NYU Group Says Its Scheme Makes Cracking Individual Passwords Impossible

An anonymous reader writes "Researchers at New York University have devised a new scheme called PolyPassHash for storing password hash data so that passwords cannot be individually cracked by an attacker. Instead of a password hash being stored directly in the database, the information is used to encode a share in a Shamir Secret Store (technical details PDF). This means that a password cannot be validated without recovering a threshold of shares, thus an attacker must crack groups of passwords together. The solution is fast, easy to implement (with C and Python implementations available), requires no changes to clients, and makes a huge difference in practice. To put the security difference into perspective, three random 6 character passwords that are stored using standard salted secure hashes can be cracked by a laptop in an hour. With a PolyPassHash store, it would take every computer on the planet longer to crack these passwords than the universe is estimated to exist. With this new technique, HoneyWords, and hardware solutions all available, does an organization have any excuse if their password database is disclosed and user passwords are cracked?."

Comments

Clarification

[JMZero]

So it turns out their system, after a reboot, can't just validate a single user (I guess that was a crazy assumption on my part) - it has to have logins from a number of users before it can authenticate anyone. And if you don't want the system breakable by someone just creating a bunch of accounts (eg. normal users on a public website), these prime logins have to be more "special accounts".

Practically, if you need some special logins after every reboot in order for the system to come online, you're going to have to have multiple people assigned this job. Or one person with N passwords he logs in with. In which case, why not just give that guy a one time pad sort of thing that he primes each server with? I mean, these passwords are going to be unrecoverable and encrypted with, effectively, an unchanging key. So... uh, we have ways to do that.

Oh wait, there's an extension that gets around this, and has the property of "the server can check and eliminate most wrong passwords right after reboot". I'm sure a lot of bosses will like that - it'll reject most wrong passwords. Great.

It's a clever idea, but I think there's some real hard sell problems there.