The Register: 4 Ways the Guardian Could Have Protected Snowden
Frosty Piss writes with this excerpt from The Register: "The Guardian's editor-in-chief Alan Rusbridger fears journalists – and, by extension, everyone – will be reduced to using pen and paper to avoid prying American and British spooks online. And his reporters must fly around the world to hold face-to-face meetings with sources ('Not good for the environment, but increasingly the only way to operate') because they believe all their internet and phone chatter will be eavesdropped on by the NSA and GCHQ. 'It would be highly unadvisable for any journalist to regard any electronic means of communication as safe,' he wrote. El Reg would like to save The Guardian a few bob, and reduce the jet-setting lefty paper's carbon footprint, by suggesting some handy tips – most of them based on the NSA's own guidance."
here are the four things, pulled from the article:
1. Encryption: It's not hard
* Keep your private key secret, encrypted and in one place (eg, not a police interrogation room)
* Meet the Advanced Encryption Standard
2. Use clean machines
3. How to shift the data securely
4. Using hidden services
Not difficult at all. It's called an air gap. You buy a laptop specifically for the purpose of decrypting the messages. You set it up without connecting it to the Internet. You generate your private-public key pair on this machine and use a flash drive to manually copy the public key to a different machine so that you can provide it to whoever needs it. When you receive a message, you copy that to a flash drive, then copy it to the other machine, then extract it.
Ideally, the private key should also be stored on a (different) USB key that you carry with you, to reduce the risk of physical theft by (hopefully) ensuring that the key and the encrypted data are never in the same place except when you are decrypting that data. If you are really paranoid, you can split the key into pieces so that multiple key dongles held by separate people must be stolen or confiscated before encryption is compromised.
This is how high-security data handling works everywhere. If intercepting it could mean the end of (the|your) world, you build an air gap, and you ensure that the computers on the inside of that gap are never connected to the public Internet in any way, shape or form. And when you're done with the machine, you destroy its hard drive in accordance with DoD manual 5200.01.
Of course, this ignores TEMPEST/Van Eck phreaking; chances are, you aren't that important, but if you are, you should also take precautions to physically secure your air gap room against any EM emissions from the computer in question.
And as always, Keep Calm and Carry a Towel.
Check out my sci-fi/humor trilogy at PatriotsBooks.
2.) Use clean machines
Extremely difficult. The US has deals with phone companies, operating system creators, and hardware manufacturers, to put backdoor systems into so many devices. They monitor so many email and phone companies. How can you be fully sure you didn't buy a machine that has a secret backdoor entry that the FBI or CIA can get into easily? How can you know that your PC isn't already set up for intercepts on all of your activity? You'd need to be an expert on computer software, hardware, intercept technology, and so many other things just to detect that you were being actively monitored. And being passively monitored like how the NSA just copies everything sent anywhere.
I call BS on this one. "You'd need to be an expert on computer software, hardware, intercept technology, and so many other things just to detect that you were being actively monitored." No, you don't. It only takes ONE expert to find that Dell, HP, Microsoft, Apple, OSX, Windows, Linux, has all these supposed backdoors to blow the whistle. While we have cases where various cloud / online services have been forced to turn over information, none of what you're claiming has been reported with hardware and OS vendors.
You're missing one important thing in your paranoia. Existing networks still have to be utilized to transfer this data. If every home PC had such a backdoor, then they still would have to use the internet connection to transmit that data. And yes, there are experts that do watch for this kind of thing, and keep an eye on what their machines are connecting to and why. Unless you're also positing the conspiracy theory that every machine has some totally secret wireless communication built in that talks to some government ghost network that no one has discovered either.
Yes, the NSA is reaching way too far, but even so you've got your tin foil hat way too tight.
Better known as 318230.
Personally I think El-Reg may be experiencing some professional jealousy. The patronising tone paints the Guardian reporters as political ideologues in trouble, but the fact is that investigative journalism is hard and expensive, and the Guardian are world leaders in the art.
And did you exchange a walk on part in the war for a lead role in a cage? - Pink Floyd.
The NSA is a deeply schizophrenic organization. On one side you have people seeking to defend and secure Americans' computer systems and networks against crackers, foreign spies, and the like. They'll propose BS like key escrow, but they're actually fairly honest: they know if there is a backdoor they can use, their adversaries can use it too.
On the other hand you have people seeking to break into computer systems and networks, including those of Americans. They oughta be first against the wall when the revolution comes.
Tom Swiss | the infamous tms | my blog
You cannot wash away blood with blood
The US has **the most journalistic freedom in the world**
wrong, according the journos themselves at least; US doesn't even make it into the top 30.
Gosh, thanks. That must be why the other ships call me Meatfucker -- GCU Grey Area (Eccentric)