NSA Allegedly Exploited Heartbleed

squiggleslash writes: "One question arose almost immediately upon the exposure of Heartbleed, the now-infamous OpenSSL exploit that can leak confidential information and even private keys to the Internet: Did the NSA know about it, and did they exploit if so? The answer, according to Bloomberg, is 'Yes.' 'The agency found the Heartbeat glitch shortly after its introduction, according to one of the people familiar with the matter, and it became a basic part of the agency's toolkit for stealing account passwords and other common tasks.'" The NSA has denied this report. Nobody will believe them, but it's still a good idea to take it with a grain of salt until actual evidence is provided. CloudFlare did some testing and found it extremely difficult to extract private SSL keys. In fact, they weren't able to do it, though they stop short of claiming it's impossible. Dan Kaminsky has a post explaining the circumstances that led to Heartbleed, and today's xkcd has the "for dummies" depiction of how it works. Reader Goonie argues that the whole situation was a failure of risk analysis by the OpenSSL developers.

Comments

Re:NSA put the bug there, of course they exploited

[93 Escort Wagon]

The author of this bug and the reviewer of the commit have both been very forthcoming about the mistake. There's little reason to suspect malicious intent in this particular instance.

That doesn't mean the NSA didn't know about it or exploit it, though.

You don't understand, yep!

[rjh]

One cannot simply sue a branch of the government without asking permission from the government to allow it to be sued - guess how often THAT happens?

Glad you asked: it happens all the time, ever since the Tort Claims Act of 1948 substantially waived the sovereign immunity doctrine. You can read more about it at Wikipedia.

People sue the government all the time. It's literally an everyday occurrence.

Failure of risk analysis by more than OpenSSL devs

[Goonie]

Just a minor correction - my piece does indeed suggest that the OpenSSL developers have some strange priorities. However, it lays the larger blame at the companies that used OpenSSL, when all the information necessary to suggest that this kind of thing could happen was already available, and the potential consequences for larger companies of a breach are easily enough to justify throwing a little money at the problem (which could have been used any number of ways to help prevent this).

Private key compromise is indeed possible

[pop ebp]

CloudFlare has retracted their statement that private key compromise is very hard. They started a challenge and at least 2 people successfully got private keys from their Heartbleed-enabled server with as few as 100K requests. (I am sure that with some optimization, the number could be even lower.)