X11/X.Org Security In Bad Shape
An anonymous reader writes "A presentation at the Chaos Communication Congress explains how X11 Server security with being 'worse than it looks.' The presenter found more than 120 bugs in a few months of security research and is not close to being done in his work. Upstream X.Org developers have begun to call most of his claims valid. The presentation by Ilja van Sprunde is available for streaming."
I'm sorry. You were complaining about a news (Yes, news) story about a talk from CCC (Which is highly popular with, and immensely relevant for, nerds), posted on Phoronix (A website that devotes itself almost entirely to information, news and reviews on hardware and software from a Linux-based perspective), about a lot (120+) of security holes (Things that matter) in the X11/X.org servers (Which are the basis for (almost) all GUI-driven applications in Linux, *BSD and some of OSX).
By my count, that makes this story "News", "For Nerds", and "Stuff that matters". Oh, and the irony in posting that Phoronix is a "Link Farm" on /. is almost entirely palpable.
Some were certainly considered but prohibited by law. Due to crypto export restrictions, it wasn't until the limits on Open Source were loosened that X was legally permitted to have any kind of meaningful security. The non-export version still had to talk to the exportable edition, after all.
Yes, X was (and is) incredibly sloppy by today's standards and yes a lot of that was due to poor decisions in the days of X10. (Yes, boundaries are a decision. MIT could have chosen any sort of access control list system they wanted, with yet another library handling it. You could have then substituted whatever you wanted, so long as the API remained the same. Pretty much futureproof, no significant extra coding, easier to maintain than what they actually did.)
The coding flaws - of which there were many - were often detectable by tools as ancient as lint.
But you must also remember, X10 and X11 were never intended as products. They were reference implementations of a protocol, not finished products intended for actual use. The different vendors were always "supposed" to provide their own.
It's a small world and it smells funny; I'd buy another if it wasn't for the money; Take back what I paid (SoM)