USB Sticks Used In Robbery of ATMs

First time accepted submitter JeffOwl writes "BBC is reporting that thieves are infecting ATMs with malware using USB sticks. The malware creates a backdoor that can be accessed at the front panel. The thieves are damaging the ATM to access a USB port then patching it back up to avoid notice. This indicates that the crew is highly familiar with the ATMs in question. Once the ATM is infected, the thieves use a 12 digit code to bring up the alternate interface. The thieves, not wanting their crew to go rogue, have built a challenge-response access control into their software and must call another member who can generate the response for them."

Comments

That's what you get

[fisted]

That's what you get from running Windows on ATMs, lol.

Re:That's what you get

[Spy Handler]

no, this is what you get when you put a USB port on a frigging ATM. Whose bright idea was that anyways?

Re:That's what you get

[asmkm22]

The USB port is pretty well hidden and secure, which is why the article points out the fact that the thieves appear to be familiar with the machines enough to know where and how to best break that part open. Even the best of security measures won't hold up against an inside job.

Re:That's what you get

[jeffmeden]

Because that part of the atm is heavily protected, whereas the usb port is behind a plastic panel.

All of the flames about windows vs linux are a red herring. This is the real design flaw. Any design that assumes the USB interface to the software is not just as important to protect as the cash itself completely ignores why they would ever put the USB port on there in the first place (to make material changes to the ATM software).

Oh, ffs.

[ledow]

Fail #1: A port that can be accessed without triggering an alarm.
Fail #2: A USB port.
Fail #3: Software running that looks at, and allows unsigned executable code to be executed from, a USB storage device without explicit authorisation.
Fail #4: No intrusion detection whatsoever to notice that this USB device has been inserted, has had code taken from it, that that code has been made executable and executed, or that that code is running with privilege enough to dispense cash.

I stopped caring at #2, if I'm honest.

You can state for all the world that the ATM's need software updates, etc. but there's just no excuse for a commodity device to be able to run arbitrary code without at least BOTHERING to check the authenticity of the code it runs first and ALERTING someone somewhere that that's what's happening (i.e. alert the branch, alert the central bank, etc.).

There's nothing stopping you issuing your updates over the local banking network, even, if that's what you want to do. Just make sure they are signed, verified, encrypted and secured. Honestly, you can't download a fecking game or movie nowadays without requiring DRM... and this is where DRM, code-signing and all that other stuff we do is supposed to be being used the most.

General purpose computers SHOULD NOT BE USED in security-conscious situations.

If your ATM isn't a SecureBoot machine (at a minimum), with code-signing explicitly required for any and all updates, and ALL WAYS to execute external code disabled, you're just a fecking idiot.