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Spamhaus Calls for Fining Operators of Insecure Servers
Barence writes "Anti-spam outfit Spamhaus has called on the UK government to fine those who are running Internet infrastructure that could be exploited by criminals. Those who leave open Domain Name Server resolvers vulnerable to attack should be fined, if they have previously received a warning, said chief information officer of Spamhaus, Richard Cox. When Spamhaus was hit by a massive distributed DDoS possibly the biggest ever recorded at more than 300Gbits/sec — open DNS resolvers were used to amplify the hit, which was aimed at one of the organization's upstream partners. 'Once they know it can be used for attacks and fraud, that should be an offense,' Cox said. 'You should be subject to something like a parking ticket... where the fine is greater than the cost of fixing it."
This sounds great in theory but, in practice, it's going to be almost impossible to enforce (eg whose definition of 'vulnerable'?) and it would promptly create several new Internet plagues, eg the "Your server has a vulnerability, pay us now to stop us reporting it" spam email.
Virtually serving coffee
Honestly, I used to love Spamhaus, but as the years wore on, I got into the IT world, and I had to interact with them I've come to really loathe them. A decent service, I guess, but every single person that is involved with them comes across like a whining child, and I hate ever having to interact with them.
...as server operators can fine Spamhaus for false positives.
Funny how an organisation as Spamhouse, who is guilty of systematic depriving random and quite innocent internet users of connectivity -- and proud of it too -- , suddenly thinks that whomever interferes with their connectivity should be punished by law. Hypocrisy.
Although I think their service does have its good points, their attitude makes me want to hurl.
That seems like misplaced blame to me. Any connectionless protocol that responds with larger packets than the inbound query can be used for a reflection attack, it's one of the items that comes up from time to time on the NTP Pool server admin's mailing list. We've seen a few attempts at using some of our servers in such attacks, there was a host that went around a few months ago that was sending about 60kbit/s worth of queries to several dozen servers in the pool, mine included. There are a few best practices you can use to mitigate this issue -- noquery with ntpd, firewall rate-limits for both NTP and DNS -- but you'll never actually solve the problem at the application level.
The proper way to address reflection attacks is for network operators to set up rules that preclude forged packets from leaving their network. There's no reason the router solely responsible for 192.168.1.0/24 should be passing along outbound traffic with a source address of 172.25.1.15. A handful of progressive networks have made this change, but they're the exception, not the rule.
I want peace on earth and goodwill toward man.
We are the United States Government! We don't do that sort of thing.
That sounds like an awful lot of trouble to avoid taking ten minutes to fix the configuration, or yum update for a correct default configuration. Do you also move to some third world country to avoid the law requiring working turn signals?