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Book Review: How I Discovered World War II's Greatest Spy
benrothke (2577567) writes "When it comes to documenting the history of cryptography, David Kahn is singularly one of the finest, if not the finest writers in that domain. For anyone with an interest in the topic, Kahn's works are read in detail and anticipated. His first book was written almost 50 years ago: The Codebreakers – The Story of Secret Writing; which was a comprehensive overview on the history of cryptography. Other titles of his include Seizing the Enigma: The Race to Break the German U-Boats Codes, 1939-1943. The Codebreakers was so good and so groundbreaking, that some in the US intelligence community wanted the book banned. They did not bear a grudge, as Kahn became an NSA scholar-in-residence in the mid 1990's. With such a pedigree, many were looking forward, including myself, to his latest book How I Discovered World War IIs Greatest Spy and Other Stories of Intelligence and Code. While the entire book is fascinating, it is somewhat disingenuous, in that there is no new material in it. Many of the articles are decades old, and some go back to the late 1970's. From the book description and cover, one would get the impression that this is an all new work. But it is not until ones reads the preface, that it is detailed that the book is simple an assemblage of collected articles." Keep reading for the rest of Ben's review.
How I Discovered World War IIs Greatest Spy and Other Stories of Intelligence and Code
author
David Kahn
pages
469
publisher
Auerbach Publications
rating
8/10
reviewer
Ben Rothke
ISBN
978-1466561991
summary
Very good collection of a large number of excellent articles from David Kahn
For those that are long-time fans of Kahn, there is nothing new in the book. For those that want a wide-ranging overview of intelligence, espionage and codebreaking, the book does provide that.
The book gets its title from a 2007 article in which Kahn tracked down whom he felt was the greatest spy of World War 2. That was none other than Hans-Thilo Schmidt, who sold information about the Enigma cipher machine to the French. That information made its way to Marian Rejewski of Poland, which lead to the ability of the Polish military to read many Enigma-enciphered communications.
An interesting question Kahn deals with is the old conspiracy theory that President Franklin Roosevelt and many in is administration knew about the impending attack on Pearl Harbor. He writes that the theory is flawed for numerous reasons. Kahn notes that the attack on Pearl Harbor succeeded because of Japan's total secrecy about the attack. Even the Japanese ambassador's in Washington, D.C., whose messages the US was reading were never told of the attack.
Chapter 4 from 1984 is particularly interesting which deals with how the US viewed Germany and Japan in 1941. Kahn writes that part of the reason the US did not anticipate a Japanese attack was due to racist attitudes. The book notes that many Americans viewed the Japanese as a bucktoothed and bespectacled nation.
Chapter 10 Why Germany's intelligence failed in World War II, is one of the most interesting chapters in the book. It is from Kahn's 1978 book Hitlers Spies: German Military Intelligence In World War II.
In the Allies vs. the Axis, the Allies were far from perfect. Battles at Norway, Arnhem and the Bulge were met with huge losses. But overall, the Allies enjoyed significant success in their intelligence, much of it due to their superiority in verbal intelligence because of their far better code-breaking. Kahn writes that the Germans in contrast, were glaringly inferior.
Kahn writes that there were five basic factors that led to the failure of the Germans, namely: unjustified arrogance, which caused them to lose touch with reality; aggression, which led to a neglect of intelligence; a power struggle within the officer corps, which made many generals hostile to intelligence; the authority structure of the Nazi state, which gravely impaired its intelligence, and anti-Semitism, which deprived German intelligence of many brains.
The Germans negative attitude towards intelligence went all the way back to World War I, when in 1914 the German Army was so certain of success that many units left their intelligence officers behind. Jump to 1941 and Hitler invaded Russia with no real intelligence preparation. This arrogance, which broke Germany's contact with reality, also prevented intelligence from seeking to resume that contact.
Other interesting stories in the book include how the US spied on the Vatican in WW2, the great spy capers between the US and Soviets, and more.
For those that want a broad overview of the recent history of cryptography, spying and military intelligence, How I Discovered World War IIs Greatest Spy and Other Stories of Intelligence and Code, is an enjoyable, albeit somewhat disjointed summary of the topic.
The best part of the book is its broad scope. With topics from Edward Bell and his Zimmermann Telegram memoranda, cryptology and the origins of spread spectrum, to Nothing Sacred: The Allied Solution of Vatican Codes in World War II and a historical theory of intelligence, the book provides a macro view of the subject. The down side is that this comes at the cost of the 30 chapters being from almost as many different books and articles, over the course of almost 40 years.
For those that are avid readers of David Kahn, of which there are many, this title will not be anything new. For those that have read some of Kahn's other works and are looking for more, How I Discovered World War IIs Greatest Spy will be an enjoyable read.
Reviewed by Ben Rothke.
You can purchase How I Discovered World War IIs Greatest Spy and Other Stories of Intelligence and Code from amazon.com. Slashdot welcomes readers' book reviews (sci-fi included) -- to see your own review here, read the book review guidelines, then visit the submission page.
The book gets its title from a 2007 article in which Kahn tracked down whom he felt was the greatest spy of World War 2. That was none other than Hans-Thilo Schmidt, who sold information about the Enigma cipher machine to the French. That information made its way to Marian Rejewski of Poland, which lead to the ability of the Polish military to read many Enigma-enciphered communications.
An interesting question Kahn deals with is the old conspiracy theory that President Franklin Roosevelt and many in is administration knew about the impending attack on Pearl Harbor. He writes that the theory is flawed for numerous reasons. Kahn notes that the attack on Pearl Harbor succeeded because of Japan's total secrecy about the attack. Even the Japanese ambassador's in Washington, D.C., whose messages the US was reading were never told of the attack.
Chapter 4 from 1984 is particularly interesting which deals with how the US viewed Germany and Japan in 1941. Kahn writes that part of the reason the US did not anticipate a Japanese attack was due to racist attitudes. The book notes that many Americans viewed the Japanese as a bucktoothed and bespectacled nation.
Chapter 10 Why Germany's intelligence failed in World War II, is one of the most interesting chapters in the book. It is from Kahn's 1978 book Hitlers Spies: German Military Intelligence In World War II.
In the Allies vs. the Axis, the Allies were far from perfect. Battles at Norway, Arnhem and the Bulge were met with huge losses. But overall, the Allies enjoyed significant success in their intelligence, much of it due to their superiority in verbal intelligence because of their far better code-breaking. Kahn writes that the Germans in contrast, were glaringly inferior.
Kahn writes that there were five basic factors that led to the failure of the Germans, namely: unjustified arrogance, which caused them to lose touch with reality; aggression, which led to a neglect of intelligence; a power struggle within the officer corps, which made many generals hostile to intelligence; the authority structure of the Nazi state, which gravely impaired its intelligence, and anti-Semitism, which deprived German intelligence of many brains.
The Germans negative attitude towards intelligence went all the way back to World War I, when in 1914 the German Army was so certain of success that many units left their intelligence officers behind. Jump to 1941 and Hitler invaded Russia with no real intelligence preparation. This arrogance, which broke Germany's contact with reality, also prevented intelligence from seeking to resume that contact.
Other interesting stories in the book include how the US spied on the Vatican in WW2, the great spy capers between the US and Soviets, and more.
For those that want a broad overview of the recent history of cryptography, spying and military intelligence, How I Discovered World War IIs Greatest Spy and Other Stories of Intelligence and Code, is an enjoyable, albeit somewhat disjointed summary of the topic.
The best part of the book is its broad scope. With topics from Edward Bell and his Zimmermann Telegram memoranda, cryptology and the origins of spread spectrum, to Nothing Sacred: The Allied Solution of Vatican Codes in World War II and a historical theory of intelligence, the book provides a macro view of the subject. The down side is that this comes at the cost of the 30 chapters being from almost as many different books and articles, over the course of almost 40 years.
For those that are avid readers of David Kahn, of which there are many, this title will not be anything new. For those that have read some of Kahn's other works and are looking for more, How I Discovered World War IIs Greatest Spy will be an enjoyable read.
Reviewed by Ben Rothke.
You can purchase How I Discovered World War IIs Greatest Spy and Other Stories of Intelligence and Code from amazon.com. Slashdot welcomes readers' book reviews (sci-fi included) -- to see your own review here, read the book review guidelines, then visit the submission page.
The most damaging spy of WWII might go to Klaus Fuchs who gave the A-Bomb secrets to Stalin: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/K... "Hans Bethe once said that Klaus Fuchs was the only physicist he knew who truly changed history" However this did not effect the outcome of WWII, but it arguably caused the Cold War.
By the 1970's, quite a bit of material relating to WWII was still classified. In the DVD notes to The World At War (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_World_at_War), a documentary series commissioned in 1969, Jeremy Isaacs noted this.
I **believe** that some of the crypto stuff is still classified - 69 years later.
I found a hardcover copy of "Seizing the Enigma" in a bookstore discount bin well over ten years ago. I found it to be an excellent read. The only (very minor) criticism I would have is the title. The book seemed as much (if not more) about the Allied prosecution of the German U-boat war as about the Enigma. Again, a very minor point about what seemed to be a very well researched and written book.
I still find it very interesting how Poland's role in breaking German encryption played in the overall history at that time. Poland very well understood that they were in a bad place (geographically and militarily) with regard to Germany and their military buildup and therefore, had a interest in trying to learn the details of Germany's intentions. I found Marian Rejewski to be a particularly interesting character. A Polish mathematician who was certainly smart, but not brilliant. Through determination (and some use of statistics) he was able to work with 2 other mathematicians to break a Enigma-encoded message. I find him to be a personally inspiring individual.
I cannot help but wonder what is happening in modern Poland with the actions of Russian and eastern Ukraine. Having joined NATO and the EU, I would still expect that they are more than a little interested in knowing what the intentions are of their neighbors.
they started so many wars that they didn't have enough people to replace their losses and after a while the allies' industrial might out produced the german army
battle of the bulge the US army was sending high school kids straight off the boat with no equipment and no training into battle. when they died, there were more of them. not so for german losses
Although Germany was indeed dealing with manpower shortages, the US didn't have overwhelming manpower to throw at Germany either - that describes Russia better than the US. What we did have was vastly better equipped soldiers, and an overwhelming material advantage. Our forces were highly mobile by comparison, and had vastly superior artillery support and air dominance at that point. I don't believe the US sent our soldiers into battle with "no equipment and no training." In all the interviews I've seen with vets, they seemed to indicate that they were well equipped and well trained.
I'm guessing "no equipment" may refer to the 101st airborne infantry holding Bastogne with little winter equipment and only light equipment and artillery, but that was a desperate and unexpected battle, and bad weather prevented resupply from the air, at least initially. While they were poorly equipped for that battle, they were among the most elite and well-trained of fighting forces.
The bulk of the German forces were driven back by Patton's third army (who were about as well equipped as they came) as he wheeled up from the south, and by Monty, who took control Bradley's army group in addition to his own, since he was cut off from them. I don't see how you could characterize these armies as under-equipped or poorly trained either.
Irony: Agile development has too much intertia to be abandoned now.
The only way for Germany to win was to make some low-odds gambles, the "more rational" Germans wern't willing to do this.
Maybe the winning move was not to play? I realize the world had given Germany the shaft after WWI, and yes, I realize Germany in general realized the world was so sick of war that they could get away with a lot without any real repercussions. But you say it yourself, the only way Germany was going to win the wider war was with many low-odds plays coming out in their favor. Maybe the best solution was to avoid the wider conflict in the first place.
Maybe I have watched too many WW II movies, but here's my take on why Germany "lost" WW II:
1. Germany's invasion of Russia in September was a bad move because they ran into the Russian winter. Had they invaded in the Russian spring they would have had a whole summer for action against Moscow and maybe Stalingrad.
2. Germany ended up fighting a two or maybe it can be called a three front war: Britain and western most of Europe, Russia and southern Europe (Italy/Mediterranean/North Africa). If they had just conquered Russia first, then the West may have had trouble beating them what with the resources they may have gained from Russia including oil, steel works, technical know how, manufacturing capacity, and man power.
3. At the battle of Stalingrad Hitler split his forces - one to take the city and one to go for the southern oil wells. The Germans should have gone for one or the other but not for both. Of course, Goering promised he could supply the German army there, but that didn't happen. Of course, by item 1 above, a three or four month head start might have been successful considering the winter situation.
4. The Germans were in love with technology and size. The tanks developed and used in the Battle of the Bulge were enormous and inappropriate for the forested/hilly/river containing terrain on the way to Holland. These tanks couldn't cross bridges because they were either too heavy or too wide and they used a lot of fuel. The Sherman and successor tanks weren't the technological marvels of the German tanks, (and those of the Russians) but they were reasonably reliable and repairable by their crews, large in numbers, maneuverable and more fuel efficient. Other choices by the Allies about what to manufacture in huge numbers and appropriate quality were also important.
4. And of course the incredible cryptanalysis capability of Bletcley Park that resulted in the defeat of the U Boats and kept the supply chain running to Britain and Russia from the U. S. as well as the defeat of the Germans at Kursk the the Russian advance west.
I'm sure others can add additional "mistakes" made by the Hitler-German war machine that resulted in Germany's defeat including the nature of the German army's culture of following orders, even if they came from a mad man.
In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act. George Orwell
If you're interested in the German side of world war cryptanalysis, an excellent book is War Secrets in the Ether, by Wilhelm Flicke. The author was a German cryptanalyst during the two world wars, and it was written shortly after the end of the second world war. (It is out of print, so I suggest looking in libraries.)
It has been a decade or more since I read it, so I may have misremembered details, but here are a few points of note:
Pre-war, he'd been analysing Russian radio usage. They had a complicated system where the same station would use different call signs depending who they were talking to. This made their intercepts more chaotic and harder to do traffic analysis on. He and all his colleagues were shifted to the western front with the outbreak of war. When the war with Russia started, in the initial shock their complicated system failed and they fell back on a more standard system. Once they started to get over the initial attack and reorganize, they returned to the complicated system. The German cryptanalysts who were present had no experience with this (the experienced ones having been moved) so they interpreted the chaoticness of the signals as showing the Russians were in complete disarray, when the exact opposite was true.
He thought that the course of Battle of Crete indicated that the allies had broken the German codes at that time. (Which was correct, but he missed that they'd broken most of the German codes for almost the entire war.)
They knew that the allies had very good intelligence, but thought that it was supplied by spies. As a result, he spend the second half of the war on a whack-a-mole mission to shut down spy radio transmitters.
He complained about the multitude of German intelligence agencies and their lack of cooperation due to infighting.
Quattuor res in hoc mundo sanctae sunt: libri, liberi, libertas et liberalitas.
To win, they just needed to not attack France, which was a crazy gamble that they got away with. Instead, build their military for another year using the phony war as an excuse, and then attack the Soviets. Unlikely that France would have attacked any more than they did for Poland.
As part of that attack, do not be so nasty, an encourage nationalist soviet armies. Stalin was so evil, and the purges and deliberate starvation so severe that many if not most of the soviet armies would be more than happy to join an opposition, and indeed many did join the Germans. Millions were captured early on, most could have been turned around. It was a real achievement of the German SS to treat the soviets even worse than Stalin did and so lose this opportunity.
By the time David Kahn had became an NSA fellow he had ceased being a writer about cryptography and had become an agency stenographer. Seriously - the "revised edition" of The Codebreakers published in 1996 simply has a 16 page forward that adds nothing to what he wrote in 1967. To learn anything about the vast changes to codes and cryptography over the last fifty years, you will have to go somewhere else.
Starships were meant to fly, Hands up and touch the sky - Nicky Minaj
The German kill ratio was always amazing due to their skills at training the small units to swap roles and keep the fire rate up with good weapon systems. Their tank crews where also well trained even without 'real' tanks in the 1930's. The supply line issue and complex mechanical designs also took a toll on German forces. Fuel would arrive but no ammo or parts. If parts did arrive you needed local expert workshop like conditions while been at war. If you got your tank repaired you then faced a loss of fuel or ammo supplies and no air cover or flak..
Over many battles just getting working tanks with fuel and ammo became very difficult for Germany. The US tanks where less complex, had huge production line like repair support with parts just waiting. The lack of good design in UK and US tanks ensured a poor combat experience but numbers lost vs Germany resupply ensured victory..
The US mil took home a lot of new ideas about engineering, design and training - not ready for Korea but later showed a total change in outlook and new "German' methods.
Domestic spying is now "Benign Information Gathering"
The most accomplished spy I know of was Garbo, a double-agent who successfully convinced Nazi Germany that D-Day was just a diversion, among many other things. His story is fascinating.