Microsoft Warns Customers Away From RC4 and SHA-1
Trailrunner7 writes "The RC4 and SHA-1 algorithms have taken a lot of hits in recent years, with new attacks popping up on a regular basis. Many security experts and cryptographers have been recommending that vendors begin phasing the two out, and Microsoft on Tuesday said it is now recommending to developers that they deprecate RC4 and stop using the SHA-1 hash algorithm. RC4 is among the older stream cipher suites in use today, and there have been a number of practical attacks against it, including plaintext-recovery attacks. The improvements in computing power have made many of these attacks more feasible for attackers, and so Microsoft is telling developers to drop RC4 from their applications. The company also said that as of January 2016 it will no longer will validate any code signing or root certificate that uses SHA-1."
Why in gods name would a company that backdoored their entire crypto stack to the NSA worry that
some crypto code is weak?
Sig Battery depleted. Reverting to safe mode.
Microsoft continues to make use of MD4 for password hashing in the Security Account Management part of the registry. The authors of MD4, RSA, had recommended for a long time switching to MD5 and now recommends using MD6, Other members of the security community also recommend using a stronger hash function, combining a salt string with the password and doing multiple rounds of the hash function. Microsoft has failed to do any of these recommendations.
MS-CHAPv2 also continues to be part of Microsoft's offering as well. Support for this is included in their OS for PPTP, iSCSI and 802.1x (and possibly others). As pointed out in the article, attacking MS-CHAPv2 is now as simple as cracking a single DES key.
It is nice the Microsoft is recognizing some of the advice of the security community and taking steps to phase out SHA-1 and RC4. But I have a hard time applauding Microsoft when this is just the tip of the iceberg of weak hashing functions and protocols in popular use in their software.
Because... the NSA pays MS for backdoors, whereas the Russians don't?
Because... the NSA tries to stay under the radar, whereas other malware often doesn't? (ex. adware, bot-nets. Thus damaging the MS "experience".)
Because... the NSA wants to know your secrets, whereas scammers want to use your secrets? (ex. Credit card payments. Further damaging the MS "experience".)
Just a few thoughts.
MD5 is broken, SHA1 has been weakened slightly but it isn't broken.
The term broken is only used when it is trivial to crack and/or forge.
No more RC4? No more SHA1? Next they'll be telling me to patch against WMF exploits.
Thank God we can still depend on ActiveX!
#DeleteChrome
I can understand RC4.
I can understand MD5.
But SHA1? right now, according to wikipedia, a full collision attack requires something like $2.77M of computing power on the cloud...
maybe a less if you have you own supercomputer, but even at $1M it sound a lot...
So why warn away from SHA1 NOW? what are we going to use? md5? md4? remember that while keccak was chosen as the SHA3, they still have to release the complete details on how it must be implemented -- number of rounds and such -- so SHA3 *NOW* is not an option.
I'll start taking microsoft seriously on this once they phase out MD4, RC4, MD5 from their existing standards and products.
"I was gratified to be able to answer promptly, and I did. I said I didn't know." -- Mark Twain
Just plain wrong.
In the field of cryptography, the term "broken" is used whenever the work factor to crack is less than that of a brute force attack. Stevens' 2^61 collision attack against SHA1 means that SHA1 is broken.
Also FatPhil on SoylentNews, id 863