Chester Wisniewski of Sophos Talks About Secure Credit Card Transactions (Video)
Chester Wisniewski's nakedsecurity describes Wisniewski's specialty thus: "He provides advice and insight into the latest threats for security and IT professionals with the goal of providing clear guidance on complex topics." So he's obviously someone who might know a little about preventing future Target-style security debacles. We've also interviewed tech journalist Wayne Rash about this topic, and will probably interview another security expert or two. Many Slashdot users may find all this credit card security talk boring, but for those who handle security matters for a living, especially for retailers, it's vital information. So here's Tim Lord talking with Chet, who is a recognized security expert for Sophos, one of the big dogs in the IT security field, when Chet was in Texas for the latest iteration of Security B-Sides in Austin. (Alternate video link.)
Until transactions are performed through a bank run broker such that the retailer NEVER GETS THEIR PAWS ON ACCOUNT CREDENTIALS, it's all a waste of time. I blame the banks; Target episodes are inevitable as long as the banks fail to provide an alternative to having retailers schlep around account credentials.
Maw! Fire up the karma burner!
Because it's so simple to authenticate all parties to the broker. Now we've gone from trusting the merchant, the shopper, and the bank, to trusting the merchant, shopper, bank, and broker. That's the problem here: every solution that relies on trust instead of hardware cryptographic implementations is equally broken.
The smart cards in the EMV system are indeed the way to go, because they are issued by the bank, and your bank stores your account's secret in them. The bank's trust never leaves the bank's systems.
EMV limits fraud only to a person who physically has the card in their possession (and who knows the PIN, assuming your card requires a PIN.) As a customer, you don't have to trust that BigMart's cash register is paying the right company or not, because you're walking out the door with your paid-for stuff. BigMart's transaction security is BigMart's problem. You don't have to trust BigMart (or a hacker) to not steal your account number, because without the authentication coming from the smart chip, the bank should refuse any transactions. It doesn't even matter much if they steal your account number and your PIN, because without the chip they still can't recreate the authentication. And if a sophisticated hacker with an ion-beam manages to read the secret from the chip, it only violates your one card; not your other accounts, not someone else's account, and not the bank's master secret.
If we ever get there.
John