Ask Slashdot: Can We Still Trust FIPS?
First time accepted submitter someSnarkyBastard writes "It has already been widely reported that the NSA has subverted several major encryption standards but I have not seen any mention of how this affects the FIPS 140-2 standard. Can we still trust these cyphers? They have been cleared for use by the US Government for Top-Secret clearance documents; surely the government wouldn't backdoor itself right?...Right?"
How could anyone trust an encryption algorithm provided by an organization whose purpose is decryption and interception? That will always be the craziest part.
http://www.nsa.gov/ia/programs/suiteb_cryptography/
AES with 128-bit keys provides adequate protection for classified information up to the SECRET level. Similarly, ECDH and ECDSA using the 256-bit prime modulus elliptic curve as specified in FIPS PUB 186-3 and SHA-256 provide adequate protection for classified information up to the SECRET level. Until the conclusion of the transition period defined in CNSSP-15, DH, DSA and RSA can be used with a 2048-bit modulus to protect classified information up to the SECRET level.
AES with 256-bit keys, Elliptic Curve Public Key Cryptography using the 384-bit prime modulus elliptic curve as specified in FIPS PUB 186-3 and SHA-384 are required to protect classified information at the TOP SECRET level. Since some products approved to protect classified information up to the TOP SECRET level will only contain algorithms with these parameters, algorithm interoperability between various products can only be guaranteed by having these parameters as options.
NSA also defined another algorithm suite, Suite A, which contains both classified and unclassified algorithms. Suite A will be used in applications where Suite B may not be appropriate. Both Suite A and Suite B can be used to protect foreign releasable information, US-Only information, and Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI).
FIPS is a financial and government-facing certification. FIPS guarantees correct implementation of cryptographic protocols according to a set of standards. It does not guarantee that there are no undiscovered (or backdoored) weaknesses in your implementation. This is still useful function to entities that require this certification. Corporate liability and loss due to getting hacked because of incorrect cryptographic implementation is orders of magnitude greater than liability and loss due to getting exposed NSA backdoors. It is all about risk management, and it says FIPS is still good idea.
Now, if you want personal security this equation changes a bit - possibility of personal harm due to hypothetical NSA backdoors goes slightly up and your likelihood of getting targeted to get pwned goes drastically down. FIPS is still likely net benefit, but diminished.
Keep in mind that there is no such thing as perfect security. You have to ask, how likely that this specific implementation was backdoored by NSA and what the worst possible outcome of such occurrence?
"Up to Top Secret" does not include Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI). The ciphers under discussion, backdoored or not, are not suitable for use on SCI.
The FIPS 140-2 standard is for "protecting sensitive but unclassified information". It is not for top secret. Also the body of the FIPS 140-2 standard is algorithm agnostic. The part that mandates specific algorithms is Annex A and can be updated to add and remove algorithms without changing the standard.
In terms of how bad the situation actually is.... I refer to Bruce:
The math is good, but math has no agency. Code has agency, and the code has been subverted.
For example, they strengthened DES against differential cryptanalysis when they were the only ones who knew about the technique.
Bzzzt! Wrong! OpenSSL jumped thru the hoops and has a FIPS 140-2 version.
Learning HOW to think is more important than learning WHAT to think.
ASCII stands for "American Standard Code for Information Interchange". Since this is an American standard, then the whole encoding scheme probably contains a backdoor that allows the NSA to read all information encoded in it. We can't trust EBDIC either as IBM is a contractor for the NSA, they would insert a backdoor as well. I think for maximum online privacy we should be using Unicode which shouldn't contain an NSA backdoor because it is an international standard. The American government has no interest in following or creating international standards.
Unfortunately Slashdot does not support Unicode, so one should now safely assume that Slashdot is an NSA honeypot .