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Security Evaluation of the Tesla Model S
An anonymous reader writes: "Nitesh Dhanjani has written a paper outlining the security mechanisms surrounding the Tesla Model S, as well as its shortcomings, titled 'Cursory Evaluation of the Tesla Model S: We Can't Protect Our Cars Like We Protect Our Workstations.' Dhanjani says users are required to set up an account secured by a six-character password when they order the car. This password is used to unlock a mobile phone app and to gain access to the user's online Tesla account. The freely available mobile app can locate and unlock the car remotely, as well as control and monitor other functions.
The password is vulnerable to several kinds of attacks similar to those used to gain access to a computer or online account. An attacker might guess the password via a Tesla website, which Dhanjani says does not restrict the number of incorrect login attempts. Dhanjani said there is also evidence that Tesla support staff can unlock cars remotely, leaving car owners vulnerable to attackers impersonating them, and raising questions about the apparent power of such employees to locate and unlock any car with or without the owner's knowledge or permission. In his paper, Dhanjani also describes the issue of Tesla's REST APIs being used by third parties without Tesla's permission, causing Tesla owners' credentials to be sent to those third parties, who could misuse the information to locate and unlock cars."
The password is vulnerable to several kinds of attacks similar to those used to gain access to a computer or online account. An attacker might guess the password via a Tesla website, which Dhanjani says does not restrict the number of incorrect login attempts. Dhanjani said there is also evidence that Tesla support staff can unlock cars remotely, leaving car owners vulnerable to attackers impersonating them, and raising questions about the apparent power of such employees to locate and unlock any car with or without the owner's knowledge or permission. In his paper, Dhanjani also describes the issue of Tesla's REST APIs being used by third parties without Tesla's permission, causing Tesla owners' credentials to be sent to those third parties, who could misuse the information to locate and unlock cars."
How to steal car:
...
1. Guess username and password.
2. Log in to "https://portal.vn.teslamotors.com".
3. Send GET to "https://portal.vn.teslamotors.com/vehicles" to get list of vehicle IDs for that owner.
4. Send GET to "https://portal.vn.teslamotors.com/vehicles/{id}/command/drive_state" to get vehicle latitude and longitude.
5. Send GET to "https://portal.vn.teslamotors/vehicles//vehicles/{id}/command/door_unlock" to unlock doors.
6. Get in car and plug laptop into onboard Ethernet, where car internals are exposed, unencrypted.
And those guys think they're going to do automatic driving. Right.
I know service can unlock your car remotely, since I have one (model S) and they did it for me.
The interesting thing is Elon made his fortune at PayPal. You think he'd know better.
David Whatley
The article is a bit misleading. The Tesla account requires a MINIMUM of 6 characters for the password. You can use a much longer one. The password also allows special character. You're not brute-forcing mine this side of the end of the universe. It's a generated password, very long and all kinds of special characters.