Are the NIST Standard Elliptic Curves Back-doored?
IamTheRealMike writes "In the wake of Bruce Schneier's statements that he no longer trusts the constants selected for elliptic curve cryptography, people have started trying to reproduce the process that led to those constants being selected ... and found it cannot be done. As background, the most basic standard elliptic curves used for digital signatures and other cryptography are called the SEC random curves (SEC is 'Standards for Efficient Cryptography'), a good example being secp256r1. The random numbers in these curve parameters were supposed to be selected via a "verifiably random" process (output of SHA1 on some seed), which is a reasonable way to obtain a nothing up my sleeve number if the input to the hash function is trustworthy, like a small counter or the digits of PI. Unfortunately it turns out the actual inputs used were opaque 256 bit numbers, chosen ad-hoc with no justifications provided. Worse, the curve parameters for SEC were generated by head of elliptic curve research at the NSA — opening the possibility that they were found via a brute force search for a publicly unknown class of weak curves. Although no attack against the selected values are currently known, it's common practice to never use unexplainable magic numbers in cryptography standards, especially when those numbers are being chosen by intelligence agencies. Now that the world received strong confirmation that the much more obscure and less widely used standard Dual_EC_DRBG was in fact an NSA undercover operation, NIST re-opened the confirmed-bad standards for public comment. Unless NIST/the NSA can explain why the random curve seed values are trustworthy, it might be time to re-evaluate all NIST based elliptic curve crypto in general."
Make sure to get an iPhone with fingerprint security.
So I can just replace the NSA's magic-numbers with my own generated from RdRand! *ducks*
Dear NSA,
Since I'm getting tired of these stories and it seems kind of unfair that you're getting all the heat recently, here is my suggestion how you could improve your PR image by doing something to our mutual benefit:
Please use your supercomputers for a few months to aggressively mine Bitcoins and Litecoins. That would make you (virtually) richer than you already are and free me and the rest of the world in future from annoying Bitcoin-mining stories.
If you like this idea, consider donating some Bitcoins to me. You know where to find me.
Thank you for your attention and best regards,
aaaaaaargh!
Well then, how do we explain the common practice of using magic numbers in cryptography standard, then?
That's easy to explain. Secret orders from secret courts and secret gag orders with secret threats that you will be "relocated" to a secret prison somewhere unless you comply (and keep your objections secret).
Wow. You butchered a butchered phrase. Truly, the student has become a more smart man- doesn't need school.
Its " fool me once, shame on - shame on you. Fool me - you can't get fooled again."
Well.. maybe. Or Maybe not. But Definitely not sort of.
it's common practice to never use unexplainable magic numbers in cryptography standards, especially when those numbers are being chosen by intelligence agencies.
Well then, how do we explain the common practice of using magic numbers in cryptography standard, then?
Explainable magic numbers.
I nominate Anonymous Coward.
We don't have a state-run media we have a media-run state.
So for the NSA to kick out the really problematic implementations, the really secure ones, those they didn't find a backdoor in yet, the NSA will just recommend them?