figure it out by tracing packet routing.
For harder-to-crack anonymity, you can upload encrypted files anonymously to a server and download all the messages periodically. Whichever ones you can decrypt with your keys are addressed to you. It's very inefficient, but there's no way to figure out who got your messages without either seizing your computer or hacking it. They can still identify who sent it and what set or receivers might have gotten it by tracing packets.
It would be interesting to see what they are finding -- in a meta-metadata sort of way. How many degrees of separation between the average person and a known or suspected terrorist? Are there dense networks of association? How many degrees of separation do you have to go out before a terrorist's association look like everyone else's? One? Three?