Object Lessons: Evan Booth's Post-Checkpoint Airport Weapons
Jah-Wren Ryel writes "In early-2013, independent security researcher, Evan 'treefort' Booth, began working to answer one simple question: Can common items sold in airports after the security screening be used to build lethal weapons? As it turns out, even a marginally 'MacGyver-esque' attacker can breeze through terminal gift shops, restaurants, magazine stands and duty-free shops to find everything needed to wage war on an airplane."
We mentioned Evan's work several months back; now his not-just-a-thought-experiment exploration of improvised weapons has been cleaned up and organized, so you don't have to watch his (fascinating) talks to experience the wonders of the Chucks of Liberty (video) or the Fragguccino (video).
Terrorist can already own a commerce inside the terminal after the security screening, pass weapon among all the unchecked goods and hand it over to a accomplish that has passed security. In fact, i am pretty sure that how secret services of every nation are doing it.
Security check point are theatre to scare peoples into submission. It does noting to improve safety of anyone. National security is not the security of the peoples from harm, but the security of the individual in power from losing that power. In a democracy the elected member of the government are expandable. We can LITERALLY, replace them over night. They do no need extra 'security'. This is the strength of democracy; for as long as there are citizens we can find, among ourselves, a new leader to replace the previous one.
I think the singular rule that stopped hijackings of substantial significance was enacted far later than the other provisions that represent a significant step backwards for freedom.
"In 1973, the Nixon Administration ordered the discontinuance by the CIA of the use of hijacking as a covert action weapon against the Castro regime. Cuban intelligence followed suit. "
You oh so conveniently missed that bit out.
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Now, how many aircrafts have you heard being hijacked over the last decade?
That's awful logic, because you're ignoring all the other things that changed as well. Secured cockpit doors. The willingness of passengers to fight back. Etcetera.
Actually some credit should go to the x-ray scanners and walk-through metal detectors as well. With those two in place it is basically impossible to sneak a viable bomb aboard an aircraft now. Sure, you can get explosives through, but not the types that are easy to detonate. The shoe bomber and pants bomber both managed to get explosives on board but were unable to detonate them because the process was so involved other passengers noticed and stopped them.
Even without locked cockpit doors hijacking would be almost impossible now anyway, since passengers don't assume they will be safe if they co-operate any more. They assume the hijacker might be planning to crash the aircraft into a building and kill them anyway, so will keep fighting them no matter what.
const int one = 65536; (Silvermoon, Texture.cs)
SJW, n: "Someone I don't like, and by the way I'm a fuckwit" - AC
I'm not sure if you noticed, but at this point I think it's safe to say that we're ALL on the list.
Yes, we have the example of Flight 93 but I think that's an exception to the rule
No so much:
http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/29/world/asia/china-plane-hijack-foiled/
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=man-attempts-to-hijack-thy-plane-in-istanbul-reports-say-2011-01-05
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-149289/Italian-plane-hijack-foiled.html
When information is power, privacy is freedom.