The Hail Mary Cloud and the Lessons Learned
badger.foo writes "Against ridiculous odds and even after gaining some media focus, the botnet dubbed The Hail Mary Cloud apparently succeeded in staying under the radar and kept compromising Linux machines for several years. This article sums up the known facts about the botnet and suggests some practical measures to keep your servers safe."
The solution to low-frequency brute force attempts is Denyhosts. It just blocks any host with repeated failed login attempts. I've been using it for longer than I can remember, probably longer than this "Hail Mary" botnet has been in existence. I'm not sure why this author seems to have never heard of it.
1^2=1; (-1)^2=1; 1^2=(-1)^2; 1=-1; 1=0.
This is about the low-intensity password brute-forcing via ssh that's been going on for years -- the only difference between this and any other password brute-forcing via ssh is that fail2ban and such scripts are ineffective, because the attempts are so low-frequency that it's practically impossible to distinguish them from users fumbling their passwords.
The simple solution is to disable password authentication for all users, and make them use keys -- this renders you 100% safe from this botnet. If that's infeasible, be damn sure you've disabled password authentication for root (i.e. "PermitRootLogin no" or "PermitRootLogin without-password" if you still want key-based root logins). If you do allow password logins for any or all users, enforce strong password requirements.
"I've managed to get my name on slashdot a lot"
"Use key auth instead of passwords"
"My references are my own blog posts"
There's nothing interesting to see here. Don't allow password logins to your system, because you can't trust people to use good passwords. It's 2013, there's no cake for pointing this out.