OpenBSD Moving Towards Signed Packages — Based On D. J. Bernstein Crypto
ConstantineM writes "It's official: 'we are moving towards signed packages,' says Theo de Raadt on the misc@ mailing list. This is shortly after a new utility, signify, was committed into the base tree. The reason a new utility had to be written in the first place is that gnupg is too big to fit on the floppy discs, which are still a supported installation medium for OpenBSD. Signatures are based on the Ed25519 public-key signature system from D. J. Bernstein and co., and his public domain code once again appears in the base tree of OpenBSD, only a few weeks after some other DJB inventions made it into the nearby OpenSSH as well."
I'm surprised that this wasn't implemented a long time ago. Even Windows has had signed code for quiet some time.
Sig: I stole this sig.
What does openBSD have to do with tattooing your Johnson?
Being limited by floppy disk support requirement sounds like a bad joke. Is that really relevant for any computer which is not hopelessly antiquated in 2014? For reference, Apple stopped shipping floppy disk drives by default in 1998.
I call bullshit: /usr/bin:
Copied right from
"-rwxr-xr-x. 1 person staff 744K Nov 11 2010 gpg"
Packed with upx --best: (note this runtime unpacks, there is no loader library etc)
"-rwxr-xr-x. 1 person staff 327K Jan 19 05:40 gpg"
I should note this is a static binary.
For large sets, this will be our guide even unto death, for the LORD will work for each type of data it is applied to...
I started using OpenBSD in 1998. It was a viable, timely competitor to Linux at the time, especially for building firewalls as such.
OpenBSD is a great example of what happens when you make life too difficult for end users and administrators in the name of Security. OpenBSD has never embraced the most recent release of anything -- if it's new, by definition it's insecure and it can't be trusted. Ergo, if you have to demonstrate the latest technology in whatever you're doing, you start with a Linux distribution.
From the article: "We wanted a tool that would fit on installation media, which meant minimizing code size and external dependencies." That's the breakage mode, in a nutshell. NO ONE in the world has been clamoring for an OpenBSD signing tool that runs on a floppy. But the designers are imagining the user requirements based on their own biases. This way lies the death of any commercial or open source software product.
Many members are up in arms over the large new utility: "Programmers these days with their fancy new computers and their gigantic 'five and a quarter' new-age magnetic spinning discs are constantly looking down on us 'old-fashioned' punch-card programmers. Why can't they write a new utility that supports six rows of 8-bit EBCDIC? Laziness. This just proves that OpenBSD don't care about small, home-built systems. Sixty four bytes is big enough for anybody."
Daniel
It's not a dupe, it's just that everyone installs from source on OpenBSD, so signing the binary never made much sense.
I'm not as familiary with RedHat or SuSe archives, but I did a little digging over at debian.org.
The debian-archive-keyring package changelog shows an initial release on 10 January 2006, or eight years ago.
Digging deeper, the devscripts changelog shows the signchanges program (now called debsign) was added in July 1999. The changelog entry implies that it was to aid an already existing signing system, so Debian has had it for about 15 years, possibly longer.
Now consider that Debian has a reputation as a late adopter.
This is probably because they want the signature checker to fit in the CD boot loader. For historical reasons, bootable CDs imitate a floppy during the initial boot process, and contain an image of a 1.44MB floppy with a FAT file system. When you boot an PC-type x86 machine from CD, that simulated floppy (the file "floppy54.fs" for OpenBSD) is read by the BIOS and a file from it is executed.
This process is so retro that the initial program loaded is executed in 16-bit X86 mode.
Also important is: which version are you looking at? The 1.4 series (still updated) is intended for smaller/embedded installs, while the 2.x series is intended for mainstream (especially desktop) usage
It's also important to ask why they are even looking at the main gpg executable and not gpgv?
gpgv is a stripped-down version of gnupg which is only able to check signatures. It is smaller than the full-blown gnupg and uses a different (and simpler) way to check that the public keys used to make the signature are trustworthy.
alias sudo="echo make it yourself #" ; # https://pipedot.org/~stderr & http://soylentnews.org/~stderr